New York Law Review

Tag: personal jurisdiction

  • Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375 (2007): Establishes Jurisdiction Based on Ongoing Attorney-Client Relationship

    9 N.Y.3d 375 (2007)

    A non-domiciliary transacts business within New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) when they purposefully solicit a New York attorney, establish an ongoing attorney-client relationship, and frequently communicate with the attorney in New York regarding the matter.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a California resident and corporation who hired a New York attorney to represent them in an Oregon lawsuit. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendants transacted business in New York by purposefully seeking out the attorney, establishing a continuing attorney-client relationship, and engaging in frequent communication with him in New York via phone, email, and fax. This was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) because the suit for unpaid legal fees directly arose from these New York contacts.

    Facts

    Suzanne Bell-Doucet, a California resident and president of Only New Age Music, Inc. (ONAM), contacted Gabriel Fischbarg, a New York attorney, to discuss representing ONAM in a lawsuit in Oregon. Bell-Doucet sent a letter to Fischbarg in New York confirming the contingency fee arrangement and included relevant case documents. Fischbarg and the defendants entered into a retainer agreement via telephone, with Fischbarg working on the Oregon case from his New York office. Over nine months, defendants regularly communicated with Fischbarg in New York via phone, email, and fax. A dispute arose regarding the retainer agreement, and Fischbarg resigned. After the Oregon action settled, Fischbarg sued in New York to recover unpaid legal fees.

    Procedural History

    Fischbarg sued Doucet and ONAM in New York seeking damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that jurisdiction was proper under CPLR 302(a)(1). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) when they retain a New York attorney and engage in ongoing communications with that attorney in New York related to the representation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within New York by soliciting the attorney’s services, establishing a continuing relationship, and repeatedly communicating with the attorney in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 302(a)(1) allows jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business within New York, even without physical presence, if their activities are purposeful and substantially related to the claim. “Purposeful activities are those with which a defendant, through volitional acts, ‘avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws’.” The court distinguished this case from those involving limited contacts, such as a single phone order or a consultant’s communications with a New York physician. The court emphasized the “quality” of the defendants’ contacts, noting that they “sought out plaintiff in New York and established an ongoing attorney-client relationship with him.” This “sustained and substantial transaction of business” (quoting Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn) subjected them to New York jurisdiction. The court found that the lawsuit arose directly from the defendants’ transaction of business in New York. The court distinguished Haar v. Armendaris Corp., where jurisdiction was lacking because the defendant’s contacts were with the attorney in Massachusetts, not New York. Here, the defendants directly solicited and communicated with the attorney in New York, thus projecting themselves into New York’s legal services market.

  • Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501 (2007): Jurisdiction Based on Foreign Lawsuit Contacts

    9 N.Y.3d 501 (2007)

    A person who sues a New York resident in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, and whose contacts with New York stem from that foreign lawsuit, does not necessarily transact business within New York under CPLR 302(a)(1), even if success in the foreign suit results in acts to be performed by the subject of the suit in New York.

    Summary

    Rachel Ehrenfeld, a New York author, was sued for defamation in England by Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, a Saudi Arabian businessman, based on statements in her book. Mahfouz served papers and sent communications related to the English lawsuit to Ehrenfeld in New York. Ehrenfeld then sued Mahfouz in New York, seeking a declaration that the English judgment was unenforceable. The New York Court of Appeals held that Mahfouz’s contacts with New York, stemming solely from the English lawsuit, did not constitute transacting business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1), and therefore, New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court emphasized that Mahfouz’s actions did not purposefully avail him of the benefits and protections of New York law.

    Facts

    Rachel Ehrenfeld, a New York-based author, wrote a book, “Funding Evil,” alleging that Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz supported terrorist groups. The book was published in the U.S., but some copies were sold in the UK. Mahfouz, a Saudi Arabian businessman, claimed the allegations were false and sued Ehrenfeld for defamation in England. Mahfouz’s lawyers contacted Ehrenfeld in New York, seeking an apology and retraction. When Ehrenfeld refused, Mahfouz sued her in England, serving her with court papers at her New York City apartment and communicating with her via mail and e-mail regarding the English action.

    Procedural History

    Mahfouz obtained a default judgment against Ehrenfeld in England. Ehrenfeld then filed suit against Mahfouz in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a declaratory judgment that the English judgment was unenforceable. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding whether CPLR 302(a)(1) conferred personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz. The New York Court of Appeals answered in the negative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPLR 302(a)(1) confers personal jurisdiction over a person (1) who sued a New York resident in a non-U.S. jurisdiction; and (2) whose contacts with New York stemmed from the foreign lawsuit and whose success in the foreign suit resulted in acts that must be performed by the subject of the suit in New York?

    Holding

    No, because these contacts do not constitute the transaction of business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPLR 302(a)(1), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business within the state if the cause of action arises from that transaction. The “overriding criterion” is whether the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York].” The court found that Mahfouz’s contacts with New York were solely related to the English lawsuit and did not involve invoking the benefits or protections of New York law. His communications were intended to further his assertion of rights under English law. The court distinguished cases where a defendant actively sought to consummate a transaction in New York or established an ongoing relationship governed by New York law.

    The court rejected the argument that Mahfouz’s refusal to waive enforcement of the English judgment in New York constituted purposeful availment. Citing Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 280 (1970), the court stated that the mere receipt of a benefit or profit from a contract performed by others in New York is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The alleged chilling effect on Ehrenfeld’s speech did not arise from Mahfouz’s invocation of New York law, but from the English remedy and Ehrenfeld’s own activities in New York.

    The court declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (2006), because California’s long-arm statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, while New York’s long-arm statute is more restrictive. The court emphasized that New York law requires purposeful availment of New York law, which was not present in this case. The court stated that using an effects test would be “an unwarranted extension of [section 302 (a) (1)] and a usurpation of a function more properly belonging to the Legislature.”

  • Ballard v. HSBC Bank USA, 8 N.Y.3d 661 (2007): Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Defective Notice of Petition

    8 N.Y.3d 661 (2007)

    A party waives objections to personal jurisdiction by actively participating in a proceeding without timely objecting to a defect in the commencement of the action on personal jurisdiction grounds.

    Summary

    Diane Ballard filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking review of a Human Rights Division order. Her notice of petition omitted the return date. HSBC, the respondent, filed a cross-petition asserting jurisdiction was proper, then moved to dismiss Ballard’s petition for lack of jurisdiction based on the missing return date. The Court of Appeals held that the omission of the return date was a waivable defect related to personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction, and HSBC waived its objection by participating in the proceeding without raising a timely objection.

    Facts

    Diane Ballard, after an adverse determination by the Acting Commissioner of the NYS Division of Human Rights, filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking review.

    Ballard’s notice of petition did not include a return date because no Justice had been assigned.

    Ballard sent a letter to the assigned Justice and copied the respondents, proposing a return date.

    HSBC filed a cross-petition, specifying a return date and stating that jurisdiction was proper.

    HSBC then moved to dismiss Ballard’s petition, alleging a lack of jurisdiction and a statute of limitations bar based on the missing return date.

    Procedural History

    Ballard filed a petition in Supreme Court.

    HSBC filed a cross-petition and subsequently moved to dismiss Ballard’s petition.

    Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion, found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the Appellate Division.

    HSBC moved to dismiss the petition in the Appellate Division for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and statute of limitations.

    HSBC then filed a second motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction and statute of limitations grounds.

    The Appellate Division granted HSBC’s motion, stating a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

    The Court of Appeals granted Ballard’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the failure to include a return date in a notice of petition constitutes a non-waivable jurisdictional defect under Executive Law § 298, implicating subject matter jurisdiction.

    Whether HSBC waived its right to challenge the defect by actively participating in the proceeding without raising a timely objection.

    Holding

    No, because the omission of the return date, at best, invokes a claim of improper commencement or personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction.

    Yes, because HSBC actively participated in the proceeding, asserted jurisdiction was proper in its cross-petition, and failed to timely object to the defect on personal jurisdiction grounds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to hear a case, conferred by the Constitution or statute. Technical defects in filings do not affect subject matter jurisdiction when they do not undermine the basis to hear a case.

    Executive Law § 298 gives the court competence to hear challenges to rulings by the Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights.

    The court distinguished this case from those where a condition precedent implicates subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the missing return date did not affect the court’s fundamental power to hear the case.

    The Court relied on its prior holdings in National Gypsum Co. and Harris v. Niagara Falls Bd. of Educ., emphasizing that defects in compliance with commencement procedures do not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction and are waived absent a timely objection.

    Regarding personal jurisdiction, the Court found that HSBC waived any objection by participating in the proceeding, asserting jurisdiction was proper in its cross-petition, and failing to timely raise a challenge to personal jurisdiction. “[D]efendants and respondents are warned that if they want to capitalize on technicalities they must mind their own procedures.”

    The court emphasized that HSBC’s initial motion at the Appellate Division did not seek dismissal on personal jurisdiction grounds. HSBC was required to either move to dismiss the petition before filing its cross petition or affirmatively raise the issue in an answer.

  • Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 516 (2005): Establishing Long-Arm Jurisdiction Based on Nexus to New York Transactions

    4 N.Y.3d 516 (2005)

    For long-arm jurisdiction to exist under CPLR 302(a)(1), there must be a substantial nexus between the defendant’s New York transactions and the plaintiff’s cause of action; the relationship cannot be too attenuated or coincidental.

    Summary

    Johnson sued Ward for negligence following a car accident in New Jersey. At the time of the accident, both parties were New York residents, and Ward held a New York driver’s license and car registration. Ward later moved to New Jersey and surrendered his New York license. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York lacked personal jurisdiction over Ward because the cause of action arose from the accident in New Jersey, not from Ward’s New York license or registration; therefore, the nexus between Ward’s New York activities and the claim was insufficient to establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

    Facts

    On October 12, 1997, Roger Johnson and Monique White were injured in New Jersey when their car was struck by a vehicle driven by Daniel Ward.

    At the time of the accident, Johnson, White, and Ward were all New York residents.

    Ward possessed a New York driver’s license and had registered his vehicle in New York.

    In December 1997, Ward moved to New Jersey and, in 1998, obtained a New Jersey driver’s license, surrendering his New York license.

    In October 2000, Johnson and White commenced a negligence action against Ward in New York County.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, New York County, granted Ward’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 3211(a)(8).

    The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint, holding that Ward’s New York license and registration satisfied the “transacting business” requirement of CPLR 302(a)(1) and that there was a substantial nexus between the cause of action and Ward’s New York activities.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a New York court has personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant under CPLR 302(a)(1) for a tort claim arising from an out-of-state motor vehicle accident, where the defendant held a New York driver’s license and car registration at the time of the accident.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s purported transaction of business in New York (holding a license and registration) and the negligence claim which arose from an accident in New Jersey.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction was not warranted under CPLR 302(a)(1). The court reasoned that, to establish jurisdiction under this statute, (1) the defendant must transact business within the state, and (2) the cause of action must arise from that transaction of business.

    The court emphasized the need for a “substantial relationship” between the defendant’s transactions in New York and the plaintiff’s cause of action, citing Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467 (1988).

    The court found that the plaintiffs’ cause of action arose from the allegedly negligent driving in New Jersey, not from the issuance of the New York driver’s license or vehicle registration. The court stated, “The negligent driver could have had a license from any state, or no license—that defendant had a New York license and registration is merely coincidental.”

    The Court distinguished cases where jurisdiction was upheld because the claim had a direct nexus to in-state transactions, such as George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648 (1977) (breach of employment contract entered into in New York) and Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443 (1965) (personal injury claim arising from the sale of a defective product in New York).

    The court contrasted these cases with situations where the relationship between the claim and transaction is too attenuated, such as Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827 (1988) (defamation action where the nexus to the defendant’s activities in New York was insufficient).

    The Court concluded that the nexus between the negligence claim and the defendant’s possession of a New York license and registration at the time of the accident was “too insubstantial” to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court’s focus on the location of the tortious act (New Jersey) as the primary factor distinguishing this case from others where jurisdiction was properly asserted.

  • Keane v. Kamin, 94 N.Y.2d 263 (1999): Estoppel and Personal Jurisdiction Based on Failure to Update Address

    Keane v. Kamin, 94 N.Y.2d 263 (1999)

    A driver’s failure to comply with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 505(5) by not updating their address with the Department of Motor Vehicles does not, by itself, create a basis for personal jurisdiction in New York courts when the driver has moved out of state.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant’s failure to update their address with the New York Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) estops them from contesting personal jurisdiction in a lawsuit filed after they moved out of state. The New York Court of Appeals held that failing to update the address does not create a basis for personal jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between the requirements of service of process and the jurisdictional basis for a court to exercise power over a party. Since the defendants were not domiciled in New York when the suit was commenced and the tort occurred out of state, there was no basis for personal jurisdiction.

    Facts

    In January 1992, Mary Jo Keane (plaintiff) was allegedly injured in a car accident in Vermont involving Madeline Kamin (defendant), who was driving a car owned by her father, Jack Kamin (co-defendant). At the time of the accident, Keane was domiciled in Connecticut, and the Kamins were domiciled in New York. In February and July 1994, the Kamins moved out of New York without notifying the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of their new addresses, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 505(5).

    Procedural History

    Keane filed a lawsuit against the Kamins in New York County Supreme Court in December 1994, relying on the Kamins’ former New York addresses from the accident report. After attempts to serve the defendants at their old NY address, the plaintiff served them in North Carolina in March 1995. The Kamins moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Keane moved for a default judgment. The Supreme Court granted the Kamins’ motion, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Kamins’ failure to notify the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles of their new addresses, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 505(5), estops them from contesting personal jurisdiction in a lawsuit filed after they moved out of state.

    Holding

    No, because a failure to comply with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 505(5) only impacts the propriety of service of process, not the fundamental basis for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the two components of personal jurisdiction: (1) service of process, which satisfies due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, and (2) the jurisdictional basis, which is the power or reach of a court over a party. “Service of process cannot by itself vest a court with jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary served outside New York State, however flawless that service may be. To satisfy the jurisdictional basis there must be a constitutionally adequate connection between the defendant, the State and the action.” The Court emphasized that these are separate inquiries, and confusing them can lead to errors. The Court found that the plaintiff mistakenly equated the service component with the jurisdictional basis. The relevant provision of New York’s long-arm statute (CPLR 302[a][2]) was inapplicable because the tort occurred in Vermont. The Court cited Pumarejo-Garcia v McDonough, 242 AD2d 374, distinguishing it by noting it involved the propriety of service, not the existence of a jurisdictional basis. The Court concluded that because the defendants were not domiciled in New York at the time the action was commenced, and the tort occurred in Vermont, New York courts lacked a jurisdictional basis to hear the case.

  • Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, 92 N.Y.2d 1014 (1998): Timeliness of Action After Dismissal in Another State

    92 N.Y.2d 1014 (1998)

    CPLR 205(a)’s six-month tolling period begins to run when a party’s sole non-discretionary appeal is exhausted, and the pursuit of further discretionary appeals does not forestall the commencement of this period.

    Summary

    Lehman Brothers commenced a legal malpractice action in New York after a similar action in Texas was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Lehman Brothers argued that the New York statute of limitations was tolled under CPLR 205(a) due to the prior Texas action. The New York Court of Appeals held that even assuming CPLR 205(a) applied, the New York action was untimely because it was commenced more than six months after the termination of the Texas action, which the court defined as the exhaustion of non-discretionary appeals. The pursuit of discretionary appeals did not extend the tolling period.

    Facts

    Lehman Brothers, Inc. sued Hughes Hubbard & Reed in New York for legal malpractice, alleging incomplete advice on Texas law. Lehman Brothers had previously filed the same claim in Texas, but it was dismissed on December 16, 1992, for lack of personal jurisdiction due to Hughes Hubbard & Reed’s lack of minimum contacts with Texas. Lehman Brothers appealed to the Texas State Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal on June 1, 1995. Lehman Brothers’ request for a rehearing was denied on July 13, 1995. The Texas Supreme Court denied discretionary review on November 22, 1995, and a subsequent request for rehearing on January 11, 1996. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 10, 1996. Lehman Brothers then filed the New York action on July 11, 1996.

    Procedural History

    Lehman Brothers initially filed suit in Texas, which was dismissed by the Texas District Court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Texas State Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied further review. Lehman Brothers then filed suit in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Supreme Court granted Hughes Hubbard & Reed’s motion to dismiss, finding the action time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the present action was timely commenced in New York under CPLR 205(a) when the same action was previously dismissed in Texas for lack of personal jurisdiction, given that the New York action was commenced more than six months after the intermediate Texas appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but within six months of the U.S. Supreme Court denying certiorari.

    Holding

    No, because the six-month tolling period under CPLR 205(a) began to run when Lehman Brothers’ sole non-discretionary Texas appeal was exhausted, and the subsequent pursuit of discretionary appeals to the Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court did not toll the commencement of that period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on when the Texas action terminated for purposes of CPLR 205(a). It cited Cohoes Hous. Auth. v Ippolito-Lutz, Inc., stating that a party cannot extend the statutory six-month period by continually pursuing discretionary appellate review. The court distinguished between appeals taken as a matter of right and discretionary appeals, noting that the six-month period begins when the prior action has terminated, which occurs after the exhaustion of non-discretionary appeals. In this case, the Texas action terminated on June 1, 1995, when the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Lehman Brothers’ subsequent attempts to seek discretionary review from the Texas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court did not delay the start of the six-month tolling period. Since the New York action was filed on July 11, 1996, more than six months after the termination of the Texas proceeding, it was deemed untimely. The court stated, “It is not the purpose of CPLR 205 (a) to permit a party to continually extend the statutory period by seeking additional discretionary appellate review.”

  • Matter of Sayeh R., 91 N.Y.2d 306 (1997): Exercise of Child Protective Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Parent

    91 N.Y.2d 306 (1997)

    A state’s child protective agency can initiate neglect proceedings against a non-resident parent based on actions within the state that threaten the emotional well-being of children domiciled there, even if those actions involve attempts to enforce custody or visitation rights granted by another state’s court.

    Summary

    The Monroe County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a neglect petition in New York against Patricia Ann P., a Florida resident, alleging her efforts to enforce Florida visitation and custody orders endangered her children’s emotional health, given their history of trauma. The children lived with their father in New York. The Family Court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction and preemption by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the PKPA did not preempt the neglect proceeding, that the DSS had the authority to bring the action, and that the Family Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the mother. The court emphasized New York’s duty to protect its domiciliaries, particularly children at risk.

    Facts

    Patricia Ann P. and Ahmad R. divorced in Florida, with Patricia initially having primary custody. After a horrific incident where their daughters were attacked, one fatally, the Florida court granted primary custody to the father, who moved to New York with the children. Years later, the children expressed a desire to cease visitation with their mother. Patricia sought to enforce her visitation rights, leading to contempt orders against the father in Florida. The Florida court ultimately modified the custody order, granting primary custody to Patricia. The Monroe County DSS then intervened, filing a neglect petition in New York, citing the children’s fragile emotional state and potential harm from being forced to return to Florida.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the DSS petition, citing lack of personal jurisdiction over the mother and preemption by the PKPA. The Appellate Division affirmed, viewing the neglect proceeding as an improper attempt to circumvent valid Florida custody orders. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed, remitting the case to Family Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) preempts a New York Family Court from exercising jurisdiction in a child protective proceeding.
    2. Whether a parent’s actions to enforce visitation/custody rights can constitute neglect under New York’s Family Court Act.
    3. Whether a New York Family Court can assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent based on actions taken within New York related to enforcing custody/visitation rights.

    Holding

    1. No, because the child protective proceeding is distinct from a custody determination and serves New York’s compelling interest in protecting its domiciled children.
    2. Yes, because a parent’s disregard for their children’s special vulnerabilities when enforcing visitation or custody rights can constitute a failure to exercise a minimum degree of care, leading to a finding of neglect.
    3. Yes, because by using New York courts and law enforcement to enforce her parental rights, the mother engaged in purposeful activity within the state, satisfying the requirements for personal jurisdiction under the Family Court Act § 1036(c).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the neglect proceeding was not a custody dispute but an independent action by the state to protect children at risk. The PKPA and UCCJA do not preclude such proceedings. The court emphasized New York’s parens patriae duty to safeguard its residents, especially children. It found that the mother’s actions, despite being attempts to enforce valid court orders, could constitute neglect if they demonstrated a failure to exercise a minimum degree of care, considering the children’s specific emotional vulnerabilities stemming from past trauma. The court highlighted the independent psychologist’s assessment of the severe emotional harm the children would suffer if abruptly forced to return to Florida. The court distinguished this case from a mere custody battle, emphasizing the clinical evidence of imminent emotional harm. Furthermore, the Court noted that the mother had invoked the aid of New York courts and law enforcement, establishing sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, quoting Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 16: respondent has “engaged in some purposeful activity…in connection with the matter in suit”. The dissent argued the mother’s actions were attempts to enforce legal rights, not neglect, and comity principles should prevent New York’s interference. Judge Bellacosa’s dissent emphasized the importance of comity and not undermining the Florida court’s jurisdiction.

  • Stewart v. Volkswagen A.G., 81 N.Y.2d 203 (1993): Strict Compliance Required for Service on Foreign Corporations

    Stewart v. Volkswagen A.G., 81 N.Y.2d 203 (1993)

    When seeking to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in New York by serving the Secretary of State, strict compliance with the sequential service requirements of Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2) is mandatory.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs sued Volkswagen A.G. (VWAG), a German corporation, for injuries allegedly caused by unintended acceleration in Audi vehicles. They attempted service by serving the New York Secretary of State and mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to Volkswagen of America (VOA) in New Jersey, purportedly on behalf of VWAG. VWAG moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing non-compliance with Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2). The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the strict sequential requirements of the statute. Mailing to VOA was insufficient, and plaintiffs did not demonstrate attempted compliance with the prior service options outlined in the statute.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs filed suit against Volkswagen A.G. (VWAG), a German corporation, for personal injuries related to alleged unintended acceleration of Audi 5000 vehicles.

    VWAG manufactured the vehicles and exported them to the United States, transferring title to Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VOA).

    VOA sold the vehicles to World Wide Volkswagen Corp., which distributed them to Audi dealers, who then sold them to consumers.

    Plaintiffs attempted to obtain jurisdiction over VWAG by serving the New York Secretary of State, pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2), and by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to “Volkswagen of America on behalf of Volkswagenwerk-Aktien Gesellschaft” in New Jersey.

    Procedural History

    VWAG moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(8), arguing that plaintiffs failed to obtain personal jurisdiction due to improper service under Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2).

    Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that VOA was a proper agent for service on VWAG.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that jurisdiction could be acquired over a foreign corporation by serving a local corporation so controlled by the foreign entity that the local corporation is deemed a mere department of the foreign corporation.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether plaintiffs could rely on mailing the summons and complaint to “the last address of such foreign corporation known to the plaintiffs” under Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2) without attempting to satisfy the preceding service prescriptions.

    2. Whether mailing the summons and complaint to Volkswagen of America (VOA) in New Jersey satisfied the requirement of mailing to the “address of such foreign corporation [VWAG]”.

    Holding

    1. No, because Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2) establishes a mandatory sequence and progression of service completion options that must be strictly followed.

    2. No, because mailing to VOA in New Jersey was not mailing to VWAG’s “last known address,” even if VOA was a mere department of VWAG, and because the plaintiffs possessed an address for VWAG in Germany.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that statutory and due process prerequisites for jurisdiction and service of process have been satisfied. Business Corporation Law § 307 establishes a mandatory sequence of service options to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, and these steps are “requirements of a jurisdictional nature which must be strictly satisfied.”

    Plaintiffs failed to show they attempted to ascertain whether VWAG had a specified post office address for receiving process or a registered office address on file with the German equivalent of the Secretary of State before resorting to the “last known address” option. The court found that plaintiffs could not randomly select from the options available in the statute.

    Even if plaintiffs were permitted to proceed directly to the “last known address” option, they did not correctly utilize it because they sent the process to VOA in New Jersey “on behalf of” VWAG. The court stated, “That is not VWAG’s ‘last known address,’ as prescribed and contemplated by the statute, even if VOA is a mere department of VWAG.” The court also noted that plaintiffs’ own documents indicated that they possessed an address for VWAG in Germany.

    The court rejected the argument that service on VOA, as an alleged “mere department” of VWAG, was sufficient. Business Corporation Law § 307 provides for constructive service on the Secretary of State, and the provisions must be strictly complied with; it does not authorize alternative notification through an agent when jurisdiction is invoked initially by service on the Secretary of State.

    The Court distinguished Luciano v Garvey Volkswagen, stating that the case addressed liability under an express warranty and did not establish that VOA is an agent of VWAG for service of process purposes under Business Corporation Law § 307(b)(2).

    “Because the appointment of the Secretary of State as agent is a constructive rather than an actual designation, the statute contains procedures calculated to assure that the foreign corporation, in fact, receives a copy of the process…and ‘strict compliance with [those procedures] is required’.”

  • Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234 (1989): Strict Adherence to Service of Process Requirements

    Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234 (1989)

    Service of process on a natural person must strictly comply with the methods prescribed by statute, and courts should not create exceptions to these requirements even in cases of alleged misrepresentation of authority to accept service.

    Summary

    These consolidated medical malpractice cases involve attempts to serve doctors by delivering summonses and complaints to their office employees and then mailing copies to the doctors’ offices, not their residences. The New York Court of Appeals held that such service was invalid because it failed to comply with CPLR 308(1), which requires personal delivery, and CPLR 308(2), which, at the time the actions were commenced, required mailing to the defendant’s residence. The Court declined to create an exception based on prior instances where the process server claimed employees impliedly represented authority to accept service. The Court also refused to apply a later amendment to CPLR 308(2) retroactively, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for service of process.

    Facts

    1. Plaintiffs attempted to commence medical malpractice actions against defendant doctors.
    2. The process server delivered copies of the summonses and complaints to employees at the doctors’ offices, not directly to the doctors.
    3. Copies of the summonses and complaints were mailed to the doctors’ offices but not to their residences.
    4. The process server claimed he had previously served doctors in the same medical group by delivering summonses to their office employees.
    5. The process server alleged that unnamed employees had stated the doctors would not come to the waiting room or allow process servers in their offices, implying authorization for employees to accept service.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dismissing the actions due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that service was effective under CPLR 308(1) or 308(2), as amended in 1987.
    3. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether delivery of a summons and complaint to an employee at a defendant’s office constitutes valid personal service under CPLR 308(1) when the defendant is not present and there is no express contemporaneous representation of authority to accept service.
    2. Whether the 1987 amendment to CPLR 308(2), which allowed mailing of the summons to either the defendant’s residence or place of business, should be applied retroactively to validate service in actions commenced before the amendment’s effective date.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPLR 308(1) requires that the summons be delivered “to the person to be served,” which means actual delivery to the defendant.
    2. No, because statutes are generally applied prospectively unless there is express or necessarily implied language allowing retroactive effect, and the legislature explicitly stated the amendment would take effect 30 days after becoming law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the importance of strict adherence to the statutory requirements for service of process, citing Espy v. Giorlando, which held that even an express representation of authority by a nurse to accept service on behalf of a doctor was insufficient. The Court reasoned that creating exceptions to CPLR 308(1), even based on a process server’s claim of implied authority, would undermine the regularity, certainty, and reliability of process. The Court stated, “Regularity of process, certainty and reliability for all litigants and for the courts are highly desirable objectives to avoid generating collateral disputes.”

    Regarding the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to CPLR 308(2), the Court noted the absence of any legislative intent for retroactive application. The Court found that allowing retroactive application would disrupt the established rules of procedure and potentially prejudice defendants who had relied on the existing law when the actions were commenced. The Court concluded, “We therefore agree with the Appellate Division that retroactive application is not available to ‘cure’ defective service in actions ‘commenced’ before the remedial procedural amendment became law.”

  • Flick v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 50 (1990): Strict Compliance Required for Service on Unauthorized Foreign Corporations

    Flick v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 50 (1990)

    Strict compliance with Business Corporation Law § 307 is required to effect service on an unauthorized foreign corporation because the designation of the Secretary of State as agent for service is constructive, not actual, requiring measures to ensure the corporation receives a copy of the process.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a court obtains personal jurisdiction over an unauthorized foreign corporation when the plaintiff fails to strictly comply with the service requirements of Business Corporation Law § 307. The plaintiff served the Secretary of State, but did not send a copy of the process to the defendant by registered mail or file an affidavit of compliance as required by the statute. The Court of Appeals held that strict compliance with § 307 is necessary for service on an unauthorized foreign corporation because the statute’s procedures ensure the corporation receives actual notice, satisfying due process requirements. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that jurisdiction was not properly obtained.

    Facts

    Plaintiff sustained injuries from a malfunctioning hose, allegedly manufactured by defendant, Stewart-Warner Corp. The defendant was a Virginia corporation with its principal office in Chicago, Illinois, and was not authorized to do business in New York, having surrendered its certificate of authority in 1952. The plaintiff, mistakenly believing the defendant was authorized to do business in New York, served two copies of the summons with notice on the Secretary of State in Albany pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306. The Secretary of State forwarded a copy to the defendant via certified mail, and the defendant received it.

    Procedural History

    After the defendant’s time to answer expired, the plaintiff moved for a default judgment. The defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the action, arguing ineffective service because the plaintiff failed to comply with Business Corporation Law § 307. Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss but also denied the default judgment, ordering the plaintiff to accept the defendant’s notice of appearance and serve a complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the failure to comply with § 307 was a mere irregularity and not jurisdictional. The Appellate Division then granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether strict compliance with the procedures of Business Corporation Law § 307 is required to effect service on an unauthorized foreign corporation, or whether serving the Secretary of State is sufficient, with subsequent deviations from the statute excused as mere irregularities.

    Holding

    No, because strict compliance with the procedures of Business Corporation Law § 307 is required to effect service on an unauthorized foreign corporation. The statute’s procedures, including registered mail and affidavit of compliance requirements, are designed to ensure actual notice, satisfying due process requirements, and are not mere irregularities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that jurisdiction over an unauthorized foreign corporation is predicated on its doing business in the state, creating a constructive presence. Business Corporation Law § 307 outlines the required method for serving process on such a corporation. Because the designation of the Secretary of State as agent is constructive, the statute contains procedures to ensure the foreign corporation receives actual notice. The court emphasized that service is not complete until ten days after the affidavit of compliance is filed. The Court contrasted this with service on authorized foreign corporations, where the designation of the Secretary of State is actual, making service complete when the Secretary of State is served under Business Corporation Law § 306. The court stated, “These are not mere procedural technicalities but measures designed to satisfy due process requirements of actual notice.” Failure to adhere to these procedures deprives the court of jurisdiction. The court distinguished Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp. v Welbilt Corp., noting that it involved a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State, which had filed an actual designation of the Secretary of State as agent for service of process. The court concluded that strict compliance with Business Corporation Law § 307 is required for service on an unauthorized foreign corporation.