New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Whalen

  • People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273 (1983): Prosecutorial Misconduct and Alibi Evidence

    People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273 (1983)

    A prosecutor’s summation that misrepresents evidence, denies prior notice of an alibi, and implies recent fabrication, coupled with knowledge that the defendant was advised by counsel not to speak with the police, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial.

    Summary

    Whalen was convicted of rape, but the conviction was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct during summation. The prosecutor improperly characterized the defendant’s alibi as a recent fabrication, despite having prior notice and knowing that the defendant and his wife were advised by counsel not to speak to the police. The prosecutor also falsely denied that notice of the alibi had been given. The Court of Appeals held that this conduct prejudiced the defendant and warranted a new trial, emphasizing the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice, not just conviction.

    Facts

    Deborah C. was raped on July 4, 1979. She described her attacker as having shoulder-length blond hair, weighing 150-160 pounds, and being 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall. At trial, Whalen presented a “mistaken identification” defense and an alibi, claiming he was home sick at the time of the rape, corroborated by his wife. He presented evidence that his hair was red and that he was six feet tall. The defense had served notice of alibi more than eight months prior to trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree in County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal was granted by a judge of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an expansive jury instruction on the scrutiny to be given to identification testimony.

    2. Whether the jury charge on alibi improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.

    3. Whether the prosecutor’s conduct during summation constituted prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court gave a technically correct, albeit minimal, instruction that the prosecutor had the burden of proving identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to properly preserve the objection to the alibi instruction for appellate review.

    3. Yes, because the prosecutor’s repeated characterization of the defendant’s alibi as a fabrication, coupled with the false denial of prior notice and knowledge of the attorney’s advice, constituted prejudicial misconduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found no legal error in the minimal identification instruction, noting that a general instruction on witness credibility coupled with the reasonable doubt standard for identification is technically correct. However, the Court advised that the better practice is to grant a defendant’s request for an expanded charge on identification, especially when mistaken identity is intertwined with an alibi.

    The Court held that the objection to the alibi instruction was not preserved because the trial judge granted the request to charge, but the delivered charge was unsatisfactory, and defense counsel failed to alert the judge to the error. The Court distinguished this from People v. Le Mieux, where the request was denied outright.

    The Court found that the prosecutor’s conduct during summation was improper and prejudicial. The prosecutor misrepresented the evidence by repeatedly characterizing the alibi as a recent fabrication, despite having received notice months earlier and knowing that defense counsel had advised both the defendant and his wife not to speak to the police. The prosecutor then falsely denied that notice had been given. The court stated, “This was completely unjustified, going far beyond any bounds of proper advocacy.” This conduct violated the prosecutor’s ethical obligation “to seek justice, rather than conviction” and warranted a new trial. The Court cited the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-13, to support the prosecutor’s duty.

  • People v. Whalen, 369 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1975): Admissibility of Prior Identification When Witness Cannot Make In-Court Identification

    People v. Whalen, 369 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1975)

    When a witness cannot make an in-court identification but has previously identified the defendant, another witness can testify to the prior identification to establish the defendant’s identity, and such testimony is admissible as evidence in chief.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of testimony regarding a prior out-of-court identification when the witness is unable to make an in-court identification. Mrs. Wesey, a robbery victim, identified Whalen shortly after the crime but couldn’t identify him at trial due to a change in his appearance. Detective Ohlhausen testified about Mrs. Wesey’s prior identification. The New York Court of Appeals held that Detective Ohlhausen’s testimony was admissible under CPL 60.25, even though the trial occurred after the statute’s effective date, finding no ex post facto violation. The court reasoned that CPL 60.25 allows a third party to establish the prior identification when the original witness cannot make an in-court identification.

    Facts

    On March 12, 1971, Mrs. Starsy Wesey was robbed at her store, the Great Neck Garden Center. The robbers, including Whalen, were apprehended and brought back to the store shortly after the robbery. Mrs. Wesey positively identified Whalen and his accomplice to Detective Joseph Ohlhausen. Before the trial, Whalen altered his appearance by cutting his hair.

    Procedural History

    Whalen was indicted and tried in December 1971. At trial, Mrs. Wesey could not identify Whalen due to his changed appearance but testified to her prior identification. Detective Ohlhausen then testified that Whalen was one of the persons Mrs. Wesey had previously identified. Whalen appealed, arguing that Detective Ohlhausen’s testimony was inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, and Whalen appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 60.25 permits a witness other than the person who made the initial identification to testify that the defendant was the person identified.

    2. Whether the application of CPL 60.25 to Whalen’s trial, which occurred after the statute’s effective date but for an indictment prior to that date, violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 60.25 specifically authorizes the admission of testimony by another person to establish that the defendant is the person whom the witness previously identified when the witness is unable to make an in-court identification.

    2. No, because a statute authorizing the use of evidence not previously admissible is not an ex post facto law; CPL 60.25 involves a procedural change in the manner of proof, not a change in the elements of the crime or the amount of evidence required for conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 60.25 allows for testimony from another witness to establish the defendant’s identity when the original identifying witness cannot make an in-court identification. The court rejected Whalen’s argument that the other witness’s role is limited to establishing the “sameness” of the defendant without mentioning the identification itself, stating, “Testimony that defendant is the person whom the witness previously identified is the necessary logical link between the defendant and the person identified.”

    The court further held that applying CPL 60.25 to Whalen’s trial did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court cited Calder v. Bull, stating that statutes which change the rules of evidence, requiring a lesser amount of evidence, are ex post facto. Procedural changes however are not. The court noted the statute does not criminalize conduct that was legal before the statute’s enactment, nor does it increase the punishment for the crime. CPL 60.25 is a procedural rule that changes the manner of proof, and therefore its application is permissible.

    The court emphasized the importance of allowing such testimony to ensure accurate fact-finding and prevent defendants from benefiting from changes in appearance. As the court highlighted, CPL 60.25 allows a third party to testify as to the facts of the out-of-court identification and is admissible as evidence in chief.

    The court specifically noted that the testimony is not hearsay, as the third party is testifying to the fact that the out-of-court statement was made and not to prove the truth of that statement.