46 N.Y.2d 251 (1978)

A perjury conviction based on Grand Jury testimony requires that the prosecutor demonstrate a palpable interest in eliciting facts material to a substantive investigation and not solely aim to trap the witness into giving a false answer.

Summary

A Supreme Court Justice, Tyler, was convicted of perjury based on his Grand Jury testimony regarding a meeting with a reputed criminal. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, holding that the perjury prosecution was improper because the prosecutor’s questioning focused on minor details without establishing the materiality of the meeting to a legitimate Grand Jury investigation. The court reasoned that the questioning appeared designed to trap the defendant into committing perjury rather than to uncover substantive crimes or official misconduct. The court also emphasized the prosecutor’s failure to adequately refresh the witness’s recollection before pursuing the perjury charges.

Facts

Tyler, a Supreme Court Justice, was investigated by an Extraordinary Grand Jury for his relationship with known gambling figures, including Raymond Marquez. Police officers testified that they observed Tyler meeting with Marquez and his wife at Patsy’s Restaurant. During Grand Jury testimony, Tyler initially denied communicating with Marquez since becoming a judge but later recalled the meeting. He described it as a brief, chance encounter, which differed significantly from the surveillance team’s account.

Procedural History

Tyler was indicted on four counts of perjury in the first degree. He was acquitted on one count and convicted on the remaining three. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictment. The Special Prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a perjury prosecution may be based on false answers about peripheral details of a meeting, where the prosecutor demonstrates no palpable interest in eliciting facts material to the authorized substantive investigation of antecedent crime or official misconduct.
2. Whether false answers about peripheral details of a single meeting may support a perjury prosecution without the prosecutor laying enough of a foundation to recall to the witness’ mind what, without some prodding, may have in truth escaped the witness’ recollection.

Holding

1. No, because the prosecutor exhibited minimal or no interest in establishing the materiality of the meeting, focusing instead on minor details, suggesting a primary aim to trap the witness into committing perjury.
2. No, because the prosecutor failed to adequately confront the defendant with contradictory facts or otherwise stimulate his memory regarding details acquired from the surveillance team, before pursuing the perjury charges.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the primary function of the Grand Jury is to uncover crimes and misconduct for prosecution, not to create new crimes through perjury traps. The court emphasized that where the prosecutor shows no palpable interest in eliciting facts material to a substantive investigation of crime or official misconduct but tailors questioning to extract a false answer, a valid perjury prosecution should not lie. The court found that the prosecutor’s questioning focused almost exclusively on the logistical details of the meeting without making a sufficient effort to establish its materiality to the Grand Jury investigation. The court also criticized the prosecutor for failing to refresh the defendant’s recollection with facts from the surveillance team’s report before pursuing the perjury charges. The court cited the principle that the examiner has an “inescapable burden to provide a transcript which demonstrates that the witness is testifying falsely intentionally, rather than mistakenly, whether it is with respect to surrounding neutral details or to substantive matters relevant to an authorized investigation.” The court concluded that the interrogation amounted to an impermissible “perjury trap,” thus warranting the dismissal of the indictment as a matter of law.