New York Law Review

Tag: Permitted Use

  • Rorie v. Woodmere Academy, 49 N.Y.2d 782 (1980): Determining Whether a Summer Program Qualifies as a Permitted School Use Under Zoning Law

    Rorie v. Woodmere Academy, 49 N.Y.2d 782 (1980)

    A summer program run by a private school is a permitted school use under zoning ordinances if it maintains a substantial educational component, even if it includes recreational activities.

    Summary

    Neighboring property owners sued to enjoin Woodmere Academy’s summer program, arguing it was an impermissible day camp rather than a school use under the zoning ordinance and constituted a nuisance. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint, finding the program a permitted use. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming the academic aspect de minimis, but remitted for a hearing on abandonment of prior nonconforming use. After a second trial court dismissed the complaint based on nonconforming use, the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals held the summer program was a permitted use under the zoning ordinance because it maintained a substantial educational component, affirming the dismissal of the complaint, but modifying the grounds for dismissal.

    Facts

    Woodmere Academy, a private school, operated a summer program on its premises. Neighboring property owners, the Rories, sought to enjoin the summer program, arguing it was a day camp, not a permitted school use under the Town of Hempstead zoning ordinance. The summer program offered courses in science, music, drama, art, photography, reading, cooking, woodworking, and swimming. All courses except swimming were also offered during the regular school year. The program employed professionally trained teachers, including graduate medical students and college students serving as counselors. The academy had no swimming pool prior to the reinstitution of the summer day program in 1978.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs (Rories) brought an action in Supreme Court, Nassau County, to enjoin the Academy’s summer program. The Supreme Court (Justice Altimari) dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and remitted for a hearing on the issue of abandonment of nonconforming use. On remittal, the Supreme Court (Justice Farley) dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Academy had the right to conduct a summer day camp as a legal nonconforming use. The Appellate Division affirmed Justice Farley’s judgment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Woodmere Academy’s summer program constitutes a permitted “private school” use under the Town of Hempstead zoning ordinance, or an impermissible “day camp” use in a Residence A district.

    Holding

    Yes, because the summer program maintains a substantial educational component, demonstrating a good faith effort by the private school to accomplish serious educational aims, and is not simply a recreational program in disguise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and found that the summer program offered a curriculum including courses that were also part of the regular school curriculum. The court noted that the summer program employed qualified teachers and used the same plant as the regular school program. The court stated, “What is essential is that the educational component of the program, the staff and the plant be of sufficient size to warrant the conclusion that the program involves a good faith effort on the part of the private school to accomplish serious educational aims and is not simply a fun and games recreational program in disguise.” The court distinguished cases relied upon by the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that the ordinance did not require that a private school be devoted solely to academic instruction. The Court found the educational component of the program, including textbooks, student evaluations, and expert testimony, demonstrated that the summer program was a serious organized program, not just a leisure activity. The court concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the program was a permitted use.

  • Horn & Hardart Co. v. Junior Bldg., Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 920 (1976): Interpreting Lease Agreements Regarding Permitted Use

    Horn & Hardart Co. v. Junior Bldg., Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 920 (1976)

    When interpreting lease agreements, courts will consider the language employed by the parties, the past and present use of the leased premises, and whether a proposed use falls within the scope of permitted uses as defined in the lease.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between a landlord and tenant regarding the permitted use of leased premises under a 1957 lease agreement. The tenant, Horn & Hardart, sought to operate a “Burger King” restaurant on the premises, which the landlord argued was not permitted under the lease’s specified uses. The New York Court of Appeals held that operating a “Burger King” restaurant was not within the permitted uses outlined in the lease, considering the language of the lease and the current operation of an “Automat” cafeteria. The court found that despite changes in food service, a distinction remained between cafeterias and limited-menu, short-order food service establishments.

    Facts

    Horn & Hardart Co. leased premises in a 30-story office building on East 42nd Street in New York City. The 1957 lease specified permitted uses as: “a service restaurant, Automat restaurant, cafeteria, counter and stool restaurant, retail shop for the sale of baked goods and other items usually sold in Horn & Hardart retail stores.” Horn & Hardart operated an “Automat” cafeteria on the premises. They sought to change the operation to a “Burger King” restaurant. The proposed “Burger King” would have a dining area and counter service, offering a limited menu for consumption on or off the premises.

    Procedural History

    Both the landlord and tenant filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division’s decision is not described. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case, finding no factual disputes and agreed to decide the case based on the existing record.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the operation of a “Burger King” restaurant is a permitted use under the 1957 lease, which specifies uses such as “service restaurant, Automat restaurant, cafeteria, counter and stool restaurant, retail shop for the sale of baked goods and other items usually sold in Horn & Hardart retail stores.”

    Holding

    No, because the operation of a “Burger King” restaurant is not within the scope of permitted uses outlined in the lease, considering the language of the lease and the existing operation of an “Automat” cafeteria.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its decision on the language employed by the parties in the lease and the use to which the leased premises had been and were presently being put. It acknowledged the differing contentions and resisted speculation about various aspects of food service. The court reasoned that despite changes in restaurant and food service, a distinction remains between cafeterias and short-order, limited-menu food service primarily for off-premises consumption. Since the “Burger King” operation was not a permitted use, the landlord could reasonably withhold consent to alterations appropriate for such use. The court did not find any admissible extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intention when they executed the lease. The court stated, “It cannot be said that the changes which concededly have occurred in recent years in manner and style of restaurant and food service have destroyed completely the difference between cafeterias and short-order, limited menu food service primarily for off-premises consumption.”