New York Law Review

Tag: Permanent Neglect

  • In re Hailey ZZ., 19 N.Y.3d 424 (2012): Limits on Court’s Power to Order Post-Termination Contact in Neglect Cases

    In re Hailey ZZ., 19 N.Y.3d 424 (2012)

    In cases of parental rights termination due to permanent neglect under Social Services Law § 384-b, Family Court lacks the authority to order post-termination contact between the parent and child, as such power resides solely with the legislature.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict among New York’s Appellate Divisions regarding Family Court’s authority to mandate continuing contact between a parent and child after parental rights are terminated due to permanent neglect. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court does not possess such authority. The case involved Hailey ZZ., whose father was incarcerated. After finding the father had permanently neglected Hailey and terminating his parental rights, the Supreme Court denied his request for post-termination visitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that absent explicit legislative authorization, Family Court cannot order post-termination contact in cases of termination due to permanent neglect. The Court noted concerns about hindering adoptions and disrupting adoptive families.

    Facts

    Hailey ZZ. was born in 2007. Her father was incarcerated in early 2008. In November 2008, the Tompkins County Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Hailey and her half-sister from their mother’s care. DSS filed petitions in March 2010 against both parents, seeking orders adjudicating Hailey as permanently neglected and terminating parental rights. The mother surrendered her rights in July 2010, but the proceedings continued against the father.

    Procedural History

    The Tompkins County Supreme Court (acting as Family Court) determined that DSS made diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship but that the father failed to plan for Hailey’s future. The court adjudicated Hailey permanently neglected and, after a dispositional hearing, terminated the father’s parental rights, denying his request for continued visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating post-termination visitation was unavailable in a contested termination proceeding. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has the authority to order post-termination contact between a parent and child when parental rights have been terminated based on permanent neglect under Social Services Law § 384-b.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court lacks the authority to mandate post-termination contact in cases where parental rights are terminated due to permanent neglect under Social Services Law § 384-b; such power rests with the legislature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the conflicting decisions of the Appellate Divisions. The Fourth Department had held that Family Court could order post-termination contact in certain cases, while the Third Department consistently held that it could not. The Court of Appeals sided with the Third Department. The Court emphasized its prior holding in Matter of Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77 (1989), where it stated that imposing post-termination contact by judicial order could threaten the integrity of the adoptive family unit and that “ ‘open’ adoptions are not presently authorized. If they are to be established, it is the Legislature that more appropriately should be called upon to balance the critical social policy choices and the delicate issues of family relations involved in such a determination.” The Court reasoned that the Legislature authorized “open adoptions” through voluntary surrender in Social Services Law § 383-c but made no corresponding change to § 384-b. The Court further noted the practical problems with judicial imposition of post-termination contact, potentially discouraging adoption and threatening adoptive families. The Court explicitly declined to vest Family Court with the discretion and flexibility to order post-termination contact, particularly in light of concerns by County Attorneys regarding the uncertainty, delay, and expense which can discourage adoption of neglected children. As the Monroe County Attorney stated, “many prospective adoptive parents are reluctant or unwilling to entertain the prospect of facilitating contact between a child and a biological parent sufficiently troubled to have lost parental rights.”

  • In re Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838 (1986): Parental Obligation to Remedy Conditions Leading to Child Removal

    In re Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838 (1986)

    Parents have an obligation to take meaningful steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of their children from their home, demonstrating a genuine change in attitude and behavior, not merely participating in mandated programs.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of parental rights due to permanent neglect. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the Family Court’s order terminating parental rights. The court emphasized that parents must do more than superficially comply with agency directives; they must genuinely address the issues that led to the children’s removal. The court gave significant weight to the Family Court’s assessment of the parents’ credibility and the recommendations of the Law Guardians, concluding that the parents failed to demonstrate meaningful change, warranting termination to allow for adoption.

    Facts

    Nathaniel was removed from his home in 1978, and the remaining four children were placed in foster care in 1980. Multiple neglect petitions detailed issues such as filth, excessive corporal punishment, inadequate supervision, and children being locked in their rooms. Despite agreements to participate in programs and avoid abuse, the Family Court found further evidence of abuse, inability to control the children, and failure to attend programs. The children exhibited behavioral issues, with one diagnosed with aggressive conduct disorder and another expressing fears of being locked in her room. The neglect proceeding also revealed disturbing disciplinary methods.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially terminated the respondents’ parental rights. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, finding that the respondents were improving and that the Family Court applied an improper standard. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Family Court’s original termination of parental rights.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the respondents failed to adequately plan for the future of their children as required by Social Services Law § 384-b (7), despite the petitioner’s diligent efforts to assist them.

    Holding

    Yes, because the respondents did not take effective steps to correct the conditions that led to the children’s removal or advance a realistic, feasible plan for their return. The focus is on whether parents have genuinely taken steps toward recognizing their problems and changing their attitudes and patterns of behavior.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Social Services Law requires parents to take concrete steps to provide a stable home within their financial means, projecting a future course of action for the child’s well-being. The court stated, “[T]he planning requirement also obligates parents to project a future course of action, taking into account considerations of how the child will be supported financially, physically and emotionally.” The court noted the importance of assessing the parents’ credibility and the testimony of those who observed them in programs. It deferred to the Family Court’s vantage point in evaluating the evidence and gave weight to the Law Guardians’ recommendations. The court found that the parents consistently found fault with programs and personnel, failing to gain insight into their own behavior that had harmed the children. Attendance at programs alone was insufficient; genuine change was required. The court found that continuing foster care after seven years of litigation was inappropriate and that termination of parental rights to free the children for adoption was necessary. The court explicitly stated that a disposition other than termination “would be reversible error.”

  • In Re Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136 (1984): Establishing Permanent Neglect in Parental Rights Termination

    In Re Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136 (1984)

    To terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, an agency must demonstrate diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, and the parent must fail to maintain contact with or plan for the child’s future for at least one year after the child enters agency custody.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights due to permanent neglect of her child. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the agency demonstrated diligent efforts to assist the mother, and the mother failed to adequately plan for the child’s future. The court clarified that a temporary transfer of the child to the parent for a trial period does not automatically terminate the agency’s custody and that the one-year period of neglect need not be the year immediately preceding the commencement of the termination proceeding.

    Facts

    The respondent, who herself was a former foster child, gave birth to Star Leslie W. in 1979. After one week, she voluntarily placed the child in the care of her former foster parents, who were then given foster parent status. The child was then placed under the care of Leake & Watts Children’s Home. The mother had visitation rights but moved frequently and was often out of contact with the agency. In December 1981, the child lived with the mother for one month but then returned to foster care. In February 1982, the agency initiated proceedings to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court granted the petition to terminate parental rights, finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite the agency’s diligent efforts. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two judges dissenting on the grounds that the agency did not make sufficient diligent efforts. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency exercised diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship as required by Social Services Law § 384-b.

    2. Whether the child was in the care of an authorized agency at the time the termination proceeding was commenced, as required by Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a).

    3. Whether the one-year period of neglect must be the year immediately preceding the institution of the termination proceedings.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the agency provided counseling, arranged visitation, and attempted to resolve the mother’s housing issues.

    2. Yes, because the temporary transfer of the child to the mother for a trial period did not terminate the agency’s custody.

    3. No, because the statute contemplates a continuous period of one year at any time after the child’s placement with the agency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the agency made diligent efforts by providing counseling, making visitation arrangements, and assisting the mother with housing. The court noted that the agency is required to make only reasonable efforts, and the mother was uncooperative. The court also held that the temporary transfer of the child to the mother did not terminate the agency’s custody because it was a trial arrangement. The court stated that the statute mandates “diligent efforts, defining them as ‘reasonable attempts… to assist, develop and encourage a meaningful relationship between the parent and child’ (Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 7, par [f]).” The court further clarified that the one-year period of neglect need not be the year immediately preceding the commencement of the termination proceeding; it can be any continuous one-year period after the child’s placement with the agency. The court stated that requiring the neglect to occur immediately before the proceeding would frustrate the purpose of the statute, as agencies may need time to consider termination or attempt further reunification efforts. Finally, the court emphasized that at the dispositional hearing, the sole concern is the best interests of the child.

  • Matter of Michael B., 58 N.Y.2d 774 (1982): Parental Rights Termination Based on Clear and Convincing Evidence of Permanent Neglect

    Matter of Michael B., 58 N.Y.2d 774 (1982)

    Parental rights can be terminated based on clear and convincing evidence that the parent has permanently neglected the child, including failure to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, which found clear and convincing evidence that the mother permanently neglected her son. The court considered the mother’s sporadic visits, intentional declination of counseling, and insufficient efforts to secure adequate living arrangements or financial support for her son, even though she had the capacity to do so. The court emphasized that parental rights can be terminated when a parent fails to adequately plan for the child’s future, thus supporting the finding of permanent neglect.

    Facts

    The appellant, the mother of Michael B., was subject to a proceeding seeking the termination of her parental rights based on permanent neglect. The initial record suggested the mother had visited her son, secured living accommodations and financial means for him, and that she had failed to undergo psychological testing due to a misdelivered appointment notice. After the initial appeal, the case was remitted for a further hearing to clarify these points. The subsequent hearing revealed that the mother’s testimony about setting up an apartment for her son was discredited, her visits were sporadic, she intentionally declined counseling, and her work record was inadequate and not sufficiently excused by her claimed illness.

    Procedural History

    The case initially came before the trial court, which made a decision that was appealed. The Appellate Division initially reviewed the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to clarify certain facts regarding the mother’s efforts to care for her son. After the additional hearing, the Trial Judge felt bound by the prior decision. The Appellate Division then reviewed the supplemented record and reversed the trial court, adjudging Michael to be permanently neglected and granting the petition to terminate parental rights. The mother then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at the hearing, including the mother’s actions and inactions, constituted clear and convincing evidence of permanent neglect, justifying the termination of her parental rights.

    Holding

    Yes, because the weight of the evidence, particularly the mother’s sporadic visits, intentional refusal of counseling, and inadequate efforts to provide suitable living arrangements and financial support, supported the finding of permanent neglect. The Appellate Division’s findings, supported by clear and convincing evidence, justified the termination of parental rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the finding that the Appellate Division’s assessment of the evidence was accurate and supported by clear and convincing proof. The court emphasized that the mother’s testimony was largely discredited, particularly her claim of setting up an apartment for her son. The court noted that her visits were infrequent, and she intentionally avoided counseling. Further, the court found that her work record was insufficient and that her claimed illness was exaggerated, indicating an unwillingness to adequately provide for her son. The court implicitly applied the standard that to terminate parental rights, the agency must prove diligent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship and the parent’s failure to plan for the child’s future during that time, despite being physically and financially able to do so. The court’s conclusion aligns with the broader policy goal of ensuring children are in stable and permanent homes.

  • Matter of Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368 (1984): Agency’s Duty to Strengthen Parent-Child Relationship

    Matter of Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368 (1984)

    When a child-care agency seeks to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, it must first affirmatively plead and prove by clear and convincing evidence that it diligently attempted to strengthen the parent-child relationship.

    Summary

    This case addresses the paramount duty of child-care agencies in New York to actively work towards reuniting parents with their children before seeking to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Brookwood Child Care Agency failed to demonstrate diligent efforts to foster a relationship between the father, Dennis H., and his daughter, Sheila G. The court emphasized that the agency’s indifference to the father’s rights and its failure to provide meaningful assistance precluded a finding of permanent neglect, highlighting the State’s obligation to help families stay together.

    Facts

    Sheila G. was born out of wedlock in 1977 and placed in the care of the Brookwood Child Care Agency shortly after birth. The father, Dennis H., contacted Brookwood, acknowledged paternity, and expressed his desire to visit and support Sheila. Brookwood informed him that the mother had refused to permit him access. Over the next year, Dennis regularly contacted Brookwood, inquiring about Sheila and reporting his efforts to establish paternity, which were hindered by the mother’s non-cooperation. Brookwood focused on the mother and later decided to seek Sheila’s surrender for adoption. Sheila was placed with foster parents who were informed she would be available for adoption within six months. Dennis eventually established paternity in 1979 and proposed plans for Sheila’s custody. Brookwood then initiated proceedings to terminate parental rights.

    Procedural History

    Brookwood filed a petition in Family Court to terminate the parental rights of both parents based on permanent neglect. The Family Court found the mother had permanently neglected Sheila, a determination not appealed. The Family Court dismissed the petition against the father, finding Brookwood failed to make diligent efforts to unite Sheila and Dennis. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Sheila was permanently neglected by both parents and terminating Dennis’s visitation rights. Dennis appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Brookwood Child Care Agency exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship between Dennis H. and Sheila G. prior to initiating proceedings to terminate Dennis’s parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Holding

    No, because Brookwood failed to demonstrate that it made reasonable attempts to assist, develop, and encourage a meaningful relationship between Dennis and Sheila. The agency’s indifference to Dennis’s rights and its failure to provide meaningful assistance precluded a finding of permanent neglect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that when a child-care agency seeks to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, the agency must first demonstrate that it has made diligent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship. Citing Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), the Court stated that a “permanently neglected child” is one whose parent has failed to maintain contact or plan for the child’s future, “notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts.” The Court highlighted the agency’s superior position and the potential for agency indifference to impede reunification attempts. The Court relied on legislative intent, underscoring that “the state’s first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has already left home.” The Court found that Brookwood’s efforts were inadequate, citing a lack of consultation with Dennis in developing a service plan, a failure to assist him in gaining custody, and scheduling visitation at inconvenient times. The Court emphasized that “proof by the child-care agency that it has satisfied its statutory obligation is a threshold consideration and a necessary prerequisite to any determination of permanent neglect.” The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to Family Court for a custody determination based on Sheila’s best interests, while underscoring Dennis’s right to meaningful assistance in gaining custody, if custody with the foster parents was continued. The Court concluded: “Once a child has been voluntarily placed with an authorized child-care agency, and is under foster care, the Family Court is vested with continuing jurisdiction over the child until there has been a final disposition of custody.”

  • Matter of Linda Kathlyn H., 59 N.Y.2d 70 (1983): Appellate Review Standard After Santosky v. Kramer

    Matter of Linda Kathlyn H., 59 N.Y.2d 70 (1983)

    When reviewing Family Court decisions of permanent neglect made before Santosky v. Kramer, the Appellate Division can apply the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard without automatically remitting the case for a new hearing, but the evidence must meet that higher standard.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedural impact of Santosky v. Kramer (455 U.S. 745 (1982)) on permanent neglect cases already in the appellate process. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division could review existing records under the newly mandated ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard, without automatically remitting for a new hearing in Family Court. However, the Court found the evidence in this specific case insufficient to meet the ‘clear and convincing’ standard and ordered a new hearing to give the Department of Social Services the opportunity to meet the heavier burden of proof.

    Facts

    The appellant’s son was placed in the custody of the Department of Social Services. The Family Court initially found permanent neglect by the mother based on a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence.’ This finding led to an order removing the son from the mother’s care, terminating her parental rights. The mother appealed this decision.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found permanent neglect. While the mother’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Santosky v. Kramer, establishing a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard for terminating parental rights. The Appellate Division reviewed the Family Court’s decision under the new ‘clear and convincing’ standard and affirmed. The mother then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Santosky v. Kramer requires an automatic remittal to Family Court for a de novo hearing in permanent neglect cases where the initial hearing occurred before Santosky was decided?

    2. Whether the evidence presented in this particular case was legally sufficient to meet the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard required for termination of parental rights?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division is capable of reviewing factual determinations and making final dispositions based on its evaluation of the evidence.

    2. No, because the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate the mother’s failure to maintain contact with or plan for the future of her child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Appellate Division is capable of reviewing factual determinations and making final dispositions based on its own evaluation of the evidence; therefore, an automatic remittal is not required. The court stated, “In view of the authority of the Appellate Division to review factual determinations and, in a case tried without a jury, to make a final disposition of the litigation predicated on its evaluation of the evidence, no new hearing was automatically required. Nothing contained in the Santosky opinion compels a contrary conclusion.”

    However, the Court found the evidence presented was insufficient to meet the ‘clear and convincing’ standard. The mother had made several visits to her son and attempted to comply with the department’s requirements. The court noted that her failure to undergo psychological tests was partially due to a misdelivered appointment notice. Because the initial hearing was held under the incorrect ‘fair preponderance’ standard, the Court ordered a new hearing to allow the Department of Social Services to present evidence under the appropriate ‘clear and convincing’ standard. The court emphasized that at the new hearing, the department would have “an awareness of the heavier burden applicable to it, to present evidence in support of its petition.”

  • In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282 (1981): Parental Rights Termination for Failure to Plan

    In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282 (1981)

    A parent’s rights may be terminated due to permanent neglect if they fail to substantially and continuously maintain contact with or plan for the child’s future for more than one year after the child enters foster care, despite the agency’s diligent efforts and the parent’s physical and financial ability to do so.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of parental rights based on permanent neglect. Hime was placed in foster care shortly after birth. The agency initiated proceedings to terminate the mother’s rights, alleging both mental illness and permanent neglect. The Family Court initially found no failure to plan, but the Appellate Division terminated rights based on mental illness. The Court of Appeals reversed the mental illness finding. On remand, the Appellate Division found permanent neglect. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so, and that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship.

    Facts

    Hime was born on March 10, 1975.
    She was temporarily placed with the Jewish Child Care Association on April 9, 1975.
    On July 8, 1975, the Family Court determined Hime was a neglected child and placed her with the agency for one year.
    The mother was hospitalized from April 1, 1975, to June 26, 1975.
    The termination proceeding was initiated on July 22, 1976, alleging mental illness and permanent neglect.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found no failure to plan but awarded custody to foster parents based on the child’s best interests.
    The Appellate Division modified, terminating parental rights based on mental illness and remanding for further proceedings.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the mental illness finding.
    On remand, the Appellate Division found permanent neglect.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order terminating parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the respondent’s child, Hime, was shown to be a “permanently neglected child” within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b(7), because respondent failed for a period of more than one year following the date the child came into the care of an authorized agency to substantially and continuously maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.

    Holding

    Yes, because the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so, and that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the record to determine which findings conformed to the weight of the evidence, given the disagreement between the lower courts. The court noted that Social Services Law § 384-b balances the child’s interest in not experiencing a protracted stay in foster care with the parents’ interest in continuing the parent-child relationship.
    The court found that the mother refused to provide details about her financial situation, giving rise to an unfavorable inference, and testified that she had always supported herself, demonstrating financial ability. The court also found that she had the physical ability to plan for Hime’s future.
    The court determined that the agency caseworker’s testimony sufficiently established both the mother’s failure to plan and the agency’s diligent efforts. The court also noted the mother’s hostility toward the caseworkers and her refusal to furnish information concerning treatment or employment, despite being advised that it was important for her right to regain custody of the child.
    The court concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the mother permanently neglected Hime. The court considered evidence of the mother’s hostility toward caseworkers and refusal to provide information relevant to her ability to care for the child. The court quoted from *Matter of Leon RR*, 48 NY2d 117, 126, noting that duties to work with both natural and foster parents are “by no means contradictory; indeed, they are complementary.”

  • In re Hime Y., 427 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1981): Mental Illness and Termination of Parental Rights

    In re Hime Y., 427 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1981)

    Mental illness, in itself, does not automatically excuse a parent from the obligation to plan for the future of their child in a permanent neglect proceeding; a separate and distinct finding must be made that the parent is presently and for the foreseeable future unable to care for the child due to the mental illness.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which parental rights can be terminated due to mental illness or permanent neglect. The New York Court of Appeals held that while evidence supported the mother’s present inability to care for her child due to mental illness, there was insufficient proof regarding her future inability. Further, the court clarified that mental illness does not automatically equate to a physical inability to plan for the child’s future, which is a requirement for a finding of permanent neglect. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine if the mother’s parental rights could be terminated due to permanent neglect.

    Facts

    Hime Y. was placed in foster care shortly after birth due to allegations of neglect. The Jewish Child Care Association filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, arguing both that the mother was mentally ill and unable to care for the child and that she had permanently neglected the child by failing to plan for her future despite the agency’s efforts to assist her.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the petition, awarding custody to the foster parents with visitation rights for the mother. The Appellate Division modified the Family Court’s decision, granting the petition to terminate parental rights based on the mother’s mental illness and deeming the permanent neglect claim moot. The mother appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the mother was presently and for the foreseeable future unable to provide proper care for her child due to mental illness, justifying termination of her parental rights.

    2. Whether mental illness, in and of itself, excuses a parent from the obligation to plan for the future of the child, as required to avoid a finding of permanent neglect.

    Holding

    1. No, because while the evidence supported a finding of present inability, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the mother would be unable to care for the child for the foreseeable future.

    2. No, because the statute requires a separate determination of physical and financial ability to plan for the child’s future, and mental illness does not automatically equate to a physical disability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erred in terminating parental rights based solely on mental illness without sufficient evidence of future inability to care for the child. The court-appointed psychiatrist testified that the mother showed improvement and might be able to care for the child in the future with ongoing treatment and medication. The court stated, “I think that remaining in remission and given therapeutic support that she might very well be able to rear the child”. The Court emphasized that any conclusion about future inability would be speculative and lacked the clear and convincing proof required for termination of parental rights.

    Regarding permanent neglect, the Court clarified that the statute requires the parent to be “physically and financially” able to plan for the child’s future. It rejected the Appellate Division’s view that mental illness automatically equates to physical inability, stating: “We do not read the language as encompassing mental condition or status, nor do we, as did the Appellate Division, equate mental and physical capacity.” The Court reasoned that if mental illness were an acceptable excuse for failing to plan, the statutory provision would be rendered nearly useless, as many parents who fail to plan may have some form of mental disturbance. The Court noted that the statute addresses mental illness specifically in other sections, implying a deliberate choice not to include it as an automatic exemption for failing to plan. The court noted that under the statute, drug and alcohol use doesn’t excuse the requirement to plan unless the parent is hospitalized for it, further emphasizing that the statute means what it says.