People v. Zorn, 34 N.Y.2d 137 (1974)

A validly obtained eavesdropping warrant permits the use of intercepted communications against parties to the conversation, even if they are not named in the warrant itself, provided the warrant’s scope encompasses the specified crime and named suspect.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether telephone conversations intercepted under a valid eavesdropping warrant could be used to establish probable cause for a subsequent search warrant against a party not named in the original eavesdropping warrant. The Court held that such conversations are admissible, provided the eavesdropping warrant was validly obtained and the intercepted communications pertained to the crime specified in the warrant involving the named suspect. The Court reasoned that the focus is on the lawfulness of the seizure of the communication, not on against whom the communication is used.

Facts

In People v. Zorn, an eavesdropping warrant was issued for the phone of Slayka, suspected of gambling offenses. During the surveillance, conversations between Slayka and Zorn were intercepted, revealing details of illegal gambling activity. Based on these conversations, a search warrant was obtained for Zorn’s apartment, where evidence of a large-scale gambling operation was discovered. Zorn was arrested after arriving at the apartment with a key. In People v. Gnozzo, a similar situation arose where Gnozzo was implicated in gambling through a conversation with Lombardo, who was the subject of a valid eavesdropping warrant. This led to a search of Gnozzo’s premises.

Procedural History

In Zorn, the trial court denied Zorn’s motion to suppress the evidence. Zorn pleaded guilty and was sentenced, with the Appellate Division affirming the lower court’s decision. In Gnozzo, the trial court granted Gnozzo’s motion to suppress, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division.

Issue(s)

1. Whether conversations intercepted under a valid eavesdropping warrant can be used against a party not named in the warrant to establish probable cause for a subsequent search warrant.
2. In Zorn, whether the eavesdropping warrant was supported by probable cause.
3. In Zorn, whether the 30-day term of the eavesdropping warrant and absence of limitation as to hours for execution was too broad.

Holding

1. Yes, because the focus is on whether the seizure of the communication was lawful under the warrant, not on who is ultimately prosecuted using that communication.
2. Yes, because the affidavit supporting the warrant application provided sufficient evidence of Slayka’s gambling activities to establish probable cause.
3. No, because the 30-day period is reasonable for the type of surveillance required in gambling investigations, and the absence of hourly restrictions did not render the warrant unconstitutional under the specific facts of the case.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the relevant statutes (Code of Criminal Procedure and Criminal Procedure Law) require warrants to particularly describe the communications sought and identify the person whose communications are to be intercepted, if known. The warrants in these cases complied with those requirements by naming the known suspects and describing the criminal activity. The Court emphasized that the constitutionality of the warrants as to the named suspects was not challenged.

The Court stated, “[T]here is no requirement the communication be used only against named suspects.” It interpreted the statute’s notice requirement to “other parties” of intercepted communications to indicate legislative intent that these statements could be used in criminal proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that the warrant had to be amended to include Zorn’s name, stating that such an amendment is required only when a communication involves a different crime than the one specified in the warrant. The court cited McKinney’s 1968 Session Laws of New York, Memorandum, p. 2293, at p. 2296, noting, “the legislative intent was to require amendments where different crimes are disclosed.”

The Court noted that both the State and Federal Constitutions prohibit only “unreasonable searches and seizures” and “unreasonable interception of telephone communications.” Since the eavesdropping was conducted in accordance with the terms of the valid warrants, it was not unreasonable. The Court cited several federal cases, including United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, in support of the proposition that eavesdropping statutes and warrants are valid, and the conversations usable against persons not named in the warrants. “Admissibility does not determine the lawfulness of the seizure; the lawfulness of the seizure determines admissibility.”