New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Voliton

  • People v. Voliton, 83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994): Resisting Arrest After Unlawful Police Seizure

    83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994)

    A defendant can be convicted of resisting arrest even if the initial attempt to detain them was unlawful, provided there was a subsequent, authorized basis for the arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was convicted of assault and resisting arrest after an encounter with police. The Appellate Division overturned the felony assault convictions, finding the initial police seizure unlawful under People v. May. However, they upheld the convictions for reckless assault and resisting arrest. Voliton appealed, arguing a due process violation and that the resisting arrest conviction was invalid because the initial detention was unlawful. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the due process claim unpreserved and finding that the reckless assault provided a basis for a subsequent, authorized arrest, thus supporting the resisting arrest conviction, focusing on his actions after being apprehended on foot.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed Voliton in a car parked near a suspected drug location. They blocked his car and approached with weapons drawn, suspecting criminal activity. Voliton attempted to drive away, injuring the officers. Shots were fired, and Voliton was eventually apprehended after a chase and physical struggle where he punched and kicked the officers.

    Procedural History

    Voliton was convicted in the trial court of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree, and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division overturned the second-degree assault convictions, citing an unlawful seizure, but affirmed the remaining convictions. Voliton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether substantive due process bars convicting a defendant for actions in direct response to a police seizure later deemed illegal.
    2. Whether a resisting arrest conviction can stand when the initial attempt to detain the defendant was unlawful.

    Holding

    1. No, because the constitutional objection was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved.
    2. Yes, because the defendant’s commission of an assault, third degree, against one officer during the initial encounter furnished the predicate for his subsequent authorized arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held the due process argument was unpreserved because it was raised for the first time on appeal, and it did not fall under an exception to the preservation rule. The Court distinguished this case from situations impacting the court’s fundamental jurisdiction. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the Court reasoned that although the initial attempt to detain Voliton may have been unlawful, his subsequent reckless assault of an officer provided probable cause for a lawful arrest. Because the jury found that Voliton punched and kicked the officers while they were attempting to handcuff him after the foot chase, the resisting arrest conviction was valid. The Court also cited Penal Law § 35.27, noting that a person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, authorized or unauthorized, when it reasonably appears the person is a police officer. The court highlighted the lack of a requested jury instruction regarding self-defense against excessive force. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial was fundamentally flawed because the jury wasn’t instructed on justification, and they should have been informed the initial police conduct was illegal when considering the assault charge. He also argued no basis existed for the resisting arrest conviction because the initial police conduct was unlawful: “It is inconsistent for this Court, as it was for the Appellate Division, to sustain a charge of resisting arrest in the face of the conclusion that the police officers violated the law.”

  • People v. Voliton, 66 N.Y.2d 116 (1985): Resisting Arrest Requires Authorized Arrest

    People v. Voliton, 66 N.Y.2d 116 (1985)

    To be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30, the arrest being resisted must be an authorized arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was charged with resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and dismissed the information, holding that because the officer lacked probable cause to believe Voliton had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense, the arrest was not authorized. Consequently, Voliton could not be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. The court clarified that Penal Law § 35.27 concerns the defense of justification and does not amend § 205.30 to criminalize resisting an unauthorized arrest.

    Facts

    An officer attempted to detain Voliton. The People conceded the officer had no grounds to believe Voliton was committing, had committed, or was about to commit an offense. Voliton struck the officer’s arm in reaction to the attempted detention.

    Procedural History

    The County Court of St. Lawrence County issued an order which was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30 when the arrest was not authorized due to a lack of probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 205.30 defines resisting arrest as preventing an officer from effecting an “authorized arrest,” and an arrest without probable cause is not authorized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its reasoning on the plain language of Penal Law § 205.30, which requires the arrest to be “authorized” for a resisting arrest charge to stand. The People’s concession that the officer lacked probable cause was fatal to their case. The court emphasized that Penal Law § 35.27, concerning justification, does not alter the requirement of an authorized arrest under § 205.30. The court explicitly stated that “Penal Law § 35.27, as its title indicates, is concerned with the defense of justification and does not amend Penal Law § 205.30 to make resistance to an unauthorized arrest an offense.” The court also disapproved of any prior case law that suggested otherwise, stating, “To the extent that People v Simms (36 AD2d 23) and People v Lattanzio (35 AD2d 313) may be read to indicate otherwise, they are not to be followed.” This clarification reinforces the principle that the legality of the underlying arrest is a prerequisite for a resisting arrest conviction. The dissent, if any, is not mentioned in the memorandum opinion.