New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Velasquez

  • People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003): Presumption of Regularity in Criminal Proceedings

    People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003)

    A criminal defendant must present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to all criminal proceedings, including the issuance of supplemental jury instructions.

    Summary

    Velasquez was convicted of assault in the first degree. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by redacting a portion of the complainant’s hospital record and violated his right to be present during supplemental jury instructions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court properly redacted the hospital record because the defendant had access to toxicology results and did not rely on the complainant’s intoxication. The Court also found that the defendant failed to present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity in criminal proceedings regarding his presence during jury instructions.

    Facts

    Velasquez and the complainant resided in the same rooming house. An incident occurred, and Velasquez was charged with assault in the first degree. At trial, Velasquez raised a defense of justification, arguing that he acted in self-defense. The complainant’s hospital record was admitted into evidence. The trial court redacted a resident physician’s notation stating that complainant was too drunk to consent to surgery.

    Procedural History

    Velasquez was convicted of first-degree assault based on a jury verdict in the trial court. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the redaction of the hospital record and his absence during supplemental jury instructions constituted reversible error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Velasquez appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in redacting a portion of the complainant’s hospital record stating that the complainant was too drunk to consent to surgery.

    2. Whether the court violated the defendant’s right to be present during the issuance of supplemental jury instructions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant had access to the complainant’s toxicology results and did not rely on the complainant’s intoxication as part of his defense.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to come forward with substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to all criminal proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in redacting the hospital record. The Court noted that the defendant possessed the laboratory results showing the complainant’s toxicology level. Critically, the Court highlighted that the defendant did not base his defense on the complainant’s intoxication. Therefore, the redacted information was not essential to the defense. Regarding the defendant’s presence during supplemental jury instructions, the Court emphasized the “presumption of regularity that attaches to all criminal proceedings.” The burden was on the defendant to present “substantial evidence” to overcome this presumption. Since Velasquez failed to do so, his claim was rejected. The Court cited *People v. Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 16 [1983]* and *People v. Richetti, 302 NY 290, 298 [1951]*, reaffirming the long-standing principle of presumed regularity in court proceedings. The Court found no basis to overturn the conviction, upholding the decisions of the lower courts.

  • People v. Velasquez, 1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003): Establishing Valid Waiver of Antommarchi Rights

    1 N.Y.3d 44 (2003)

    A defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors (Antommarchi right) can be waived by counsel, and the trial court is not required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether defendants’ rights to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors were violated. In People v. Foster, the Court held that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of his absence from a robing room conference. In People v. Velasquez, the Court found that the defendant validly waived his right to be present, even without a direct colloquy with the court. The Court affirmed both convictions, emphasizing that while a direct colloquy wasn’t required for a valid waiver, greater attention should be paid to recording a defendant’s presence or absence to avoid future disputes.

    Facts

    In People v. Foster, during jury selection, the trial court informed prospective jurors that those with concerns would be invited individually into the robing room with the attorneys. The transcript didn’t explicitly record Foster’s presence. In People v. Velasquez, after a bench conference, defense counsel stated, “Waived,” to which the court responded, “Antommarchi waived.” A prospective juror was questioned at a sidebar conference outside Velasquez’s presence.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions, with two justices dissenting in Velasquez. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Foster: Whether the defendant presented substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity and establish his absence from a material stage of the trial.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences without a direct colloquy with the court.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Foster: No, because the defendant failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of court proceedings.

    2. In People v. Velasquez: Yes, because a trial court is not required to engage the defendant in an on-the-record colloquy to ensure the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    In People v. Foster, the Court relied on the presumption of regularity that attaches to judicial proceedings, which can only be overcome by substantial evidence. The Court stated that the absence of a specific record of the defendant’s presence, by itself, is insufficient to rebut this presumption. The Court declined to speculate based on the lack of explicit notation of presence.

    In People v. Velasquez, the Court held that defense counsel’s waiver, announced in open court, was sufficient. The Court reasoned that requiring a specific colloquy in every case would be overly burdensome. The court stated, “[T]here is no requirement that the Judge conduct a pro forma inquisition in each case on the off-chance that a defendant who is adequately represented by counsel . . . may nevertheless not know what he is doing” (quoting People v. Francis, 38 NY2d 150, 154 [1975]). The Court emphasized that the waiver occurred in the defendant’s presence, and the defendant didn’t object. The court emphasized, “While the better practice would have been to state the substance of the right being waived, nothing in the record calls into question the effectiveness of defendant’s waiver as announced by counsel…”

    The dissenting judge argued that a hearing should be held to determine if the defendants were present or made adequate waivers, as the record did not clearly show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be present during juror questioning. The dissent argued the presumption of regularity should not substitute for reconstructing the record.