New York Law Review

Tag: PINS

  • In re Gabriela A., 22 N.Y.3d 157 (2013): Limits on Converting PINS Status to Juvenile Delinquency

    In re Gabriela A., 22 N.Y.3d 157 (2013)

    A Person In Need of Supervision (PINS) cannot be subject to the same penalties as a juvenile delinquent, and conduct stemming from PINS status cannot be used to justify a juvenile delinquency adjudication and secure detention.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a PINS (Person In Need of Supervision) can be adjudicated a juvenile delinquent based on actions taken while resisting being returned to a non-secure detention facility. The Court of Appeals held that resisting such restraint, an action stemming directly from her PINS status, could not be the basis for a juvenile delinquency adjudication. Allowing such a conversion would undermine the statutory limitations on the treatment of PINS, specifically the prohibition against placing them in secure detention. The court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between actions warranting PINS status and those constituting true juvenile delinquency.

    Facts

    Gabriela A., a 15-year-old, was adjudicated a PINS and placed on probation. After several PINS violations, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed against her based on a physical abuse complaint. She absconded from a non-secure detention facility. Probation officers visited her home to execute a PINS warrant. Gabriela A. resisted the officers, leading to a juvenile delinquency petition charging her with acts that would constitute resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration if committed by an adult. The presentment agency submitted a superseding amended petition alleging resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, attempted assault, and menacing.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found Gabriela A. committed acts constituting resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, dismissing the attempted assault and menacing charges, and remanded her to secure detention. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the fact-finding order, and dismissed the petition, holding that Gabriela A.’s conduct was consistent with PINS behavior, not juvenile delinquency. The presentment agency appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether resisting restraint by probation officers attempting to return a PINS to a non-secure detention facility constitutes resisting arrest or obstructing governmental administration, thereby justifying a juvenile delinquency adjudication and secure detention.

    Holding

    No, because the restraint of a PINS pursuant to Family Court Act § 718 is not the same as a criminal arrest, and the legislature did not intend for behavior characteristic of a PINS to be the basis for secure detention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a PINS proceeding is civil in nature, not criminal. Resisting restraint under Family Court Act § 718 is not equivalent to resisting an authorized arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. “[A] PINS who resists being restrained or transported back to a placement facility is not resisting arrest within the meaning of Penal Law § 205.30.” While Gabriela A. admitted to obstructing the officers, the court emphasized that a PINS’s disobedience is inherent in their PINS status, as defined by Family Court Act § 712(a). Allowing such behavior to justify secure detention would contradict the legislative intent of Family Court Act § 720(1) and (2), which prohibit placing a PINS in secure detention. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Family Court’s contempt powers are improperly used to “bootstrap” PINS behavior into juvenile delinquency. The court deferred to the Appellate Division’s factual finding that Gabriela A.’s resistance fell within the bounds of acting “beyond the lawful control of . . . lawful authority” rather than constituting a criminal obstruction of governmental administration. The court found that the Appellate Division’s factual findings more nearly comported with the weight of the evidence.

  • In re Lavette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136 (1974): Permissibility of Placing PINS Children in State Training Schools

    In re Lavette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136 (1974)

    Placement of a Person In Need of Supervision (PINS) in a state training school is not unlawful per se, provided that the facility offers adequate supervision and treatment tailored to the child’s individual needs, and is not merely custodial care.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a child adjudicated as a Person In Need of Supervision (PINS) can be placed in a state training school. The New York Court of Appeals held that such placements are not inherently unlawful, provided that the training school offers bona fide and adequate treatment programs suited to the child’s needs. The court emphasized that the key is the quality of supervision and treatment, not simply the label of the facility. The court also acknowledged the limitations on judicial power to determine the adequacy of treatment, noting that courts should assure the presence of a bona fide treatment program rather than determine the “best possible treatment.”

    Facts

    Lavette M., a 13-year-old, was adjudicated a PINS for absenting herself from home. Initial probation and placement attempts failed. A psychologist recommended a highly structured setting, while a psychiatrist suggested a group home. The Family Court ordered her placement in a state training school after previous placements were unsuccessful. Maurice O., also 13, was adjudicated a PINS for running away from foster homes. He had a history of absconding, including an attempt to leave the state with a forged ticket. Psychiatric reports recommended a secure setting. The Family Court ordered his placement in a state training school due to his history of running away from private facilities.

    Procedural History

    In Lavette M.’s case, the Family Court ordered placement in a state training school, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. In Maurice O.’s case, the Family Court ordered placement in a state training school, but the Appellate Division reversed and remitted the matter for placement in a “suitable environment.” The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in Maurice O.’s case, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the placement of a PINS child in a state training school is unlawful per se.

    Holding

    1. No, because the critical factor is the adequacy of the supervision and treatment provided, not merely the designation of the facility as a training school. As long as the training school provides a bona fide and adequate treatment program, placement of a PINS child is permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holding in Matter of Ellery C., stating that the prohibition was against confining PINS children in a “prison atmosphere” with juvenile delinquents, not placement in a training school per se. The court emphasized the importance of “individualized treatment and not mere custodial care.” The court acknowledged the preference for community-based treatment options but recognized that training schools could be appropriate if they provide adequate treatment. The court noted the Division for Youth’s efforts to upgrade training schools and implement the PINS child’s right to necessary care and treatment, including coeducational environments, counseling, therapy, and educational programs. While acknowledging the practical limitations on judicial power to assess the effectiveness of treatment, the court stated that its role is to ensure “a bona fide treatment program.” The court held that failure to provide suitable treatment cannot be justified by lack of staff or facilities, and that initial diagnosis and periodic assessment are required. The court stated, “There must be a bona fide effort to adequately treat the child in need of supervision in the light of present knowledge.”

  • In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588 (1973): Confinement of Persons in Need of Supervision

    In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588 (1973)

    A child adjudicated as a Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) cannot be confined in a state training school alongside juvenile delinquents.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a child adjudicated a Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) can be confined in a state training school alongside juvenile delinquents. The New York Court of Appeals held that it is improper to confine a PINS child in an institution where juvenile delinquents are confined because the PINS statute was created to distinguish between children who commit criminal acts and those who merely misbehave. The court emphasized that confinement with juvenile delinquents does not constitute appropriate supervision or treatment for a PINS child and may lead to further criminal behavior.

    Facts

    Ellery C., a 16-year-old, was adjudicated a Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) based on his mother’s application. After about a year, the Family Court, acting on the Probation Department’s recommendation, sent him to the New York State Training School at Otisville. Attempts to place Ellery elsewhere had been unsuccessful. The training school housed both PINS children and juvenile delinquents.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court (Kings County) ordered Ellery C. to be sent to the New York State Training School at Otisville. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s disposition by a divided vote.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child adjudicated as a Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) can be confined in a state training school alongside juveniles convicted of committing criminal acts.

    Holding

    No, because confining a PINS child with juvenile delinquents is inconsistent with the purpose of the PINS statute, which aims to provide supervision and treatment, not punitive confinement in a prison-like environment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the PINS statute (L. 1962, ch. 686) was enacted to distinguish between juvenile delinquents (who commit criminal acts) and PINS children (who merely misbehave in ways that would not be objectionable if the actor were not a minor). The court emphasized that the Family Court Act differentiates between dispositional hearings for delinquency cases (involving supervision, treatment, or confinement) and PINS cases (involving supervision or treatment). The omission of “confinement” for PINS children was intentional. The court quoted the dissenting opinion below, stating that confinement with adjudicated juvenile delinquents in a prison environment “can hardly, in any realistic sense, serve as ‘supervision’ and ‘treatment’ for him. On the contrary, it may well result in his emerging from his incarceration well tutored in the ways of crime.” The court rejected the argument that the training school was the only available facility, stating that even if true, it would not justify confining a PINS child with juvenile delinquents. The court noted that proper facilities must be made available to provide adequate supervision and treatment for PINS children. The court also distinguished Matter of Tomasita N., 30 N.Y.2d 927, stating that the court elected not to address the propriety of placing the youngster in a training school because she had already been released prior to the decision.

  • In re Ronald B., 29 N.Y.2d 730 (1971): Single Act Insufficient for Person in Need of Supervision (PINS) Designation

    In re Ronald B., 29 N.Y.2d 730 (1971)

    A single, isolated incident of misconduct, even if it constitutes a crime if committed by an adult, is insufficient to support a determination that a minor is a “person in need of supervision” (PINS) under New York Family Court Act.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a single act of criminal trespass is sufficient to classify a 13-year-old as a “person in need of supervision” (PINS). The New York Court of Appeals held that it is not. The court emphasized that a PINS designation requires more than an isolated incident to justify state intervention. The court also clarified the permissible scope of findings on lesser included offenses when the primary charge is dismissed. This decision underscores the need for evidence of a pattern of misbehavior to support a PINS adjudication and protects against overreach based on isolated youthful indiscretions.

    Facts

    A petition was filed against Ronald B., a 13-year-old, alleging acts that, if committed by an adult, could constitute criminal trespass in the second degree and burglary in the third degree. The petition sought to have Ronald B. declared a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision based on these alleged actions. The only specific misbehavior alleged was a single instance of criminal trespass.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the charge of third-degree burglary at the close of the petitioner’s case. Despite dismissing the burglary charge, the Family Court found Ronald B. to be a “person in need of supervision” based on the evidence presented. Ronald B. appealed this determination, arguing that a single act of criminal trespass was insufficient to support the PINS designation. The appellate division affirmed the Family Court decision, and Ronald B. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a single instance of criminal trespass is sufficient to support a finding that a minor is a “person in need of supervision” under the New York Family Court Act.
    2. Whether the Family Court retains jurisdiction to find a juvenile delinquent on a lesser-included offense when the primary charged offense is dismissed.

    Holding

    1. No, because a PINS determination requires evidence of more than a single, isolated incident of misbehavior. The record must demonstrate a pattern or ongoing behavior that warrants state intervention.
    2. No, because when the Family Court dismissed the burglary charge, the court was thereafter without jurisdiction to find any lesser crime included within the dismissed burglary charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court’s order, holding that the petition and the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the finding that Ronald B. was a “person in need of supervision.” The court relied on its prior decision in Matter of David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, emphasizing that “there must be more than a single isolated incident to support the determination of ‘need of supervision’.” The court reasoned that Article 7 of the Family Court Act does not provide for intervention based on a single illegal act unless that act would constitute a misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult.

    The court further explained that while the facts alleged might have supported a charge of juvenile delinquency based on criminal trespass in the second degree (if properly alleged), the petition only presented this as a lesser included offense of the dismissed burglary charge. Once the burglary charge was dismissed, the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to find Ronald B. guilty of any lesser crime included within it.

    The court acknowledged that the Family Court could find a respondent had committed a lesser included crime and determine them to be a juvenile delinquent based on that crime, but it emphasized that in this instance, the procedural posture (dismissal of the primary charge) precluded that finding. This case is significant because it clarifies the limits of PINS designations and emphasizes the need for evidence of ongoing misbehavior rather than single incidents. It also reinforces the principle that jurisdiction over lesser-included offenses is contingent on the viability of the primary charge.