New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Wheatman

  • People v. Wheatman, 31 N.Y.2d 17 (1972): Defining Accomplice Status Based on Intent

    People v. Wheatman, 31 N.Y.2d 17 (1972)

    A witness is considered an accomplice only if they participated in the crime with the intent to assist, counsel, induce, or encourage its commission; the critical factor is intent.

    Summary

    Wheatman and others were convicted of conspiracy and bribery related to bid-rigging on New York City Housing Authority painting contracts. The prosecution relied heavily on accomplice testimony. A key issue arose regarding the status of Feldman, an employee who made payments to an official at his employer’s direction. The trial court left it to the jury to determine whether Feldman was an accomplice, instructing them to consider whether he acted with intent to further the conspiracy or merely as a conduit for his employer. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on accomplice status, as Feldman’s intent was a question of fact. Independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony.

    Facts

    Several painting contractors, including Jerome, Spector, and Marcus, conspired with New York City Housing Authority employees Wheatman and Lowell, and a union official, Rarback, to rig bids on painting contracts. Esrig, an unindicted accomplice, initiated the conspiracy to control bidding and increase profits. Wheatman and Lowell received bribes for providing confidential bid information. Feldman, an employee of one of the contractors, testified that he drove his employer to meetings and made payments to an Authority inspector at his direction.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the New York County Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions of some defendants due to illegally seized evidence, but affirmed Wheatman’s conviction. The Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the illegally seized evidence and then affirmed the remaining convictions after the Appellate Division determined there were no other grounds for reversal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplices’ testimony to satisfy the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine if witness Feldman was an accomplice.

    3. Whether evidence of assaults and threats against witnesses prejudiced the defendants.

    4. Whether the prosecutor’s calling of a witness who refused to testify prejudiced the defendants.

    5. Whether Wheatman’s statement to a security officer was inadmissible under Bruton v. United States.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because independent evidence, such as copies of bid estimates and handwritten lists found in the contractors’ offices, tended to connect the defendants to the crime and reasonably satisfied the jury that the accomplices were telling the truth.

    2. No, because the facts left Feldman’s intent in doubt, making his status as an accomplice a factual question for the jury to decide.

    3. No, because the evidence supported a finding that the assaults were arranged and inflicted in furtherance of the conspiracy.

    4. No, because the jury was instructed to disregard the incident, and there was no indication of the testimony the prosecutor expected or that the refusal was based on self-incrimination.

    5. No, because the rule in Bruton does not apply when the challenged statement does not incriminate any of the declarant’s co-defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, emphasizing that sufficient independent evidence corroborated the accomplices’ testimony, satisfying the requirements of section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now CPL 60.22). The court cited People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, stating that corroborating evidence is sufficient “if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.” The Court determined that it was proper for the trial judge to allow the jury to determine Feldman’s status as an accomplice because there was ambiguity regarding his intent. The court stated that “The generally accepted test as to whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have been convicted * * * either as principal or accessory * * * The question of intent must always enter as an element of the crime.”, citing People v. Jackerson, 247 N.Y. 36, 42. The court also held that the evidence of assaults was admissible because it was part of the conspiracy, and the incident with the witness who refused to testify was harmless because the jury was instructed to disregard it. Finally, the court clarified that the Bruton rule does not apply when the challenged statement does not incriminate any co-defendants.

  • People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971): Establishing Probable Cause with Hearsay from Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Wheatman, 29 N.Y.2d 337 (1971)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant can be based on hearsay if it provides the magistrate with sufficient information to determine both the reliability of the informant and the reliability of the information provided.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause in a search warrant affidavit when the affidavit is based on hearsay. The District Attorney obtained search warrants based on an affidavit summarizing grand jury testimony alleging a bid-rigging conspiracy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the affidavit was sufficient because the grand jury witnesses testified under oath against their penal interests, and their testimonies corroborated each other. This established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of the information, justifying the issuance of the search warrants. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had found the affidavit insufficient.

    Facts

    The District Attorney investigated a bid-rigging conspiracy involving painting contracts for New York City Housing Authority projects. The conspiracy allegedly involved painting contractors and a Housing Authority official, Wheatman, who provided inside information on bidding estimates. Assistant District Attorney Phillips applied for search warrants for the offices of the contractors, submitting an affidavit based on sworn testimony from witnesses before the Grand Jury. The affidavit stated that these witnesses admitted to being parties to an agreement to rig bids and identified the contracting firms as parties to the agreement. It further alleged that Jerry Jerome obtained Housing Authority estimates and shared them with other conspirators. Based on this information, Judge Fine issued warrants, and a search uncovered relevant documents.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants were convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division, on reargument, affirmed Wheatman’s conviction, finding he lacked standing to challenge the warrants. Wheatman also appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an affidavit based on hearsay testimony before a grand jury can establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the affidavit adequately demonstrates the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit summarized sworn grand jury testimony where witnesses admitted to being part of a bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests and corroborating each other’s accounts, which sufficiently established both the reliability of the informants and the reliability of their information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that for an affidavit based on hearsay to be sufficient, it must allow a magistrate to independently assess the reliability of both the informant and their information. The court noted that reliability can be established in various ways, including prior reliable information, corroboration, statements against penal interest, and sworn testimony. In this case, the informants’ reliability was demonstrated by their sworn testimony before the grand jury, where they admitted to being parties to the bid-rigging agreement, thereby testifying against their penal interests. The fact that multiple informants corroborated each other’s testimony further bolstered their reliability.

    Regarding the reliability of the information, the court found it significant that the witnesses had firsthand knowledge of the conspiracy. The affidavit indicated that the witnesses testified to being parties to the agreement and identified the roles of various individuals and companies. The court reasoned that because the bid estimate information was essential to the conspiracy, it was reasonable to infer that copies of the forms would be found in the offices of the conspirators. The court rejected the argument that the affidavit was defective for failing to provide a “substantial basis” for concluding that the material sought would be found in the contractor’s offices.

    The court also addressed the defendants’ request for the names of the grand jury witnesses, stating that revealing their identities would jeopardize the ongoing investigation and potentially expose the witnesses to interference or intimidation. Quoting the decision, the court noted the importance of protecting witnesses “from interference from those under investigation,” preventing “subornation of perjury and tampering with prospective [trial] witnesses” and assuring “prospective witnesses [before the Grand Jury] that their testimony will be kept secret.”

    In conclusion, the court found the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider other factual and legal contentions raised by the defendants.