Matter of Khan v. New York State Dept. of Health, 96 N.Y.2d 879 (2001)

When a statute requires a ‘lay member’ on a disciplinary panel, a physician’s assistant does not qualify as a lay member because their expertise and licensing in the medical field align them more closely with medical professionals than with the public the ‘lay member’ is intended to represent.

Summary

This case addresses the interpretation of ‘lay member’ in the context of Public Health Law § 230 (6), which governs the composition of medical disciplinary panels. The central issue is whether a physician’s assistant can be considered a ‘lay member’ on such a panel. The Court of Appeals held that a physician’s assistant cannot fulfill this role because their medical training and professional function align them with medical professionals rather than the public consumer the lay member is intended to represent. The dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation undermines the legislative intent to balance medical expertise with public accountability.

Facts

The case arose from a disciplinary proceeding against a physician. The disciplinary panel included two physicians and a physician’s assistant. The petitioner, Khan, challenged the composition of the panel, arguing that a physician’s assistant does not qualify as a ‘lay member’ as required by Public Health Law § 230 (6). The statute mandates that disciplinary panels include a lay member to represent the perspective of the medical consumer.

Procedural History

The Appellate Division initially ruled in favor of Khan, finding that the inclusion of a physician’s assistant as a lay member violated the statute’s intent. The New York State Department of Health appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the physician’s assistant could serve as a lay member.

Issue(s)

Whether a physician’s assistant can be considered a ‘lay member’ for the purposes of Public Health Law § 230 (6), which governs the composition of medical disciplinary panels.

Holding

No, because a physician’s assistant, due to their medical training and professional role, cannot adequately represent the perspective of a medical consumer as intended by the statute’s requirement for a ‘lay member’.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the term ‘lay member’ should be interpreted in light of the statute’s purpose, which is to balance medical expertise with public accountability. While the statute does not define ‘lay member,’ the court considered the legislative history and the ordinary meaning of the term. The dissenting opinion emphasized that the legislative history indicates the lay member was intended to represent “consumer[s]”. The dissent argued that physician’s assistants are medical providers, not medical consumers, and therefore cannot fulfill the role of a lay member. The dissent also argued that under the majority’s interpretation, medical residents would qualify as laypeople, which would be an absurd result. The dissent stated, “Medical providers are the opposite of medical consumers. Because physician’s assistants provide, rather than receive, medical services, the presence of a physician’s assistant as the “lay” panel member frustrates rather than furthers the legislative goal.” The dissent further clarified its position on the definition of “lay”, stating, “the relevant question is not whether physician’s assistants are physicians, but whether physician’s assistants are “expert in some field” or “expert on a particular subject.” The dissent concludes that because physician’s assistants are indeed experts in the medical field, they cannot be considered “lay” members.