New York Law Review

Tag: People v. White

  • People v. White, 16 N.Y.3d 726 (2010): Preserving Fourth Amendment Standing Arguments for Appeal

    People v. White, 16 N.Y.3d 726 (2010)

    To preserve for appellate review a challenge to a defendant’s standing to contest a search, the People must raise a timely objection in the suppression court.

    Summary

    Defendant White was convicted of drug charges, and sought to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of an apartment. The People argued the search was justified by exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, and consent. The suppression court denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding White lacked standing to challenge the search, an argument not raised at the suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the People must timely object to a defendant’s failure to prove standing in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. This requirement ensures the defendant has notice and an opportunity to develop the record on standing.

    Facts

    Police officers conducted a warrantless entry into an apartment and arrested White. The arrest stemmed from a “buy and bust” operation where White sold drugs to an undercover officer. Incident to the arrest, officers recovered “buy money” from White. White moved to suppress the buy money, arguing the warrantless entry and search were unlawful. The People argued the entry was justified under the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit exceptions to the warrant requirement, and also that the tenant (White’s mother) had consented to the search.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied White’s suppression motion, holding that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit exceptions. The issue of White’s standing was not raised at the suppression hearing. White pleaded guilty and appealed his conviction, arguing the suppression ruling was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding White failed to establish standing to challenge the search, and thus did not reach the other arguments. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People must timely object to a defendant’s failure to prove standing to challenge a search in order to preserve that issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People are required to alert the suppression court if they believe that the defendant has failed to meet his burden to establish standing. The preservation requirement also serves the purpose of alerting the adverse party of the need to develop a record for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated its holding in People v. Stith, that the People cannot raise a defendant’s lack of standing for the first time on appeal. The Court acknowledged conflicting rulings from the Appellate Division, and clarified that those decisions should no longer be followed to the extent they suggest the People need not timely object to preserve the standing issue. The Court emphasized that the primary reason for requiring a timely objection is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention, allowing it to make a ruling on the issue. Quoting People v. Gray, the court stated that “demanding notice through objection or motion in a trial court, as with any specific objection, is to bring the claim to the trial court’s attention.” The court also noted that the preservation requirement alerts the defendant to the need to develop a record on appeal. The court emphasized that a defendant “must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing.” Because the People did not challenge White’s claim of a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment at the suppression hearing, they failed to preserve the issue for appeal, and the Appellate Division erred in considering it.

  • People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900 (1992): Sufficiency of Evidence for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900 (1992)

    To be entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a defendant must present sufficient credible evidence for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, both an objective element (reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance) and a subjective element (conduct influenced by the disturbance at the time of the crime).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. While the defendant presented evidence of a tumultuous relationship with his wife (satisfying the objective element), he failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. The Court emphasized that post-homicide conduct alone is insufficient to establish the necessary subjective element, especially when the defendant maintains his innocence.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of killing his wife. He had a history of a violent and tumultuous relationship with her, marked by repeated humiliation. After his wife’s death, he washed her body, wrapped it in a bedspread, and concealed it in a closet in their apartment. The body remained there for a week while the defendant continued his daily routines, including cleaning and cooking for his stepchildren. The defendant steadfastly maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted of a crime related to his wife’s death. At trial, the defendant requested that the jury be instructed on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court refused this request. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant presented sufficient credible evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, specifically regarding whether his conduct at the time of the homicide was influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. The evidence presented related solely to post-homicide conduct and was insufficient to establish the necessary element of the affirmative defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance has two components: an objective element (reasonable explanation or excuse) and a subjective element (conduct influenced by the disturbance at the time of the crime). The court stated, “In order for defendant to be entitled to such an instruction, a court must determine that sufficient credible evidence has been presented for the jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the elements of the affirmative defense have been established.” While the defendant presented sufficient evidence of a tumultuous relationship to establish the objective element, he failed to demonstrate that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. The court noted that the “second element of this defense cannot be inferred from the provocative act itself, which occurred weeks before the homicide.” The court distinguished this case from People v. Moye, where the defendant’s statements about his state of mind and the events immediately preceding the killing provided sufficient evidence. Here, the evidence relied upon by the defendant pertained exclusively to his post-homicide conduct. Instructing the jury on the defense, under these circumstances, would have “invite[d] impermissible speculation as to defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing.” The court emphasized the absence of any evidence regarding the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing itself, making any findings on this point purely speculative. The Court made clear that circumstantial evidence of post-homicide conduct is insufficient to establish the required mens rea at the time of the crime.

  • People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense and Attempted Murder

    People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 469 (1989)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance when sufficient evidence is presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that would allow a jury to find the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation or excuse.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court reasoned that, under the specific circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was sufficient evidence presented to create a jury question as to whether the defendant was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court also held that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with attempted murder and raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. At trial, the defendant presented evidence concerning his subjective state and the external circumstances as he perceived them. The specific facts contributing to the claim of extreme emotional disturbance are not detailed in this memorandum opinion.

    Procedural History

    The defendant requested a jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the charge should have been given. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the defense was inapplicable to attempted murder. The defendant cross-appealed the Appellate Division’s failure to remit the case for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People preserved the argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder for appellate review.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in failing to remit the case for resentencing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the People did not argue against the charge on extreme emotional disturbance based on its inapplicability to attempted murder at the trial level.
    2. Yes, because under the circumstances and viewing the evidence favorably to the defendant, there was enough evidence to present a jury question on whether the defendant was acting under extreme emotional disturbance.
    3. No, because under the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Division’s decision not to remit for resentencing was not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the People’s argument that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance is inapplicable to attempted murder, finding that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at trial. Citing People v. Villani, the Court reiterated that issues not raised at the trial level are generally waived on appeal.

    Regarding the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on extreme emotional disturbance, the Court emphasized the standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence. It cited People v. Casassa, stating that the assessment requires consideration of “the subjective, internal situation in which defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time.” The Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (as required by People v. Moye), concluded that the evidence presented a jury question on the defense.

    Finally, the Court addressed the defendant’s cross-appeal concerning resentencing, holding that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion. The Court cited People v. Cohen, indicating that the decision to remit for resentencing is generally discretionary.

  • People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110 (1982): Waiver of Counsel Requires Informed Consent by a Neutral Magistrate

    People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110 (1982)

    A defendant may waive the right to counsel in a case involving a minor offense, but only if a neutral magistrate ensures the defendant understands the risks and disadvantages of proceeding without an attorney.

    Summary

    Bryant K.O. White was arrested for unlawful possession of marihuana, a minor offense. After retaining counsel, he was arraigned without his attorney present. The court advised him of his rights, but White waived his right to counsel and pleaded guilty. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a defendant can waive counsel in such a case, it requires a searching inquiry by a neutral magistrate to ensure the defendant understands the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The court found the arraignment judge’s inquiry inadequate and reversed the conviction.

    Facts

    Defendant White was arrested for unlawful possession of marihuana. After being jailed, White contacted the director of the Geneva Human Rights Commission, who secured attorney David Lee Foster for him. Foster interviewed White and informed the police of his representation. White was then taken to a judge’s home for arraignment without notifying Foster. During the arraignment, the judge advised White of his rights, including the right to an attorney. White stated he didn’t understand how he could be guilty and wished to resolve the matter quickly. The judge offered an adjournment for White to obtain counsel or a trial, but White pleaded guilty.

    Procedural History

    White was convicted in City Court. He appealed to the County Court, arguing his right to counsel was violated. The County Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the rule requiring counsel’s presence for waiver did not apply at arraignment. White then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City Court erred in allowing the defendant to proceed without his retained counsel present, and if so, under what conditions would such a waiver be permissible?

    Holding

    Yes, because while the court had the power to permit the defendant to forego counsel, it could only do so after a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure the defendant appreciated the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged New York’s strong protection of the right to counsel. However, it also recognized that this right is not absolute and can be limited in cases of lesser import, particularly where imprisonment is not a possibility. Citing Faretta v. California, the court stated that a defendant can waive the right to counsel, but only if the court ensures the defendant understands the “dangers and disadvantages” of doing so. The court emphasized that “a right too easily waived is no right at all.” The court distinguished this scenario from custodial interrogations: “Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel.” In this case, the arraigning judge’s inquiry was deemed inadequate because it did not thoroughly explain the objectivity and professionalism counsel could provide. The judge’s statement that the defendant had a right to counsel was insufficient. The court stated that a sufficient inquiry should ensure the waiver is “knowing and intelligent” and that a defendant’s silence or a simple desire to abandon counsel’s services is not enough. Because the inquiry was inadequate, the court reversed the order and remitted the case for further proceedings.

  • People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797 (1976): Defendant’s Right to Independent Testing of Alleged Dangerous Drugs

    People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797 (1976)

    A defendant charged with a drug offense is generally entitled to pretrial discovery to conduct independent tests on the alleged contraband, subject to court supervision and safeguards.

    Summary

    White was convicted of criminal possession of a dangerous drug. Prior to trial, he requested permission to conduct his own tests on the substance, but the motion was denied. At trial, he was limited in his ability to cross-examine the prosecution’s chemist about the reliability of their tests. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant should have been granted the opportunity for independent testing, provided that the defendant can show that the discovery is material to the defense and the request is reasonable. Such testing should be conducted under court supervision with appropriate safeguards.

    Facts

    Police found contraband in White’s apartment. The New York State Police chemist performed microscopic and chemical tests on the substance.

    White moved for a pretrial order allowing him to conduct his own scientific tests on the alleged dangerous drug, which motion was denied without explanation.

    During cross-examination of the People’s chemist at trial, White was hampered by his inability to refer to the results of any comparative testing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted White of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree.

    White appealed, arguing that the denial of his pretrial motion for independent testing was erroneous.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant charged with a dangerous drug offense is entitled to pretrial discovery to conduct independent tests on the alleged dangerous drug.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant’s guilt or innocence may hinge exclusively on the nature and amount of the substance in question, making independent testing essential for refuting the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that defendants in narcotics cases should generally be permitted to have their own experts perform tests on the alleged narcotic. The court noted the prevalence of this practice in federal courts under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as in other state courts. The court stated that the denial of the motion was erroneous because “Defendant’s guilt or innocence hung exclusively on the nature and amount of the substance in question; he advanced no other theory of defense. For refutation of the charge against him there was no acceptable alternative to scientific testing by experts of his choice.”

    The court emphasized that the trial court has discretion in granting pretrial discovery under CPL 240.20, subd. 3, but that discretion should normally be exercised in favor of granting the request assuming that the defendant can show that discovery is material to the preparation of his defense and the request is reasonable. If there are concerns about alteration of the substance, the defendant should be afforded the opportunity to conduct testing after the drug has been introduced at trial.

    The court specified that “Any pretrial discovery and testing should, of course, be conducted under the supervision of the court and with safeguards, analogous to those observed by the prosecution in its own testing, to protect against contamination or destruction of the evidence. The particular safeguards must necessarily be designed on an ad hoc basis in the light of the nature, form, quantity and other characteristics of the substance in question and with recognition of other material circumstances of the individual case.”

    The court also addressed White’s contention that there was a fatal deficiency of proof regarding the chain of custody. The court found that weaknesses in the chain of custody affected the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and did not create reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.

  • People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 876 (1976): Consecutive Sentences for Separate Possessory Offenses

    People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 876 (1976)

    Consecutive definite sentences are permissible for separate and distinct possessory offenses, even if discovered during a single incident, as long as the offenses do not arise from the same criminal transaction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether consecutive sentences for criminal possession of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon, both discovered during a single search, violated Penal Law § 70.25(3), which limits the aggregate term for offenses committed as part of a single incident. The Court held that the consecutive sentences were permissible because the two possessory offenses were separate and distinct, not arising from the same criminal transaction. Allowing concurrent sentences for unrelated offenses would reduce the deterrent effect of consecutive sentences.

    Facts

    Police searched the defendant, White, and found 28 glassine envelopes containing heroin and a knife with a 10-inch blade on his person during the same incident.

    Procedural History

    White was convicted after a jury trial of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and possession of a dangerous weapon. He received consecutive sentences: one year for the narcotics charge and nine months for the weapons charge. White appealed, arguing the consecutive sentences violated Penal Law § 70.25(3). The Appellate Term’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of consecutive definite sentences for criminal possession of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon, both discovered during a single search of the defendant, violates Penal Law § 70.25(3), which limits the aggregate term of imprisonment to one year for offenses committed as parts of a single incident or transaction?

    Holding

    No, because the two possessory offenses were separate and distinct and did not arise from the same criminal transaction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that although the narcotics and the weapon were discovered at the same time, the offenses were separate and distinct. The Court determined that the possession of heroin and the possession of a knife were not part of the same criminal transaction. To construe these unrelated offenses as arising from the same transaction would weaken the deterrent effect of consecutive sentences. The court cited People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 NY2d 259, 264 and People v. Frazier, 67 Misc 2d 376. The court referenced the Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, § 70.25, p 236, noting that extending the statute to unrelated offenses would reduce the deterrent effect of consecutive sentences. The court stated, “[w]here consecutive definite sentences of imprisonment * * * are imposed on a person for offenses which were committed as parts of a single incident or transaction, the aggregate of the terms of such sentences shall not exceed one year.” The court distinguished the facts of this case to show that the offenses were not related.

  • People v. White, 26 N.Y.2d 276 (1970): When an Eyewitness is Considered an Accomplice Requiring Corroboration

    People v. White, 26 N.Y.2d 276 (1970)

    A witness is considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of their testimony, only if they participated in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist, or if they counseled, induced, or encouraged the crime.

    Summary

    Michael White appealed his conviction for robbery, grand larceny, and assault, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that Ariel Alexis Slowe, a witness, might be an accomplice. White contended that if Slowe was an accomplice, her testimony would require corroboration. The Court of Appeals affirmed White’s conviction, holding that there was no evidence to suggest Slowe was an accomplice. Her mere presence and asking the victim for carfare did not demonstrate participation or intent to assist in the crime.

    Facts

    William Lance, the victim, was attacked and robbed near a subway station. Prior to the attack, Ariel Alexis Slowe asked Lance for carfare, which he provided. They walked to the subway station together. Three men then attacked Lance. Police arrested William Leroy White at the scene. Michael White (the appellant) and another defendant were arrested later based on information from Slowe. Neither the officers nor Lance could identify Michael White as one of the attackers at trial. Slowe testified that she knew the defendants and was present during the attack, even telling the assailants to leave Lance alone. A defense witness testified that Slowe was seen drinking with the codefendants earlier that day.

    Procedural History

    Michael White, William Leroy White, and William Wallace Brown were convicted in a jury trial of robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree, and assault in the second degree. White appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Slowe might be an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Ariel Alexis Slowe might be an accomplice, requiring corroboration of her testimony to convict the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence presented at trial to support a finding that Ariel Alexis Slowe was an accomplice to the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the test for whether a witness is an accomplice is whether they could be indicted as a principal. This requires a showing that the witness participated in the preparation or perpetration of the crime with the intent to assist, or that the witness counseled, induced, or encouraged the crime. The court found no evidence in the record to suggest that Slowe was an accomplice. Her presence on the street, asking for carfare, and acquaintance with the perpetrators did not establish participation or intent to aid in the crime. The court emphasized that the token was borrowed a block away from the subway station and the victim was in no way distracted or misled by her for any purpose connected with the crime.

    The court stated, “Her mere presence on a public street alone or her borrowing of a token from the victim would not have allowed the jury to infer that she participated in the commission of the crime.” It further explained that the victim was not lured into a deserted area and there was no indication she forced him to go to the station. The fact that she knew the perpetrators was not probative of her involvement or intent to aid in the crime. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would require an accomplice charge whenever any eyewitness testified against the defendant. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, Slowe was not an accomplice.