New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Winograd

  • People v. Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383 (1986): Strict Compliance with Eavesdropping Warrant Requirements

    People v. Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383 (1986)

    New York’s eavesdropping statute (CPL Article 700) demands strict compliance; failure to seek prompt amendment of a warrant after intercepting evidence of an unauthorized crime or to immediately seal tapes after a warrant’s expiration results in suppression of the evidence.

    Summary

    The Winograds, suspected of running a fencing operation and loansharking business, were subject to extensive police surveillance, including video surveillance and wiretaps. An initial wiretap authorized interception of conversations related to stolen property, but officers soon intercepted conversations regarding criminal usury. The prosecution’s delay in seeking an amendment to include usury, and subsequent delays in sealing the tapes after the warrants expired, led to the suppression of the evidence. The Court of Appeals emphasized the need for strict compliance with the eavesdropping statute to prevent abuse and protect privacy, reversing the conviction.

    Facts

    The Winograds operated a furrier business and were suspected of fencing stolen goods. Police used an informant and video surveillance to gather evidence. The initial wiretap warrant authorized interception of conversations about stolen property. Almost immediately, conversations concerning criminal usury were intercepted. The People obtained warrants authorizing wiretaps on the Winograds’ business, targeting stolen property and later, criminal usury. There were delays in seeking amendments to the warrant to include usury and in sealing the tapes after the warrants expired.

    Procedural History

    The Winograds were arrested and indicted. The defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was denied. She was convicted on multiple counts of criminal usury and possession of stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the crime of criminal usury is a crime “dangerous to life, limb, or property” within the meaning of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, thereby authorizing state eavesdropping warrants for such a crime?
    2. Whether the People sought an amendment to the eavesdropping warrant “as soon as practicable” after intercepting conversations relating to criminal usury, as required by CPL 700.65(4)?
    3. Whether the People complied with the sealing requirements of CPL 700.50(2) by immediately sealing the tapes after the expiration of the eavesdropping warrants?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the term “crime” in the federal statute is to be construed generically and the organized criminal enterprise here is dangerous to life, limb or property.

    2. No, because the People delayed 18 days in seeking the amendment, which was not “as soon as practicable.”
    3. No, because the People failed to offer satisfactory explanations for the delays in sealing the tapes after the expiration of the warrants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that New York law requires strict compliance with eavesdropping statutes. On the first issue, the Court found that criminal usury fell within the ambit of crimes “dangerous to life, limb, or property” permitting wiretapping, as it was part of a larger criminal enterprise. Regarding the warrant amendment, the Court stated that CPL 700.65(4) requires that an amendment be sought “as soon as practicable” after probable cause exists for an unlisted crime. Here, the police had probable cause to believe that the Winograds were committing criminal usury as early as July 14, yet they did not seek to amend the warrant until August 1, a delay of 18 days. The court found this delay violated the statute, especially given the continuous interception of conversations related to usury. Regarding the sealing requirement, CPL 700.50(2) mandates immediate sealing upon expiration of the warrant. The Court found the People’s explanation for the delay in sealing wiretap No. 2 (supervising Justice’s unavailability) inadequate, as they could have transferred authority to another Justice. Similarly, the delay in sealing wiretap No. 3 (expiration on a Saturday, sealing on Monday) was deemed insufficient, as law enforcement does not cease on weekends. The Court suppressed the evidence and any evidence derived from it, remanding for a determination of what evidence was derived from the suppressed evidence. The Court quoted People v. Sher, ” ‘[I]n the absence of compliance, the State officials lack authority to wiretap, and any interceptions they make are unlawful, and any evidence derived from the wiretap is inadmissible’ “.

  • People v. Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383 (1986): Admissibility of Evidence When a Search Warrant Relies on Both Valid and Invalid Information

    People v. Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383 (1986)

    Evidence obtained via a search warrant is admissible if the warrant was supported by probable cause established by untainted information, even if the warrant application also included information obtained in violation of sealing requirements for wiretap evidence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of evidence seized under a search warrant when the warrant application contains information from a valid wiretap and an invalid wiretap (due to a failure to seal the tapes promptly). The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible because the warrant was supported by probable cause based on information from a reliable informant, which was independent of the tainted wiretap information. The court emphasized that the valid information, standing alone, was sufficient to justify the warrant’s issuance.

    Facts

    A detective obtained two search warrants, one for Gates Avenue and another for Dumont Avenue, based on wiretap information and an informant’s statements. The Gates Avenue warrant was based on a valid wiretap. The Dumont Avenue warrant was based on an informant’s statements and corroborating information from another wiretap. However, the tapes from the second wiretap were not sealed as required by statute at the time the Dumont Avenue warrant was issued. The informant claimed to be a runner in a policy operation, calling in wagers to the Dumont Avenue location.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ruled on the admissibility of evidence obtained from the search warrants. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant is admissible when the warrant application included information obtained from a wiretap that was not sealed in compliance with statutory requirements, but also included independent information from a reliable informant that, standing alone, established probable cause.

    Holding

    Yes, because the informant’s statements, standing alone, provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, and the infirmity of the corroborative proof does not invalidate the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the validity of a search warrant depends on whether it is supported by probable cause. Here, the detective’s affidavit contained statements from an informant whose reliability had been previously demonstrated. The informant’s statements regarding placing policy wagers at the Dumont Avenue premises provided an independent basis for probable cause. The court stated that while the information from the unsealed wiretap could not be used to support the warrant, its presence did not invalidate the warrant because the informant’s statements were sufficient on their own. The court differentiated this case from cases where the warrant lacked sufficient probable cause without the tainted evidence. The court emphasized a practical approach, focusing on whether probable cause existed independent of the inadmissible evidence. The court noted, “But the infirmity of the corroborative proof does not serve to vitiate the validity of the statements of the informer which, standing alone, provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.” The court also distinguished its holding from People v. Sher, noting that the analysis adopted in People v. Weiss (which was relied upon in this case) was not proposed or considered in Sher.