New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Velez

  • People v. Velez, 20 N.Y.3d 645 (2013): Enforceability of Resentencing Deadlines and Double Jeopardy

    People v. Velez, 20 N.Y.3d 645 (2013)

    While statutory deadlines for resentencing under Correction Law § 601-d are not strictly enforced absent prejudice to the defendant, resentencing after the original sentence has expired violates double jeopardy protections.

    Summary

    These cases address the timeliness of resentencing defendants to include a term of post-release supervision (PRS) that was illegally omitted from their original sentences. The Court of Appeals held that failing to meet the statutory deadlines in Correction Law § 601-d does not invalidate a resentencing, absent egregious delay or prejudice to the defendant. However, the Court also held that resentencing Velez after the expiration of his original sentence violated double jeopardy principles, as established in People v. Williams. The Court emphasized the importance of a clear temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence.

    Facts

    Both Velez and Rodriguez were convicted of violent felonies and received determinate sentences, which legally required PRS. The sentencing courts failed to impose a PRS term in either case. DOCS notified the sentencing courts of the omissions, triggering the resentencing procedures outlined in Correction Law § 601-d. In Velez’s case, the resentencing occurred after his original sentence had expired. Rodriguez was resentenced while still serving his original sentence.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed Velez’s resentence, citing double jeopardy. It affirmed Rodriguez’s resentence. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the failure to meet the statutory deadlines in Correction Law § 601-d invalidates a resentencing.

    2. Whether resentencing a defendant to include PRS after the original sentence has expired violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute does not explicitly prohibit resentencing after the deadlines have passed, and legislative history indicates that the deadlines were not intended as strict limitations on the court’s power to resentence.

    2. Yes, because resentencing after the original sentence has been fully served violates double jeopardy, as it infringes on the defendant’s legitimate expectation of finality in their sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Correction Law § 601-d sets forth specific deadlines for resentencing, it does not state that failure to meet these deadlines bars resentencing. The Court cited legislative history, specifically statements from the Division of Criminal Justice Services and the Governor’s approval memorandum, indicating that resentencing is not precluded by missing the deadlines. The Court acknowledged arguments that the strict regulation of deadline extensions suggests substantive significance but maintained that the legislature could have explicitly forbidden resentencing after the deadlines if that was their intent. The Court also emphasized the public safety concerns that would arise if warranted PRS terms were not imposed simply because of missed deadlines.

    Regarding double jeopardy, the Court relied on People v. Williams, which held that resentencing to add PRS after the original sentence is completed is forbidden. The Court rejected the People’s argument that the beginning of a resentencing proceeding before the sentence expires negates the double jeopardy concern, stating, “Under Williams, a defendant acquires a ‘legitimate expectation of finality’ when his sentence has been fully served, and the sentence may not then be enhanced by adding a term of PRS.” The Court emphasized its intent in Williams to establish a clear temporal limitation on resentencing and found that allowing resentencing to depend on the start of proceedings would create uncertainty and incentivize defendants to stall. The Court noted that prosecutors can avoid double jeopardy issues by diligently seeking resentencing well before the original sentence’s expiration date. A direct quote: “Even where a defendant’s sentence is illegal, there is a legitimate expectation of finality once the initial sentence has been served and the direct appeal has been completed (or the time to appeal has expired). In these situations, the sentences are beyond the court’s authority and an additional term of PRS may not be imposed”

  • People v. Velez, 73 N.Y.2d 735 (1988): Harmless Error and Illegally Obtained Evidence

    People v. Velez, 73 N.Y.2d 735 (1988)

    When a constitutional error occurs during a criminal trial, such as admitting illegally obtained evidence, a conviction can only stand if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The trial court admitted photographs of leather jackets that had been suppressed as the product of an unlawful search and seizure. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the conviction, holding that the admission of the photographs, although conceded to be constitutional error by the prosecution, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the prosecution’s case was not overwhelming, the complainant’s credibility was questionable, and the photographs corroborated the complainant’s testimony and were specifically requested by the jury during deliberations.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for allegedly taking two leather jackets from the complainant at gunpoint.

    Prior to trial, the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the two leather jackets, finding that they were the product of an unlawful search and seizure.

    At trial, over defense counsel’s objection, the People introduced photographs of the suppressed leather jackets as evidence in their direct case.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant.

    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the admission of the photographs was error.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of the dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of photographs of evidence suppressed as the product of an unlawful search and seizure was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    No, because there was a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that to determine whether a constitutional error is harmless, a court must assess the quantum and nature of the evidence against the defendant if the error were excised, and the causal effect the error may have had on the jury. The court referenced People v. Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 756, and noted the standard for harmless error is whether “there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction”.

    In this case, the prosecution’s case was not overwhelming, relying heavily on the testimony of the complainant, whose credibility was questionable due to his extensive criminal history. Moreover, the photographs of the leather jackets corroborated the complainant’s testimony that he possessed the jackets and were the first items the jury requested during deliberations.

    Because the photographs were the only evidence corroborating the complainant’s story and were specifically requested by the jury, the court found a reasonable possibility that they influenced the verdict. Therefore, the error in admitting the photographs was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that under these specific facts, the error warranted reversal of the conviction. This case highlights the importance of excluding illegally obtained evidence and the high standard required to deem the admission of such evidence as harmless error.

  • People v. Velez, 51 N.Y.2d 725 (1980): Preserving Errors for Appeal – The Need for Timely Objections

    People v. Velez, 51 N.Y.2d 725 (1980)

    Failure to object to a jury instruction at trial generally forfeits the right to appellate review of that instruction as a matter of law, unless the appellate court chooses to exercise its discretion to review the error in the interest of justice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, which had reversed the defendant’s conviction due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence. Because the defendant did not object to the omission at trial, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in reversing the conviction as a matter of law. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to decide whether it should exercise its discretionary power to review the unpreserved error.

    Facts

    The specifics of the underlying criminal charges against Velez are not provided in this short per curiam opinion. The critical fact is that the trial court omitted to instruct the jury regarding the presumption of innocence. Critically, the defense counsel did not object to the omission of this charge at the time of trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the presumption of innocence necessitated reversal as a matter of law. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the defendant’s conviction as a matter of law based on the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the presumption of innocence, when the defendant did not object to the omission at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the absence of an objection at trial generally means the alleged error is unpreserved for appellate review as a matter of law. However, the Appellate Division has discretion to review unpreserved errors in the interest of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant did not object to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, the Appellate Division’s reversal of the conviction as a matter of law was in error. The court cited People v. Cona, 49 NY2d 26 and People v. Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 472. The Court emphasized that absent a timely objection, the Appellate Division should only reverse if it chooses to exercise its discretionary powers to review the alleged error. The Court stated it would be inappropriate to express an opinion on the merits of the defendant’s claim regarding the missing jury instruction because it was not properly preserved in the trial court. The decision underscores the importance of making timely objections at trial to preserve issues for appellate review, and it clarifies the scope of an appellate court’s discretion to review unpreserved errors.