New York Law Review

Tag: physical contact

  • People v. Brown, 95 N.Y.2d 771 (2000): Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and ‘Physical Contact’ in Harassment

    People v. Brown, 95 N.Y.2d 771 (2000)

    A crime is only a lesser included offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense; menacing in the second degree does not require physical contact, whereas harassment in the second degree does, thus harassment is not a lesser included offense of menacing.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether harassment in the second degree is a lesser included offense of menacing in the second degree. The Court held that it is not. The defendant was charged with menacing after swinging a baseball bat at a mental health caseworker. The defense requested a charge on harassment as a lesser included offense, which was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that menacing does not require physical contact (actual, attempted, or threatened), while harassment does. Thus, it is possible to commit menacing without committing harassment.

    Facts

    On June 13, 1997, a mental health caseworker visited the defendant’s home in the course of his duties. The defendant opened the door holding an aluminum baseball bat. He cursed and swung the bat, missing the caseworker, who ducked. The caseworker wrestled the bat away from the defendant. The supervisor was notified and then called the police. The defendant was arrested and charged with menacing in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried on an information in District Court. During the pre-charge conference, defense counsel requested a jury charge on harassment in the second degree as a lesser included offense. The District Court denied the request. The defendant was found guilty of menacing in the second degree. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether harassment in the second degree is a lesser included offense of menacing in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because it is possible to commit menacing without committing harassment, as menacing does not require physical contact while harassment does.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the definition of a lesser included offense under CPL 1.20(37), which states that a crime constitutes a lesser included offense when “it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree.” The Court then examined the elements of menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14(1)) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26(1)). Menacing requires intentionally placing another person in reasonable fear of physical injury by displaying a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Harassment requires intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person by striking, shoving, kicking, or otherwise subjecting such other person to physical contact, or attempting or threatening to do the same.

    The Court emphasized that the “crux” of harassment is the element of physical contact, actual, attempted, or threatened. The Court noted that while the contact need not rise to the level of assault, it must involve some form of offensive touching. Distinctly, menacing does not require any form of physical contact; it only requires an intent to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury by displaying a weapon. Thus, it is possible to commit menacing without committing harassment. The court referenced the principle of statutory construction requiring courts “to limit general language of a statute by specific phrases which have preceded it.”

    The dissenting judge argued that menacing necessarily involves a threat of physical contact because displaying a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument with the intent to frighten someone inherently threatens physical contact. The dissent reasoned that a dangerous instrument is defined as an object “readily capable of causing” physical injury, implying the threat of physical contact.

  • Killakey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 N.Y.2d 405 (1988): Defining ‘Physical Contact’ in Hit-and-Run Insurance Claims

    Killakey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 N.Y.2d 405 (1988)

    In hit-and-run insurance claims, ‘physical contact’ occurs when the accident originates from a collision with an unidentified vehicle or an integral part of that vehicle.

    Summary

    Eric Killakey sought arbitration from Allstate Insurance Company for his wife’s death, which occurred when a detached tire and rim from an unidentified vehicle struck their car. Allstate denied the claim, arguing that there was no ‘physical contact’ as required by the policy and Insurance Law § 5217. The lower courts sided with Allstate, citing prior case law. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that physical contact includes collisions with integral parts of an unidentified vehicle. The court emphasized that the focus should be on proving the accident originated from a collision with an unidentified vehicle, not on artificial distinctions based on detached parts.

    Facts

    Eric Killakey’s wife died in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by him. The accident occurred when a tire and rim detached from an unidentified vehicle traveling in the opposite direction on the Long Island Expressway, crossed the median, and struck the windshield of Killakey’s vehicle, causing it to crash. The deceased had an insurance policy with Allstate containing an uninsured motorist endorsement covering bodily injury caused by a hit-and-run vehicle. Five independent witnesses corroborated that an unidentified vehicle lost a wheel, and the detached tire and rim caused the accident. The witnesses also observed the unidentified vehicle stopping to mount a spare tire before leaving the scene without the driver identifying himself.

    Procedural History

    Killakey demanded arbitration of his claim against Allstate. Allstate sought a stay of arbitration, arguing the lack of ‘physical contact.’ The lower courts granted Allstate’s petition, staying arbitration, based on interpretations of a prior Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to clarify the ‘physical contact’ requirement.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether ‘physical contact,’ as required by Insurance Law § 5217 and the insurance policy’s uninsured motorist endorsement, occurs when a detached part of an unidentified vehicle strikes the insured’s vehicle, causing an accident.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because ‘physical contact’ occurs within the meaning of the statute when the accident originates in collision with an unidentified vehicle, or an integral part of an unidentified vehicle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holding in Matter of Smith (Great Am. Ins. Co.), stating that physical contact requires a collision with the unidentified vehicle or an integral part of it. The court reasoned that the purpose of the ‘physical contact’ requirement is to prevent fraudulent claims by ensuring that there was indeed an unidentified vehicle involved in the accident. Focusing on whether the detached part originated from the unidentified vehicle, rather than making artificial distinctions about the nature of the contact, better serves this purpose. The court emphasized that the claimant bears a substantial burden of proving that the detached part caused the accident in an unbroken chain of events, thereby establishing that the claim originated in a collision. In this case, the court found that the evidence presented was sufficient to meet that burden, as witnesses confirmed the tire and rim came from an unidentified vehicle and caused the accident. The court distinguished the facts from Matter of Smith, noting that snow and ice are not integral parts of a vehicle. The court quoted its previous holding in Matter of Smith stating that ‘physical contact as contemplated by the statute may involve * * * the continued transmission of force indirectly and simultaneously through an intermediate agency, but the initial impact must * * * be that of a collision between the unidentified vehicle with the claimant, the vehicle occupied by him, an obstruction or other object causing the bodily injury.’

  • Matter of Smith (MVAIC), 26 N.Y.2d 337 (1970): Defining Physical Contact in Hit-and-Run Insurance Claims

    Matter of Smith (MVAIC), 26 N.Y.2d 337 (1970)

    In hit-and-run cases involving the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC), the ‘physical contact’ requirement for arbitration is satisfied even if the hit-and-run vehicle’s contact is indirect, through an intermediary vehicle, provided the accident arose from the hit-and-run vehicle’s actions.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the ‘physical contact’ requirement in hit-and-run insurance claims under New York’s MVAIC law. Smith’s car was struck by a vehicle that had been pushed across the median by a hit-and-run driver. The court addressed whether this indirect contact satisfied the statutory requirement of ‘physical contact’ between the hit-and-run vehicle and the claimant’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that indirect contact, via an intermediary vehicle, fulfills the physical contact requirement, reasoning that the purpose of the law is to protect innocent victims of hit-and-run accidents, and a rigid interpretation would defeat this purpose.

    Facts

    On September 6, 1962, Smith was driving on the Long Island Expressway when his car was hit by another vehicle. This other vehicle had been propelled across the center divider by a hit-and-run vehicle that fled the scene. Smith sought to compel arbitration with MVAIC, claiming damages from the unidentified hit-and-run driver.

    Procedural History

    Smith sought arbitration with MVAIC. MVAIC applied for a stay of arbitration, arguing that the ‘physical contact’ requirement of the Insurance Law was not met. The Supreme Court denied MVAIC’s application. The Appellate Division reversed, granting MVAIC’s stay of arbitration. Smith appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ‘physical contact’ requirement of Section 617 of the Insurance Law, as a condition precedent to arbitration in hit-and-run cases, is satisfied when the hit-and-run vehicle’s physical contact with the claimant’s vehicle is indirect, occurring through an intermediary vehicle.

    Holding

    Yes, because the purpose of the MVAIC law is to protect innocent victims of hit-and-run accidents, and requiring direct physical contact in all cases would lead to unjust and absurd results contrary to the legislative intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of interpreting statutes in light of their intended purpose. It noted that the legislative intent behind the MVAIC law was to provide recourse for victims of hit-and-run accidents. While the statute requires ‘physical contact’ to prevent fraudulent claims, the court reasoned that requiring direct physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the claimant’s vehicle would be an overly rigid interpretation. The court stated that “Adherence to the letter will not be suffered to * defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted.” The court provided hypothetical situations where a strict interpretation of ‘physical contact’ would lead to unjust outcomes. The court found that the actual contact situation is juridically indistinguishable from the situation in the present case. The court determined that the vehicle which made actual contact with the appellant’s automobile in this case was a mere involuntary intermediary and, in the circumstances, it could not logically serve to insulate the respondent from arbitration. The court also pointed out that other provisions of the Insurance Law, such as the 24-hour police notification requirement in hit-and-run cases, are designed to facilitate investigation and prevent fraud. The court concluded that the Legislature did not intend to impose the further burden of requiring the claimant to establish direct physical contact without the intervention of another automobile, where the claimant has established an accident with a hit and run vehicle involving physical contact.