New York Law Review

Tag: Personal Knowledge

  • Gallo v. Bartelemucci, 64 N.Y.2d 898 (1985): Establishing Falsity in Defamation Claims

    Gallo v. Bartelemucci, 64 N.Y.2d 898 (1985)

    In defamation cases involving matters of public concern, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence demonstrating the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defamation action brought by a minor plaintiff against a newspaper and an individual defendant (Bartelemucci) for publishing letters that allegedly falsely accused him of criminal conduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to meet their burden of establishing that the defamatory statements were false. The court emphasized that when faced with a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits attesting to the accuracy of the statements, the plaintiff must offer evidentiary proof, typically through someone with direct knowledge, to demonstrate falsity. Reliance on a verified complaint by someone without personal knowledge (the plaintiff’s mother in this case) is insufficient to raise a question of fact.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs commenced a defamation action based on letters written by defendant Bartelemucci and printed in a newspaper published by Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. The letters described the 17-year-old infant plaintiff’s conduct and criticized the police and courts’ handling of charges against him. The newspaper defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from employees alleging the accuracy of the published statements. The plaintiffs opposed the motion with a verified complaint by the infant plaintiff’s mother but offered no affidavit from the infant or anyone else with direct knowledge of the underlying events.

    Procedural History

    The Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and also for summary judgment. The Appellate Division granted defendant Bartelemucci’s motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action but denied it as to the remaining causes of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the newspaper’s motion for summary judgment and upholding the dismissal of the negligence claim against Bartelemucci.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a defamation action, a plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying solely on a verified complaint from someone without personal knowledge of the underlying facts, when the defendant presents affidavits asserting the truth of the statements.
    2. Whether an individual defendant who is treated as the newspaper is liable for ordinary negligence, or only for grossly irresponsible conduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because when a defendant moving for summary judgment in a defamation case submits affidavits claiming the accuracy of the statements, the plaintiff must offer evidence from someone with personal knowledge to demonstrate falsity.
    2. No, because the plaintiff conceded that under the circumstances, the individual defendant is charged with the same duty of care as the newspaper, which is to avoid grossly irresponsible conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once the newspaper presented affidavits alleging the accuracy of the published statements, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate falsity. The Court cited Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 AD2d 294, 297, and Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 116, at 839 et seq., emphasizing the plaintiff’s responsibility to establish falsity. The court found the mother’s verified complaint insufficient because she lacked personal knowledge of the facts. The court emphasized that while a verified pleading can serve as an affidavit under CPLR 105(t), it’s inadequate when the affiant lacks direct knowledge of the events in question. As stated in the decision, “[T]he infant’s mother did not have personal knowledge of the incident and her verified complaint was not sufficient to raise a question of fact on the issue of falsity.” Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to the newspaper.

    Regarding Bartelemucci, the court noted the plaintiff’s concession that she should be held to the same standard as the newspaper which is liability only for grossly irresponsible conduct, citing Gaeta v New York News, 62 NY2d 340 and Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 NY2d 196. Therefore, the negligence cause of action against her was correctly dismissed.

  • GTF Marketing, Inc. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 965 (1985): Sufficiency of Evidence in Summary Judgment Opposition

    GTF Marketing, Inc. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 965 (1985)

    When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must demonstrate a triable issue of fact with admissible evidence, and an attorney’s affidavit lacking personal knowledge is insufficient to defeat the motion.

    Summary

    GTF Marketing sued Colonial Aluminum Sales for breach of contract, alleging Colonial failed to pay for “leads” (names of potential customers). Colonial moved for summary judgment, arguing GTF hadn’t provided usable leads and further asserting collateral estoppel based on prior similar lawsuits. Colonial supported its motion with an affidavit from its president. GTF opposed with only an attorney’s affidavit. The Court of Appeals held that while collateral estoppel didn’t apply, GTF’s opposition was insufficient because it lacked admissible evidence from someone with personal knowledge of the facts, thus failing to demonstrate a triable issue.

    Facts

    GTF Marketing and Colonial Aluminum Sales entered into a contract where GTF would provide Colonial with names, addresses, and phone numbers of homeowners interested in aluminum siding for $10 per “lead.”
    GTF claimed it supplied 12,463 leads but Colonial refused to pay $124,630.
    Colonial moved for summary judgment, arguing GTF provided no usable leads and raised collateral estoppel.
    Colonial’s president, Michael Longo, submitted an affidavit claiming the purported leads were useless, consisting of people who hadn’t sent in data cards, were promised free gifts, hung up, or lacked phone numbers.
    GTF opposed with an affidavit from its attorney, asserting that a question of fact existed as to performance under the agreement.

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied Colonial’s motion for summary judgment.
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding GTF was barred by third-party issue preclusion and that GTF’s papers were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
    GTF appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel (third-party issue preclusion) applies to bar GTF’s claim against Colonial.
    Whether GTF’s affidavit submitted in opposition to Colonial’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.

    Holding

    No, because it wasn’t clear that the trial court in the prior actions specifically and necessarily decided the issue of whether GTF fraudulently failed to send out data processing cards.
    No, because the affidavit was from GTF’s attorney and lacked personal knowledge of the facts, which is insufficient to demonstrate a triable issue in response to a properly supported summary judgment motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding collateral estoppel, the court noted that while the contracts in the prior actions were similar, it wasn’t clear the prior court necessarily decided the precise issue of whether GTF fraudulently failed to send out data processing cards. The court stated, “It is not clear from the decision, however, whether the trial court specifically and necessarily decided that issue, and third-party issue preclusion therefore does not lie”. The court also noted the prior decision was delivered orally, making it difficult to ascertain the dispositive issues.
    Regarding the sufficiency of the opposing affidavit, the court emphasized that a party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate a factual issue requiring trial with admissible evidence. “[O]nce the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts; ‘the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a trial of the action or tender an acceptable excuse for his failure so to do, and the submission of a hearsay affirmation by counsel alone does not satisfy this requirement’”. Since GTF’s attorney lacked personal knowledge, the affidavit had no evidentiary value. “[A]n affidavit or affirmation of an attorney without personal knowledge of the facts cannot ‘supply the evidentiary showing necessary to successfully resist the motion’”. Because Colonial presented evidence that GTF failed to provide usable leads, and GTF failed to counter with admissible evidence, summary judgment was appropriate. The uncontroverted fact was that GTF did not perform or provide Colonial with any “leads” under the agreement.

  • People v. Walker, 198 N.Y. 329 (1910): Admissibility of Evidence Based on Witness’s Personal Knowledge

    People v. Walker, 198 N.Y. 329 (1910)

    A witness may testify to facts within their personal knowledge, even if those facts might be considered conclusions deducible from other specific facts, provided the opposing party has the opportunity to cross-examine and clarify the basis of the witness’s knowledge.

    Summary

    Walker was convicted of uttering a forged check. The key issue was whether Menton, who endorsed the check on behalf of the payee (Ross Lumber Company), had authority to do so. At trial, C. Edward Ross, one of the partners of Ross Lumber Company, testified that Menton was not authorized to sign the check. Walker appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed Ross to testify about the lack of authorization. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Ross’s testimony was admissible because it related to a fact within his personal knowledge as a partner, and Walker’s counsel failed to properly object on grounds of hearsay or calling for a conclusion. The court also noted the defense’s focus on the judge’s questioning, rather than the substance of the testimony.

    Facts

    A check payable to Ross Lumber Company, a partnership, came into the possession of Menton, an officer of D.J. Menton Company. Menton endorsed the check with “Ross Lumber Company” and gave it to Walker, the secretary/treasurer of D.J. Menton Company. Walker deposited the check, collected the funds, and disbursed them, allegedly to pay D.J. Menton Company’s debts. The prosecution claimed Menton’s endorsement was a forgery, and Walker knew it.

    Procedural History

    Walker was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing C. Edward Ross to testify that Menton was not authorized to endorse the check on behalf of Ross Lumber Company, when the objection was based on the judge asking the question, not the nature of the testimony itself.

    Holding

    No, because the objection was not properly made on the grounds of hearsay or that it called for a conclusion. Furthermore, the witness was competent to testify, and the defendant was not prejudiced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a witness must generally testify from personal knowledge and not offer conclusions. However, whether a question calls for inadmissible hearsay or a conclusion often depends on the specific context and the witness’s relationship to the facts. Here, Ross’s knowledge of whether Menton had authority from Ross Lumber Company depended on whether anyone other than Ross could authorize such an endorsement.

    The Court quoted Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N.Y. 465, 471, noting that a question does not necessarily call for an opinion merely because the answer may be a conclusion deducible from other facts. The opposing party has the right to cross-examine the witness to clarify the basis of their knowledge. Similarly, the court cited Nicolay v. Unger, 80 N.Y. 54, stating, “It is not difficult to see that it is entirely competent to prove under some circumstances as a fact what under others might be regarded as a mere conclusion of law and would be clearly inadmissible.”

    The court highlighted that Walker’s counsel did not object to the question on the grounds that it called for hearsay or a conclusion. Instead, the objection focused solely on the fact that the *judge* asked the question. Because the objection was not properly made, and because Walker’s defense hinged on C. Edward Ross’s (lack of) authorization, the defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony. The court stated, “Defendant, therefore, could not have been prejudiced by the question and answer even if he had properly objected thereto.”