New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Weaver

  • People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123 (2011): Establishing Disorderly Conduct with Risk of Public Disturbance

    People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123 (2011)

    A person can be convicted of disorderly conduct if their actions, though not directly causing public disturbance, recklessly create a risk of such disturbance, considering the time, place, conduct, and potential impact on the public.

    Summary

    Tony Weaver was convicted of disorderly conduct for yelling obscenities at his wife and a police officer in a public area. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Weaver’s actions recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if no actual disturbance occurred. The Court emphasized that the potential for public disruption, rather than actual disruption, is sufficient for a disorderly conduct conviction, considering factors like the time and location of the incident and the presence of other people.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, Sergeant House encountered Weaver yelling at his wife in a parking lot outside a hotel. Weaver then entered a mini-mart gas station. Upon exiting, he resumed yelling obscenities at his wife in a loud and aggressive manner. Sergeant House warned Weaver to calm down, but he responded with further obscenities directed at her. The incident occurred near a hotel and mini-mart that were open for business, with customers present.

    Procedural History

    Weaver was indicted for assault, resisting arrest, and two counts of disorderly conduct. A jury acquitted him of assault but convicted him of the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the disorderly conduct convictions, specifically whether Weaver’s behavior recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.

    Holding

    Yes, because Weaver’s conduct, considering the time, place, and nature of his actions, recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, satisfying the elements of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20 (1), (3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 240.20 (1) and (3), which define disorderly conduct as engaging in fighting or violent behavior, or using obscene language in a public place, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof. The Court emphasized that the disruptive behavior must be of a public, rather than individual, dimension, citing People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980). The Court stated that a person may be guilty of disorderly conduct even if the action does not result in actual public disturbance, if the conduct recklessly creates a risk of such disruption. Factors considered included the time and place of the incident, the nature of the conduct, the number of people in the vicinity, and whether they were drawn to the disturbance.

    The court noted, “[D]isorderly conduct is a statutory creation. Intended to include in the main various forms of misconduct which at common law would often be prosecuted as public nuisances…a common thread that ran through almost all of this legislation was a desire to deter breaches of the peace or, more specifically, of the community’s safety, health or morals.” (People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769, 773-774 [1997]).

    Here, the Court found that the incident occurred in a public place during early morning hours, with people nearby. Weaver’s conduct escalated despite warnings from the police, and his loud, aggressive, and obscene behavior created a risk of public disturbance. The Court concluded that “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a jury could have found that his conduct reached the point of ‘a potential or immediate public problem’.” (Munafo, 50 NY2d at 331).

  • People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433 (2009): Warrantless GPS Tracking Violates New York Constitution

    12 N.Y.3d 433 (2009)

    Under the New York State Constitution, the prolonged warrantless use of a GPS device to track a vehicle’s movements on public roads constitutes an unreasonable search, requiring suppression of the evidence obtained.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the warrantless placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle for 65 days violated the suspect’s rights under the New York State Constitution. The court reasoned that continuous GPS surveillance constitutes an unreasonable search because it reveals a detailed profile of a person’s movements and associations, far exceeding what could be obtained through visual surveillance. This level of intrusion requires a warrant based on probable cause.

    Facts

    State Police Investigator placed a GPS tracking device (a “Q-ball”) on the defendant Weaver’s van while it was parked on a public street, without obtaining a warrant. The device monitored the van’s location continuously for 65 days. The GPS data was used as evidence against Weaver in a burglary case, placing his van near the scene of the crime.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Weaver’s motion to suppress the GPS data. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. A dissenting justice granted leave to appeal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the motion to suppress the GPS evidence, and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle to monitor its movements on public roads for an extended period constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prolonged, warrantless use of a GPS device to track a vehicle’s movements constitutes an unreasonable search under the New York State Constitution, requiring a warrant supported by probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court grounded its decision on the right to privacy guaranteed by the New York State Constitution, noting that this right extends beyond protection of property interests and encompasses the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. While individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in their vehicles on public roads, this does not equate to a complete surrender of privacy. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Knotts, where the Supreme Court upheld the use of a beeper to track a container of chloroform, emphasizing that GPS technology is “vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful technology” than the beeper used in Knotts. GPS surveillance provides a comprehensive record of a person’s movements, associations, and activities, revealing far more than visual surveillance could. The court noted, “What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits.” The court acknowledged that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” (quoting Katz v. United States). The placement of the GPS device for 65 days did not meet any exception to the warrant requirement. The court explicitly based its holding on the New York State Constitution, leaving the federal constitutional question open. Citing Delaware v. Prouse, the court stated “An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation…Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles”. The court recognized that technological advances can easily produce abuse and found the risk unacceptable. Therefore, it held that absent exigent circumstances, the installation and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual’s whereabouts requires a warrant supported by probable cause.