People v. Waitz, 31 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. 1969)

A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit containing specific facts establishing unlawful activity on the premises to be searched; a conclusory statement that individuals frequenting the premises are “LSD users and sellers” is insufficient to establish probable cause.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions for possession of dangerous drugs, holding that the search warrant used to seize the drugs was issued without sufficient probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that “LSD users and sellers” frequented the defendant Waitz’s cottage. The court found this statement to be a conclusory assertion lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises. Furthermore, the court held that the warrant, which described the cottage but not the surrounding area, did not justify the search of the defendant’s car when it was driven onto the property while officers were present. Because the warrant lacked proper foundation and the car search exceeded its scope, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed.

Facts

Police obtained a search warrant for a cottage belonging to defendant Waitz. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage. When the police arrived to execute the warrant, the defendant’s automobile was driven onto the property. The police searched the car, as well as the cottage, and seized LSD, marijuana, and hypodermic needles.

Procedural History

The defendants were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs based on the evidence seized during the search. Justice McInerney granted a certificate of reasonable doubt, questioning whether the mere presence of alleged drug users and sellers at a house was sufficient for probable cause. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, and the People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an affidavit stating that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” a premises provides sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for that premises.
2. Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of a specific building extends to a vehicle that is driven onto the property while the search is being conducted.

Holding

1. No, because the affidavit contains a conclusory statement lacking specific facts to establish unlawful activity on the premises.
2. No, because the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the automobile was not included in the warrant’s description of the premises.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked the factual substance required to establish probable cause. The statement that “LSD users and sellers are frequenting” the cottage was deemed a conclusory characterization, without any specific facts to suggest that illegal activity was occurring within the premises. The court cited Spinelli v. United States and Aguilar v. Texas, emphasizing that a mere assertion of police suspicion or reputation is insufficient to justify a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. “But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient.”

The court also addressed the scope of the search warrant, noting that it authorized the search of the cottage but did not mention the automobile. Citing People v. Rainey, the court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution require that a search warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.” Since the warrant did not include the automobile, the search of the car was deemed unlawful. Probable cause must be shown in each instance, and a warrant to search a building cannot be extended to justify the search of a separate location, such as a vehicle that happened to be present at the time of the search. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from both the cottage and the car should have been suppressed, leading to the reversal of the defendants’ convictions.