New York Law Review

Tag: photographic identification

  • People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 201 (2010): Admissibility of Photographic Identification After Defendant Obstructs Lineup

    People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 201 (2010)

    A defendant forfeits the right to exclude photographic identification evidence when the defendant’s own misconduct, such as refusing to participate in a lineup, makes a corporeal identification impossible.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of a photographic identification when a defendant obstructs a police lineup. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant forfeits the right to exclude photographic identification evidence if their own misconduct thwarts a corporeal lineup. In this case, the defendant refused to cooperate with a lineup, leading the police to show the victim a photographic array, from which the victim identified the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant should not benefit from their own wrongdoing, and the photographic identification was admissible to ensure a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was suspected of involvement in an armed robbery where the victim was shot. Based on information received, police created a photographic array including the defendant’s picture. The victim identified the defendant from the array. When the defendant was arrested and a lineup was scheduled, the defendant refused to participate, kicking, spitting, and cursing. As a result, a traditional lineup was impossible. The detective took a photograph of the defendant and photos of the proposed fillers and showed the victim the array of photos; the victim identified the defendant’s picture.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court held a Wade hearing and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s lineup identification made months later, as well as the victim’s prospective in-court identification. The court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the photographic identification. At trial, the trial court ruled the photographic identification admissible. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who obstructs a corporeal lineup, forfeits the right to exclude evidence of a photographic identification made necessary by that obstruction?

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant should not be able to benefit from their own misconduct by preventing a corporeal lineup and then objecting to the introduction of a photographic identification that resulted from their actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while New York law generally excludes pretrial photographic identifications due to concerns about distortion and potential prejudice (jury inferring prior arrests), this rule does not apply when a defendant’s misconduct prevents a corporeal lineup. Citing the principle that “the law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong,” the court held that the defendant forfeited the right to rely on the exclusionary rule. The court emphasized that the detective’s testimony clarified that the photograph shown to the victim was taken on the day of the aborted lineup, mitigating any potential prejudice. The trial court also reasonably concluded that a later lineup identification might be viewed as less reliable than an identification closer to the crime. This ruling balances the need to protect defendants from unfair identification procedures with the need to ensure that they do not benefit from obstructing justice. As the Court stated in People v. Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366 (1995), “the maxim that the law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong…creat[es] a forfeiture dictated by sound public policy”.

  • People v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419 (1984): Admissibility of Identification Testimony Before Grand Jury

    People v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419 (1984)

    An indictment is not dismissable solely because a complaining witness identified the defendant before the Grand Jury without disclosing that the initial identification was based on photographs.

    Summary

    Defendants Brewster and Alfonso were indicted for robbery, burglary, and firearm offenses. A complaining witness testified before the Grand Jury that she identified the defendant without mentioning that the identification was made from photographs. The defense moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Grand Jury proceeding was defective. The Court of Appeals held that the indictment was valid because the identification testimony presented to the Grand Jury, absent any information about the photographic identification, established a prima facie case. The court emphasized that the Grand Jury proceeding is not an adversary proceeding and the identification testimony was not hearsay because the Grand Jury was not informed of the photographic identification.

    Facts

    Two defendants, Brewster and Alfonso, were indicted along with others for robbery, burglary, and related firearm charges. Before the Grand Jury, a complaining witness testified that she identified Brewster, and another witness testified she identified Alfonso. Neither witness revealed that their identifications were made from photographs. The People served notice of intent to present testimony at trial from witnesses who had previously identified the defendants from photographs. During a Wade hearing, it was revealed that the Grand Jury testimony was based on photographic identifications, and each witness made a corporeal identification of the defendant during the hearing.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment based on insufficient evidence and defects in the Grand Jury proceedings, and a Wade hearing was ordered. During the Wade hearing, the defendants filed a supplementary motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.35 (subd 5). The hearing judge granted the motion, finding the indictment based on incompetent evidence but allowed in-court identification based on an independent source. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, deeming CPL 60.30 inapplicable to Grand Jury proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, albeit with different reasoning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment should be dismissed under CPL 210.35 (subd 5) when a complaining witness testifies before the Grand Jury that she identified the defendant, without disclosing that the identification was initially made from photographs.

    Holding

    No, because the identification testimony before the Grand Jury established a prima facie case that, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a Grand Jury proceeding is not an adversary proceeding, except for the limited rights granted to a defendant to testify and request witnesses. The purpose of an indictment is to bring a defendant to trial upon a prima facie case that, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction. The identification testimony before the Grand Jury served that purpose. The court emphasized that the identification testimony was not hearsay because the Grand Jury was not presented with information about how or when the identification was made. The Grand Jury was only informed that the witness identified a defendant as her assailant, which constituted a present statement of the fact that she recalled the defendant as the person who assaulted her. The court noted that withholding the information about the photographic identification avoided unfairness to the defendant by preventing the Grand Jury from inferring a prior arrest record. The court stated, “The identification testimony before the Grand Jury satisfied that purpose.” (quoting People v. Oakley, 28 NY2d 309, 312). The court found no infringement of CPL 60.30, which concerns the admissibility of prior identification evidence at trial, because the Grand Jury was not presented with any evidence concerning the photographic identification. The court distinguished the case from situations where a witness identifies a photograph of the perpetrator and a custodian testifies to the name of the person in the photograph, which is permissible.

  • People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18 (1966): Limits on Bolstering Witness Identification Testimony

    People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18 (1966)

    Testimony regarding a witness’s prior identification of a defendant from photographs is generally inadmissible to bolster in-court identification, especially when the witness’s opportunity for observation was limited, and such testimony is not admissible merely because the witness’s credibility was challenged on cross-examination.

    Summary

    Caserta was convicted of manslaughter based largely on the eyewitness identification of a single patrol officer. The prosecution introduced testimony from the officer and another detective regarding the officer’s prior identification of Caserta from photographs. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that this testimony improperly bolstered the officer’s identification, as the opportunity for observation was limited and there was no basis to admit this testimony. The Court emphasized that merely challenging a witness’s credibility on cross-examination does not open the door to bolstering identification testimony with prior photographic identifications.

    Facts

    Daniel Iglesia was killed in a bizarre incident involving gunshots and being run over by a car. Buth Bailey, a witness, provided a detailed account but could not identify the defendant. The victim’s widow testified about her black Oldsmobile, which was identified as the car at the scene. A revolver, determined to be the murder weapon, was found outside the defendant’s apartment door. The prosecution’s primary evidence linking Caserta to the crime was the testimony of Patrolman Maimone, who claimed to have seen the defendant driving a similar car near the scene shortly before the incident. Maimone’s opportunity for observation was limited to a brief moment at night, and he had no reason to focus on the driver at the time.

    Procedural History

    Caserta was convicted. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting testimony about the patrol officer’s prior identification of him from photographs. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Caserta then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a police officer and a detective regarding the officer’s prior identification of the defendant from photographs, thereby bolstering the officer’s in-court identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the testimony improperly bolstered the witness’s identification and because merely challenging a witness’s credibility on cross-examination does not create an exception to the rule against introducing prior photographic identifications.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the long-standing rule against admitting testimony of prior identifications, especially from photographs, due to the risk of prejudice and the potential to unduly influence the jury. The Court acknowledged that Section 393-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure created a limited exception allowing a witness to testify about their own prior in-person identification of the defendant. However, this exception does not extend to photographic identifications. The Court noted that, “One of the most stubborn problems in the administration of the criminal law is to establish identity by the testimony of witnesses to whom an accused was previously unknown, from quick observation under stress…”

    The Court distinguished this case from *People v. Singer*, where prior consistent statements were admitted to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, because in *Singer*, the witness had a motive to falsify only after making the prior consistent statement. Here, no such specific motive to falsify arose after the photographic identification. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that cross-examination of the patrol officer opened the door to this testimony. The court stated, “If, whenever a lawyer for a defendant argues that the police want to solve a crime, and that, therefore, their credibility may be suspect, it would open the door to the People to show prior identification from photographs in the rogues’ gallery or to prove prior identification by other witnesses, contrary to the established law, there would be little left of these salutary rules.”

    The Court found that the error was not harmless, as the identification was a critical issue in the case, and the bolstering testimony could have significantly influenced the jury’s verdict.