New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Young

  • People v. Young, 28 N.Y.3d 415 (2016): Confidentiality of Presentence Reports and the Right to Respond

    28 N.Y.3d 415 (2016)

    A sentencing court violates a defendant’s due process rights and CPL 390.50 by failing to adequately explain on the record the reasons for withholding information from the defendant, reviewed by the court for sentencing purposes, even if the source was promised confidentiality.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two issues concerning sentencing procedure. First, the court held that a sentencing court is not required to state its reasons for denying youthful offender (YO) status. Second, the court found that the sentencing court violated CPL 390.50 and the defendant’s due process rights by failing to sufficiently explain its reasons for withholding a confidential document from the defendant that was considered during sentencing. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the County Court for further proceedings, emphasizing the importance of transparency and the defendant’s right to respond to information used in sentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant, then 18, was indicted for attempted murder and assault after a stabbing incident. He pleaded guilty and requested youthful offender status and disclosure of victim impact statements. At sentencing, the court denied disclosure of victim impact statements and imposed a 20-year prison sentence. The Appellate Division remitted for the sentencing court to make a record of its determination regarding youthful offender (YO) status and to explain the reasons for refusing to disclose certain written statements. On remittal, the court denied YO status and stated that it had reviewed a confidential page of the presentence investigation report (PSI), withholding it from disclosure. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the sentencing court had sufficiently complied with its prior order, prompting the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at the trial court and appealed to the Appellate Division, which remitted the case for specific findings. After a second sentencing, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Division again, which affirmed the sentencing court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case back to the County Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a sentencing court is required to state, on the record, its reasons for denying youthful offender (YO) treatment.

    2. Whether the sentencing court violated CPL 390.50 and the defendant’s due process rights by failing to adequately explain its reasons for withholding a confidential document from disclosure.

    Holding

    1. No, because the legislature did not explicitly require courts to state the reasons for denying YO status, and the court is not obligated to articulate its reasoning for a sentence that is within statutory parameters.

    2. Yes, because the sentencing court failed to adequately explain its reasons for withholding the confidential document, thereby depriving the defendant of the ability to respond to information used in sentencing and violating his due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court first addressed the YO status issue, referencing the plain language of CPL 720.20, and concluding that the legislature left it to the sentencing court’s discretion to decide whether to explain the denial of YO status. The court emphasized that CPL 720.20 does not mandate a statement of reasons, unlike some other sentencing provisions. The court reasoned that policy considerations support this discretion, as sentencing courts are best positioned to weigh the benefits and detriments of explaining the decision to deny YO status. The court determined that the sentencing court had complied with CPL 720.20 by explicitly denying the defendant’s request for YO treatment.

    The court then examined the withholding of the confidential document. Citing CPL 390.50, the court recognized that defendants have a due process right to contest information used in sentencing. Although the court can except information from disclosure based on a promise of confidentiality, it must still exercise its own discretion. The court found that the sentencing court failed to explain the nature or reasons for the confidentiality of the document. The court held that without this explanation, neither the Court of Appeals nor the Appellate Division could adequately review whether the court had abused its discretion, violating the defendant’s rights and CPL 390.50. The court quoted: “In all cases where a part or parts of the report or memoranda are not disclosed, the court shall state for the record that a part or parts of the report or memoranda have been excepted and the reasons for its action.”

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of transparency in sentencing. It clarifies that while sentencing courts are not obligated to provide reasons for denying youthful offender status, they must clearly justify withholding information from a defendant that will be considered in sentencing. The court recognized the importance of ensuring the accuracy and reliability of information used in sentencing and protecting the defendant’s right to respond. This means that the court must state on the record the nature of any withheld document, as well as the reason for withholding it. If a court intends to keep confidential any portion of a document, it should disclose the nature of that document, or redacted portion, as much as possible without revealing confidential information. The court may also choose not to rely on the document, and state that on the record. This decision impacts how judges handle sentencing, specifically the balancing act between confidentiality and a defendant’s right to a fair process.

  • People v. Young, 11 N.Y.3d 967 (2009): Proper Standard for Weight of Evidence Review

    People v. Young, 11 N.Y.3d 967 (2009)

    An appellate court’s reference to People v. Gaimari in its weight of the evidence review does not automatically indicate that the court applied an incorrect legal standard.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, which had upheld the defendant’s conviction for assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon. The defendant argued that the Appellate Division applied the wrong standard when determining that the verdict wasn’t against the weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals disagreed, clarifying that a mere citation to People v. Gaimari does not demonstrate that the Appellate Division failed to properly analyze the defendant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction. The Court also rejected the defendant’s claims that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding justification.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted after a bench trial of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. The specific facts of the assault and weapon possession are not detailed in this memorandum opinion, as the legal issues revolve around the standard of review applied by the Appellate Division and the trial court’s handling of the justification defense, not the underlying facts of the crime itself.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted the defendant after a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division used the wrong legal standard in its weight of the evidence review and that the trial court improperly handled the justification defense.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, merely by referencing People v. Gaimari.

    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in not reversing the conviction because the trial court allegedly shifted the burden of proving justification to the defendant, failed to view the evidence of justification in the light most favorable to the defendant, and applied the wrong legal standard regarding the amount of force one can use for justification purposes.

    Holding

    1. No, because a mere reference to People v. Gaimari does not, by itself, indicate that the Appellate Division failed to apply the correct legal standard when reviewing the weight of the evidence.

    2. No, because the trial court properly considered whether the defendant’s actions were justified and concluded that they were not, and that the People had disproven the defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division’s reference to People v. Gaimari did not automatically mean that it failed to apply the proper legal standard for analyzing the defendant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. The court cited People v. Vega and People v. Romero, clarifying that simply mentioning Gaimari does not invalidate the Appellate Division’s conclusion, especially when the court explicitly states it exercised its factual review power and found the trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence to be supported by the record.

    Regarding the justification defense, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court properly considered and rejected the defense, finding that the prosecution had met its burden of disproving justification beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did not find any reversible error in the trial court’s handling of the justification issue.

    The Court of Appeals also stated that the defendant’s legal sufficiency argument as to the weapon possession charge was unpreserved (meaning the defendant did not raise it properly in the lower courts) and that his interest of justice argument was beyond the Court of Appeals’ review. This highlights the importance of properly preserving legal arguments at each stage of litigation to ensure appellate review.

  • People v. Young, 81 N.Y.2d 727 (1992): Prior Threats and Justification Defense

    People v. Young, 81 N.Y.2d 727 (1992)

    Evidence of a victim’s prior threats against a defendant is admissible to determine who was the initial aggressor in a self-defense claim; however, an error in failing to instruct the jury on this point can be harmless if the evidence overwhelmingly disproves the justification defense.

    Summary

    Young was convicted of manslaughter and weapon possession after shooting Torrence. Young claimed self-defense, citing prior threats and violence by Torrence. The trial court allowed the jury to consider these threats only when evaluating Young’s state of mind, not when determining who was the initial aggressor. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the trial court erred, the error was harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that Young was the initial aggressor and Torrence did not pose an imminent threat.

    Facts

    On July 2, 1990, Young shot Torrence in the back of the neck, paralyzing him. Torrence later died from complications. Young claimed self-defense, alleging that Torrence had repeatedly threatened him in the weeks leading up to the shooting. Young testified that on the night of the shooting, Torrence made a gesture toward his waistband, leading Young to believe he was about to be attacked. Witnesses testified that Torrence was unarmed, attempted to flee, and was shot in the back of the neck.

    Procedural History

    Young was indicted for attempted murder, then for murder after Torrence’s death. At trial, Young argued justification. The trial court instructed the jury that prior threats could only be considered in evaluating Young’s state of mind. The jury convicted Young of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the deceased victim’s prior threats against the defendant could only be considered in determining the defendant’s state of mind, and not in determining who was the initial aggressor.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court erred because prior threats can be used to determine the initial aggressor; however, the error was harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly disproved the justification defense, indicating that Young was the initial aggressor and Torrence posed no imminent threat.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the precedent set in Stokes v. People and People v. Miller, holding that evidence of a deceased victim’s prior threats against the defendant is admissible to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor, regardless of whether the threats were communicated to the defendant. The Court reasoned that such threats can indicate an intent to act upon them. However, the Court found that the error in this case was harmless because the evidence clearly showed that Torrence was unarmed, tried to run away, and was shot in the back. The Court emphasized that Young’s use of deadly force was unreasonable, as there was no persuasive evidence that Torrence was about to use deadly physical force against him. The Court stated: “Because there was overwhelming evidence disproving the justification defense and no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the charge been correctly given, the error in the trial court’s justification charge was harmless.” The Court also held that the trial court properly excluded cumulative and collateral testimony. The Court cited People v Davis, noting the trial court has discretion to admit or preclude relevant evidence based on an analysis of its probative value versus whether it confuses the main issues and misleads the jury.

  • People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40 (2006): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40 (2006)

    A trial court has discretion to admit or deny expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, but that discretion should lean towards admission when identification evidence is weak and uncorroborated.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of robbery and burglary based on a witness’s identification, which was preceded by a suppressed lineup identification. The trial court denied the defendant’s request to present expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the dissent argued that the expert testimony should have been admitted given the weakness of the eyewitness identification and lack of corroborating evidence. This case highlights the complexities and judicial discretion involved in determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony.

    Facts

    William and Lisa Sykes were victims of a home invasion in March 1991. The perpetrator wore a scarf and blanket, obscuring his face but revealing his eyes, forehead, and part of his nose. Lisa Sykes described the assailant to police. She could not create a composite sketch or identify anyone in a photo array. She later identified the defendant, Young, in a lineup. Young’s initial conviction was reversed due to a lack of probable cause for his arrest, leading to suppression of the lineup identification.

    Procedural History

    1. Defendant was initially convicted in 1992.
    2. The conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division in 1998 due to an unlawful arrest.
    3. Prior to the second trial, the trial court held an independent source hearing to determine if Mrs. Sykes had a basis to identify Young independent of the tainted lineup.
    4. Defendant was convicted again in January 2000.
    5. The Appellate Division affirmed the second conviction.
    6. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, with a dissent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, given that the primary identification evidence was potentially tainted and uncorroborated.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification rests within the trial court’s discretion, and in this instance, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of that discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority found that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the expert testimony. However, the dissent argued that excluding the testimony was an error, especially given the circumstances of the identification. The dissent emphasized that Mrs. Sykes could not initially create a composite sketch or identify Young in a photo array, and her identification only occurred after the illegal lineup. The dissent cited People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 (2001), noting that while trial courts have discretion, the trend favors admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification when it would assist the jury. The dissent pointed out that, unlike People v. Lee, where the witness made multiple identifications, Mrs. Sykes’s identification was more tenuous. The dissent quoted People v. Mooney, 76 NY2d 827, 829 (1990), stating that “the emerging trend today is to find expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification sufficiently reliable to be admitted, and the vast majority of academic commentators have urged its acceptance”. The dissent argued that when eyewitness identification is attenuated and uncorroborated, courts should be more inclined to allow expert testimony. The expert’s testimony was intended to show the weak correlation between witness confidence and accuracy, the difficulty of remembering a face when the mind cannot encode all the features at once, and the possibility of memory source confusion. Allowing it would have assisted the jury in assessing the reliability of Mrs. Sykes’ identification.

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 170 (1999): Appellate Court’s Power to Modify Illegal Sentences

    People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 170 (1999)

    An intermediate appellate court has the discretion, when reversing or modifying a sentence, either to remit the case to the trial court for resentencing or to substitute its own legal sentence for the illegally imposed sentence.

    Summary

    The People appealed from an Appellate Division order modifying a judgment of the trial court by directing that all sentences run concurrently, arguing that the Appellate Division’s only option was to remit the case for resentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that under CPL 470.20, an intermediate appellate court has the discretion to either remit for resentencing or substitute its own legal sentence when correcting an illegal sentence. The Court found that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in choosing to modify the sentence itself.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of sodomy in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for these convictions. The Appellate Division found that imposing consecutive sentences was erroneous because both convictions arose from a single incident.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant and imposed consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division modified the trial court’s judgment, directing that the sentences run concurrently instead of consecutively. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division lacked the authority to modify the sentence and should have remitted the case to the trial court for resentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 470.20, the Appellate Division’s only available corrective action on the illegal sentence was to remit for resentencing by the trial court.

    Holding

    No, because an intermediate appellate court, in exercising its responsibility under CPL 470.20 to take “such corrective action as is necessary and appropriate,” has the discretion, upon reversing or modifying a sentence, either to remit to the trial court for resentencing or to substitute its own legal sentence for the illegally imposed sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 470.20 grants appellate courts the power to take “such corrective action as is necessary and appropriate.” This broad language, according to the Court, allows the Appellate Division to choose between remitting the case or modifying the sentence directly. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division is not limited to remittal and has the discretion to substitute its own legal sentence. The court stated that an intermediate appellate court has the discretion, upon reversing or modifying a sentence, either to remit to the trial court for resentencing or to substitute its own legal sentence for the illegally imposed sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion in the Appellate Division’s decision to modify the sentence, concluding that the statute allows for both options when an illegal sentence is identified. The decision provides flexibility for appellate courts to efficiently correct sentencing errors without necessarily requiring a new hearing at the trial level. The ruling ensures that appellate courts have the tools necessary to provide effective remedies for sentencing errors, promoting judicial efficiency and fairness in the criminal justice system.

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999): Presumption of Vindictiveness After Retrial

    94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999)

    A presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing does not automatically arise when a defendant receives a greater sentence on an individual count after retrial, but a lesser overall sentence; courts must examine the record for a reasonable likelihood that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    Summary

    Defendant was initially convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of 45 years to life. After a successful appeal and retrial, he was convicted of only one offense, but received a sentence of 25 years to life on that count, exceeding the original sentence for that specific count, though the aggregate sentence was reduced. The New York Court of Appeals held that a presumption of vindictiveness did not automatically arise because his aggregate sentence was lower and required examination of the record to determine the likelihood the enhanced sentence was a result of vindictiveness. It affirmed the sentence because the record indicated it was based on his extensive criminal history.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with burglary and related offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 45 years to life. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. Upon retrial, Defendant was convicted of only one count: criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree. The second trial court sentenced Defendant, as a persistent felony offender, to 25 years to life on that count.

    Procedural History

    The initial conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division. After retrial and a new sentence, the Appellate Division affirmed the new sentence, finding no increased sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant receives a lesser overall sentence following retrial, but a greater sentence on an individual count?

    Holding

    No, because the presumption of vindictiveness arises only if the circumstances evince a reasonable likelihood that the greater sentence on the individual count was the result of vindictiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the principle that defendants should not be penalized for exercising their right to appeal, citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort’”). It noted the presumption of vindictiveness arises when defendants who have won appellate reversals are given greater sentences after retrials. However, this presumption is not absolute. Quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989), the court stated that the presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial”. The court reasoned that the key is whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    The court declined to adopt a strict “aggregate” or “count-by-count” approach. Instead, it mandated examination of the record to determine whether there’s a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was due to vindictiveness. In this case, the court emphasized Defendant’s extensive criminal history, including convictions for murder, robbery, and burglary, and the sentencing judge’s focus on this history. The court explained that the initial lenient sentence on the stolen property count was because the other convictions allowed for the desired overall sentence, but after retrial, the stolen property conviction was the only means to impose an appropriate sentence. Therefore, no presumption of vindictiveness arose because it was clear the increased sentence was based on his criminal history.

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 692 (2000): Limits on Prosecutorial Influence over Grand Jury Reconsideration

    People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 692 (2000)

    A Grand Jury may reconsider a no true bill vote only if the decision to reconsider is truly sua sponte and not the result of prosecutorial intervention; otherwise, the prosecutor must seek court permission to resubmit the charge.

    Summary

    Young was charged with robbery. The grand jury initially voted a no true bill on the robbery charge but, after the prosecutor reacted with visible disbelief and the District Attorney addressed the jury, they reconsidered and indicted him. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s reaction improperly influenced the grand jury’s decision to reconsider, violating the statute prohibiting resubmission of charges without court authorization. The court emphasized the importance of grand jury independence and curbing prosecutorial excess.

    Facts

    Young and two others allegedly beat and robbed Lee Cornell. The case was presented to a grand jury, which initially voted 12-10 against indicting Young for robbery, opting instead for a prosecutor’s information on assault. Upon receiving the vote, the Assistant District Attorney visibly reacted with disbelief. Although the Grand Jury had voted a no true bill on the robbery charge, the vote was never filed as a finding of dismissal under CPL 190.75 (1). The following day, the District Attorney spoke to the Grand Jury at its request, and at least one of the jurors expressed disapproval of the Assistant’s reaction to their vote. The District Attorney advised the jurors that they could reconsider any vote that had not been handed up. A week later, the grand jury recalled Cornell, heard further testimony, and subsequently indicted Young for robbery and assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that the prosecutor’s conduct influenced the grand jury’s reconsideration. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the grand jury’s decision was sua sponte. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the indictment but allowing the assault charge to proceed via prosecutor’s information, subject to the People seeking leave to resubmit the robbery charge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Grand Jury may reconsider its vote of a no true bill without court permission pursuant to CPL 190.75 (3), under circumstances which incontrovertibly indicate prosecutorial involvement in the Grand Jury’s deliberative process.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s intervention compromised the grand jury’s independence, requiring the prosecutor to seek court permission before resubmitting the charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 190.75(3) prohibits resubmitting a charge dismissed by a grand jury without court leave, preventing prosecutorial abuse. While a grand jury can reconsider a dismissal sua sponte before filing, prosecutorial intervention taints the process. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Grand Jury acts on its own: “Once the Grand Jury has indicated its rejection of the People’s evidence, then the customarily unfettered prosecutorial discretion in dealing with the Grand Jury is checked by the necessity of judicial authorization to resubmit.” The court found the prosecutor’s reaction to the initial vote contributed to the reconsideration, undermining the grand jury’s independence. The court stated, “The inference is undeniable that the prosecutor’s action upon receiving the initial vote sheet contributed to the Grand Jury’s decision to reconsider its prior action. Therefore resubmission of the robbery charge violated the prerequisite of CPL 190.75 (3).” Even without bad faith, the appearance of influence is enough to require court authorization for resubmission. This protects the grand jury’s independence and curbs potential prosecutorial overreach, consistent with the statute’s intent.

  • People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995 (1980): Voluntariness of Confession and Mistrial Standard

    People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995 (1980)

    A defendant’s inculpatory statements are admissible if they were voluntarily made following a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent; a mistrial is not warranted for peripheral references to other criminal acts if less drastic means can alleviate potential prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant’s confession was admissible because it was voluntarily made after a valid waiver of his rights. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s requests for a mistrial, which were based on peripheral references to another alleged criminal act, because less drastic means of addressing any potential prejudice were available and, in one instance, actively pursued through a jury instruction.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jerry Young, made inculpatory statements. Prior to trial, Young moved to suppress these statements, arguing that they were not voluntarily made. During the trial, peripheral references were made to another criminal act allegedly committed by the defendant. The defendant requested a mistrial based on these references.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found that the defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntary and admissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntarily made following an effective waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s requests for a mistrial based on peripheral references to another criminal act allegedly performed by the defendant.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record supports the finding that the inculpatory statements were voluntarily made after a valid waiver of rights.

    2. No, because less drastic means of alleviating whatever prejudice may have resulted from the references were available.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the factual finding of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the defendant’s statements were voluntarily made following an effective waiver of his rights. The Court emphasized that it found no basis for disturbing this finding.

    Regarding the mistrial requests, the Court stated that a mistrial was not mandated because less drastic means were available to alleviate any potential prejudice. In one instance, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. In another, the court indicated a willingness to consider a request to address the issue. The Court noted that the defendant insisted on a mistrial instead of pursuing these less drastic alternatives.

    The court stated, “Our examination of the record persuades us that there exists no basis for disturbing the factual finding made by Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division that the inculpatory statements had been voluntarily made by defendant following an effective waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.”