New York Law Review

Tag: peremptory challenges

  • People v. Alston, 88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996): Permissible Jury Selection Methods Under New York Criminal Procedure Law

    88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996)

    CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, without requiring the prosecution to exhaust all challenges to the entire panel at once.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 270.15) mandates the prosecution to make all peremptory challenges to a jury array before the defendant makes any, or if the court can require sequential challenges to individual jurors or subsets. The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection as long as the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant and doesn’t challenge a juror already accepted by both parties. This decision upheld the trial courts’ methods and affirmed the defendants’ convictions.

    Facts

    In People v. Alston, after initial rounds of jury selection, the trial court directed the parties to exercise peremptory challenges to the first five prospective jurors to complete the jury. The defendant objected, arguing the prosecution had to challenge the entire panel. In People v. Morris, the court instructed attorneys to make peremptory challenges juror by juror, with the prosecution going first. The defendant objected, arguing CPL 270.15 required the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges against the entire panel before the defense made any.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial courts’ methods violated CPL 270.15. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals due to the similar issue regarding jury selection procedures.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 270.15 mandates that the prosecution exercise all peremptory challenges to a particular array of jurors before the defendant is required to exercise any peremptory challenges to that array, or whether the trial court has discretion to implement alternative methods.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15 provides flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, and the prosecution does not challenge a juror already accepted by both parties, consistent with the statute’s language and history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that CPL 270.15 allows flexibility in jury selection. Specifically, the court noted the ambiguity in CPL 270.15 (2), stating that the phrase “[t]he people must exercise their peremptory challenges first” can be interpreted to mean that each prosecution challenge must precede each defense challenge, rather than requiring all prosecution challenges to precede any defense challenges. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to require the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges to the entire panel would give some defendants a tactical advantage, dependent on the judge’s discretionary decisions regarding filling the jury box. Quoting People v. McQuade, the court acknowledged that “the requirement…that the People shall challenge first, is the only substantial advantage remaining to a defendant.” The Court found that the historical rule that the People make peremptory challenges first, and never be permitted to go back and challenge a juror accepted by the defense was not violated by the juror-by-juror method. The dissent argued the statute plainly requires the People to exercise all peremptory challenges to the panel “first,” before the defense begins and that once the defense exercises its challenge or challenges, the statute precludes the People from challenging any juror then in the box, not just those jurors in the box whom “both sides have had an opportunity” to challenge.

  • People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263 (1993): Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination in Jury Selection Under Batson

    People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263 (1993)

    To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, a defendant must show that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial group and that facts and circumstances raise an inference that the challenges were used to exclude potential jurors because of their race.

    Summary

    Defendant, an African-American, was convicted of burglary. During jury selection, defense counsel claimed the prosecutor was using peremptory challenges to exclude African-American jurors. The trial court, stating peremptory challenges are absolute, overruled the objection. The Appellate Division affirmed, noting the voir dire wasn’t part of the record. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defense failed to present sufficient facts to raise an inference of discrimination. The Court clarified that while a trial court’s misstatement of Batson principles is error, a defendant must still meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

    Facts

    The defendant, an African-American, was charged with burglary. During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges. Defense counsel objected, asserting the prosecutor was using peremptory challenges to exclude African-American jurors, arguing that the jurors’ questioning was proper and they indicated no reason why they could not serve fairly. The prosecutor stated that he accepted one black juror and was not excluding black jurors because of their race. The trial court overruled the objection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree and possession of burglar’s tools in the trial court. The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to require the prosecutor to furnish a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges. The Appellate Division rejected the argument, holding the defendant failed to substantiate his claim because the voir dire proceedings were not made available as part of the record on appeal. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky.

    2. Whether the minutes of the voir dire must be furnished to obtain relief on appeal under Batson v. Kentucky.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s assertions were insufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race.

    2. No, because the minutes of the voir dire need not be provided in every instance as a precondition for obtaining Batson relief, especially when the facts elicited during the Batson colloquy are sufficient for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the trial court’s misstatement of the law regarding peremptory challenges being absolute, clarifying that Batson v. Kentucky prohibits racially motivated peremptory challenges. However, the Court emphasized that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court reiterated the Batson standard: the defendant must show that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial group and that facts and circumstances exist to raise an inference that the challenges were used to exclude potential jurors based on race.

    The Court found that the defense counsel’s assertion that the jurors’ questioning was proper and that they gave no reason why they could not serve fairly was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. The court reasoned that merely striking two of three African-American jurors, without more, did not establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. The Court stated, “Defense counsel’s other assertions during the Batson colloquy that ‘[the prospective jurors’] questioning was proper’ and that ‘[t]hey indicated no reason why they could not serve fairly on this jury’ were also insufficient to establish a prima facie case on this record.”

    The Court also clarified that the voir dire minutes are not always necessary for appellate review. A trial or appellate court can determine whether a prima facie case exists based on the facts elicited during the Batson colloquy. The Court emphasized that a party asserting a Batson claim should articulate all supporting grounds, both factual and legal, during the colloquy. In the instant case, the Court found defense counsel’s statements too perfunctory to establish an inference of discriminatory motive.

  • People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 874 (1995): Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

    People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 874 (1995)

    A defendant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky when the prosecution uses peremptory challenges to remove a disproportionate number of jurors from a cognizable racial group, shifting the burden to the prosecution to provide racially neutral reasons for the strikes.

    Summary

    The defendant, an African-American, appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution engaged in racially discriminatory jury selection by using peremptory challenges to remove four of the six African-American members of the venire. The New York Court of Appeals agreed that the defendant had presented a prima facie case of discrimination, triggering the prosecution’s obligation to provide racially neutral explanations for the strikes. Because the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to explain one of the strikes, the Court remitted the case to the trial court for a hearing to allow the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason. If a satisfactory explanation is provided, the conviction stands; otherwise, the conviction is vacated, and a new trial is ordered.

    Facts

    During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove four of the six African-American members of the jury venire. The defendant, who is also African-American, objected, arguing that the prosecution’s strikes were racially motivated.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant made a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner by striking four of the six African-American prospective jurors.

    Holding

    Yes, because the disproportionate number of strikes against African-American jurors established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, shifting the burden to the prosecution to provide racially neutral reasons for the strikes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79, 96, and People v. Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, which prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on race. The Court determined that the defendant met the initial burden of showing circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors because of their race. “Defendant — pointing to the fact that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged four of the six African-American members of the venire — contends that he has made a prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, and that the burden therefore shifted to the prosecution to come forward with racially neutral reasons for the strikes”. Because the prosecutor was not asked to provide a racially neutral reason for one of the challenged jurors, the case was remitted to the Supreme Court for a hearing. The Court emphasized that the prosecution should be given the opportunity to provide a race-neutral reason for the exercise of the strike. If a satisfactory explanation is provided, the judgment of conviction should be amended to show that result; otherwise, the judgment of conviction should be vacated and a new trial ordered. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of ensuring that jury selection is free from racial bias and provides a practical mechanism for addressing potential violations of the Batson rule.

  • People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 764 (1990): Peremptory Challenges Based on Highest Crime Charged

    People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 764 (1990)

    The number of peremptory challenges a defendant is entitled to during jury selection is determined by the highest crime charged in the indictment, regardless of the evidence’s sufficiency to support that charge.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for attempted robbery in the first degree, a class C felony, but the trial court found insufficient evidence for that charge, believing the evidence supported only attempted robbery in the second degree, a class D felony. Despite this, the People did not supersede the indictment. At trial, the court granted the defendant only 10 peremptory challenges, the number allowed for the lesser charge, instead of the 15 challenges for the higher charge in the indictment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the number of peremptory challenges is dictated by the highest crime formally charged in the indictment, not by the crime the court believes is supported by the evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on a single count of attempted robbery in the first degree based on displaying what appeared to be a firearm during the crime. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence to support the charge. The trial court agreed that the evidence was insufficient for attempted first-degree robbery but found sufficient evidence for the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the second degree. However, the court did not dismiss the first-degree robbery charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. The People did not attempt to supersede the indictment. The case proceeded to trial on the original charge of attempted robbery in the first degree. The trial court granted the defendant only 10 peremptory challenges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the number of peremptory challenges allowed to a defendant is determined by the highest crime charged in the indictment, or by the crime the trial court believes is supported by sufficient evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 270.25(2) clearly states that the number of peremptory challenges is based on the degree of the highest crime charged in the indictment, regardless of the evidence’s strength regarding that charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of CPL 270.25(2), which explicitly ties the number of peremptory challenges to the highest crime charged in the indictment. The court rejected the argument that the trial court could effectively “amend” the indictment to reflect the lesser charge. The court stated, “Although the court made it clear that if the People’s case proceeded as expected, attempted first degree robbery would not be submitted to the jury, that was no substitute for compliance with the clear statutory directive of CPL 270.25 (2), which bases the number of peremptory challenges each party must be allowed on the degree of the highest crime charged.” The court acknowledged the trial court’s frustration with the situation but stressed that such procedural matters are for legislative action, not judicial improvisation. Because the defendant was formally charged with a class C felony, attempted robbery in the first degree, he was entitled to 15 peremptory challenges, regardless of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.

  • People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638 (1990): Defense’s Use of Peremptory Challenges and Racial Discrimination

    People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638 (1990)

    The purposeful exclusion of jurors based on race by the defense, through peremptory challenges, violates both the Civil Rights Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of manslaughter and assault stemming from an attack on Black men. During jury selection, the defense used peremptory challenges to remove all Black jurors. The prosecution argued this was discriminatory. The New York Court of Appeals held that defense counsel’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on race violates the state constitution’s Civil Rights and Equal Protection Clauses. The court reasoned that jury service is a civil right and privilege of citizenship, and the State is inextricably involved in enforcing discriminatory decisions made during jury selection. This landmark case extends the Batson principle to defense attorneys in New York.

    Facts

    Michael Griffith, Cedric Sandiford, and Timothy Grimes, Black men, sought help after their car broke down in Howard Beach, Queens. A group of white teenagers, including defendants Kern, Lester, and Ladone, who had been at a birthday party, confronted and attacked the men. The incident escalated, with the attackers wielding bats and sticks, yelling racial slurs, and chasing the victims. Griffith, attempting to escape, ran onto the Belt Parkway, where he was struck by a car and killed. Sandiford was severely beaten. The defendants were arrested and indicted for manslaughter, assault, and conspiracy.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in Supreme Court, Queens County. During jury selection, the defense used peremptory challenges to remove Black jurors. The prosecution challenged this as discriminatory. The Supreme Court ruled that the defense could not exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, applying the Batson v. Kentucky standard prospectively. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the State Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.

    2. Whether the defense exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges constitutes “State action” for equal protection purposes.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense is prohibited by the Civil Rights Clause of Article I, § 11 of the State Constitution.

    2. Yes, because the judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by defense counsel constitutes “State action” for the purposes of the State equal protection provision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that jury service is both a privilege of citizenship secured by Article I, § 1 of the State Constitution and a civil right explicitly protected by Civil Rights Law § 13, which states that no citizen shall be disqualified from jury service based on race. The court reasoned that the Civil Rights Clause of Article I, § 11 prohibits private as well as state discrimination regarding civil rights. "[I]t is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government" (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130). The court found “State action” because the State is “inevitably and inextricably involved in the process of excluding jurors as a result of a defendant’s peremptory challenges.” The statute (CPL 270.25) confers the right, the jurors are summoned by the State, and the judge enforces the discriminatory decision. The court concluded that “judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by defense counsel constitutes ‘State action’ for the purposes of our State equal protection provision.” The court affirmed the lower court’s order.

  • People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992): Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

    People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992)

    A defendant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection by showing membership in a cognizable racial group, the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race, and circumstances raising an inference that the challenges were used to exclude jurors based on race.

    Summary

    Bolling, a black defendant, was convicted of robbery. During jury selection, the prosecutor used 7 of 10 peremptory challenges to remove black jurors. Bolling argued this was discriminatory. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. The Court of Appeals agreed a prima facie case was made but modified the order, remitting for a hearing to allow the prosecution to offer race-neutral explanations for the strikes. The Court held excluding even some jurors based on race violates equal protection, regardless of the racial makeup of the final jury, but the prosecution should have an opportunity to explain the challenges.

    Facts

    Bolling, a black man, was indicted for robbery and attempted murder. During jury selection, the prosecution used 7 of its 10 peremptory challenges to remove black prospective jurors. The defense attorney argued this constituted a pattern of discrimination, as the Bronx population was majority black. The prosecutor volunteered to explain the qualifications of each juror, but the trial court denied the mistrial motion and declined the offer.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Bolling of second-degree robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a discriminatory pattern of strikes against black jurors. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that ordering a new trial deprived them of the opportunity to offer non-pretextual, race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky?

    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in ordering a new trial without first providing the prosecution an opportunity to offer race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor’s disproportionate use of peremptory challenges to strike black venirepersons, who were a heterogeneous group, raised an inference of discrimination.

    2. Yes, because the People were effectively deprived of their opportunity to present their case when the trial court summarily rejected their offer to explain the challenges, and fairness dictates they be given that opportunity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that racially motivated peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must show membership in a cognizable racial group, the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race, and circumstances raising an inference that the challenges were used to exclude jurors based on race. The Court found the high number of strikes against black jurors (7 out of 10) established a pattern. The court emphasized that even if some black jurors remain, excluding others based on race is a Batson violation because it harms both the defendant and the excluded jurors, undermining public confidence in the justice system. The court stated, “The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community…Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is ‘a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.’” (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 87-88). The Court remanded the case to allow the prosecution to offer race-neutral explanations because the trial court originally prevented them from doing so.

  • People v. Pepper, 68 N.Y.2d 775 (1986): Retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky

    68 N.Y.2d 775 (1986)

    The procedural safeguards established in Batson v. Kentucky regarding peremptory challenges do not apply retroactively to cases where the normal appellate process was exhausted before Batson was decided.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors violated his right to an impartial jury under Batson v. Kentucky. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Batson’s new procedural rules do not apply retroactively to cases where the appellate process was complete before Batson was decided. The court also addressed and dismissed other claims related to the defendant’s mental state and the constitutionality of certain penal law sections.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on six counts, including attempted murder in the first degree, stemming from an alleged attempt to rob a gas station, commandeer a police car, and shoot at a police officer.

    At trial, the defendant claimed mental disease or defect as a defense.

    The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney after receiving Miranda warnings, to rebut the defense of mental disease or defect.

    The defendant alleged the prosecutor systematically used peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction.

    A judge of the Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal but reconsidered after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson v. Kentucky and subsequently granted leave.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence and request for counsel to rebut the insanity defense, and whether defense counsel adequately preserved this issue for appeal.

    2. Whether the rule established in Batson v. Kentucky, regarding the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race, applies retroactively to cases where the appellate process had been exhausted before Batson was decided.

    3. Whether the defendant’s argument regarding the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 110.05, raised for the first time in the reply brief, should be considered by the court.

    Holding

    1. No, because defense counsel’s generalized objections did not adequately alert the trial judge to the specific arguments raised on appeal, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.

    2. No, because Batson v. Kentucky is not applicable to cases where the normal appellate process has been exhausted.

    3. No, because the argument was improperly raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the defense counsel’s generalized objections at trial were insufficient to preserve the issue of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence for appellate review. The court emphasized that specific objections are required to alert the trial judge to the precise nature of the alleged error.

    Regarding the Batson issue, the Court relied on principles of retroactivity, stating that Batson does not apply retroactively to cases where the normal appellate process had already been exhausted. The Court cited Allen v. Hardy, which held that Batson’s rule is not mandated by Federal constitutional retroactivity principles. The court stated, “Batson is not applicable to a case where the normal appellate process has been exhausted, as occurred here.“

    Finally, the Court declined to consider the defendant’s argument concerning the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 110.05 because it was raised for the first time in the reply brief, violating established procedural rules against raising new arguments in reply briefs. The court cited State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v LiMauro, noting the prohibition against sur-reply briefs. “This contention was improperly raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief to this court.“

  • People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 482 (1982): Peremptory Challenges and Racial Bias in Jury Selection

    People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 482 (1982)

    A prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on race does not violate the New York Constitution unless a pattern of systematic exclusion over time is demonstrated, aligning with the Supreme Court’s holding in Swain v. Alabama.

    Summary

    McCray was convicted of robbery. During jury selection, the defense argued the prosecutor unlawfully used peremptory challenges to exclude black and Hispanic jurors and moved for a mistrial or a hearing. The trial court denied the motions, relying on Swain v. Alabama, which held that a prosecutor’s motives are not subject to scrutiny based solely on the manner in which peremptory challenges are exercised in a single case. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the State Constitution does not compel a departure from Swain, and the peremptory challenge system does not require prosecutors to justify their use of such challenges absent a showing of systematic exclusion of minority jurors over time.

    Facts

    Philip Roberts, a student, was robbed at gunpoint. Roberts later identified McCray in a group on a street corner. During jury selection, the prosecutor used 8 of 11 peremptory challenges to exclude all black and the only Hispanic prospective juror.

    Procedural History

    The defense moved for a mistrial or a hearing, claiming the prosecutor unlawfully used peremptory challenges based on race. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial or a hearing to inquire into the prosecutor’s motives for exercising peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on their race or ethnicity, in the absence of a showing of a systematic pattern of discrimination.

    Holding

    No, because the New York Constitution does not compel a departure from the Supreme Court’s holding in Swain v. Alabama, which requires a showing of systematic exclusion of minority jurors over a period of time, not just in a single case, before requiring the prosecutor to justify the use of peremptory challenges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the distinction between the jury pool and the selected jury. The Sixth Amendment requires the jury pool to be a representative cross-section of the community, but prospective jurors can be excluded through cause and peremptory challenges. A peremptory challenge requires no assigned reason. The court in Swain v. Alabama determined that a prosecutor’s motives for striking particular jurors may not be scrutinized based solely on the assertion that peremptories are being used to exclude minorities; systematic exclusion over time must be shown. The court stated, “[T]he peremptory challenge ‘must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.’” The court declined to convert the peremptory challenge system into one based solely on challenges for cause, as doing so would eliminate subtle biases that voir dire may fail to uncover. Requiring prosecutors to justify peremptory challenges would lead to more extensive voir dire and evidentiary hearings, causing unwarranted delays. “[O]ne who discriminates ‘cannot be expected to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discrimination practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive.”‘ The court found no basis for rejecting the holding of Swain v. Alabama, concluding that the benefits of requiring justification for peremptory challenges are outweighed by the damage to a system that guarantees a fair and impartial jury.

  • People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977): Prohibition and Mandamus in Criminal Cases

    People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977)

    Prohibition and mandamus do not lie to review errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Summary

    In an Attica-related criminal prosecution, the trial court granted the defendants more peremptory jury challenges than allowed by statute. The prosecution sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from exceeding its statutory authority. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition (and mandamus) are extraordinary remedies that do not lie to correct mere errors of law in criminal cases, even if those errors are unreviewable on appeal. Allowing such collateral review would create undue delays and undermine the policy of limiting appeals in criminal matters.

    Facts

    Two inmates were charged with murder stemming from the Attica prison riot. Prior to jury selection, the defendants moved for an order allowing them more than the 20 peremptory challenges prescribed by CPL 270.25. The trial court granted the defendants 30 peremptory challenges and denied the People an equal increase. The prosecution argued that the trial court’s action was without statutory authority and violated precedent. The prosecution also argued that the ruling would never be reviewable on appeal due to statutory limitations on appeals in criminal actions.

    Procedural History

    The People commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from granting the defendants more peremptory challenges than statutorily allowed. The Appellate Division granted the People’s petition. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition or mandamus under CPLR article 78 may lie to undo what may be assumed to be an egregious error of law in a criminal action, and which, for the purposes of the present review, may also be assumed to have been prejudicial to the rights of the People.

    Holding

    No, because the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus do not lie to correct errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies available only where there is a clear legal right, and in the case of prohibition, only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. Errors of law, even if verbalized as excesses of jurisdiction, are not a proper basis for using the extraordinary writ. Nonreviewability by appeal alone does not provide a basis for collateral review via prohibition or mandamus. The court emphasized that the right of review by appeal in criminal matters is determined exclusively by statute, reflecting a policy to limit appellate proliferation and ensure speedy trials. Allowing collateral proceedings to review errors of law would lead to undue delays and frustrate the efficient administration of justice. The Court distinguished cases where prohibition or mandamus were appropriate, noting that those cases involved an unlawful use or abuse of the entire criminal action, as opposed to an error within the proceeding related to its proper purpose. The court warned that allowing such proceedings would “make speedy trial a legal impossibility.”