De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N.Y. 485 (1890)

For the purposes of matrimonial actions, residency is synonymous with domicile, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain; a foreign divorce decree is invalid if the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant due to lack of domicile in that foreign jurisdiction.

Summary

This case addresses the requirements for establishing residency for the purpose of a divorce action and the validity of a foreign divorce decree. The New York Court of Appeals held that for matrimonial actions, residency equates to domicile, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain. The Court found that because the wife was not domiciled in Germany and was not personally served there, a German divorce decree obtained by the husband was invalid in New York. The court emphasized that a state’s jurisdiction over divorce matters depends on the domicile of at least one party within its borders. The decision clarifies the jurisdictional requirements for divorce and the recognition of foreign decrees.

Facts

The parties married in Dresden, Saxony, in 1870. In 1881, the wife left the husband in Dresden and moved to New York. In 1882, she commenced an action for separation in New York, serving the husband personally in Dresden. The husband asserted that he was not a resident of New York and that the court lacked jurisdiction. Both parties had been born in New York to parents who were residents, but had spent significant time in Europe after the marriage.

Procedural History

The wife filed suit for separation in New York. The husband answered, contesting jurisdiction and asserting counterclaims. The trial court found that both parties were residents of New York but denied relief to both parties on their respective claims. The husband appealed the trial court’s decision to admit certain testimony and exclude evidence of a German divorce decree. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Issue(s)

1. Whether, for the purposes of a separation action, residence is synonymous with domicile, requiring both physical presence and intent to remain.
2. Whether a foreign divorce decree is valid when the defendant in the foreign action was not domiciled in that jurisdiction and was not personally served there.

Holding

1. Yes, because in legal phraseology residence is synonymous with inhabitancy or domicile and it is in this sense that the term resident is used in the provisions of the Code before referred to.

2. No, because a court has no extra territorial jurisdiction, and a person not domiciled in the state or country cannot be charged in personam by adjudication there, unless he is personally served with notice or process within it or voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of its court by appearing in some manner in the action or proceeding sought to be instituted against him.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that for matrimonial actions under the relevant New York statutes, residency is equivalent to domicile, meaning a permanent home to which a person intends to return. To change domicile, both the fact of physical relocation and the intention to establish a new domicile must coincide. The court emphasized the importance of domicile in determining jurisdiction over matrimonial matters. The Court held that because the wife was not domiciled in Germany when the husband obtained a divorce decree there and was not personally served in Germany, the German court lacked personal jurisdiction over her, rendering the decree invalid in New York. The court stated that, “a court has no extra territorial jurisdiction, and a person not domiciled in the state or country cannot be charged in personam by adjudication there, unless he is personally served with notice or process within it or voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of its court by appearing in some manner in the action or proceeding sought to be instituted against him.” Because the lower court found that both parties were domiciled in New York at the time the German divorce was issued, the evidence of the German decree was properly excluded at trial.