People v. Townsley, 20 N.Y.3d 294 (2012)

Appellate counsel’s failure to raise a clear conflict of interest on the part of trial counsel constitutes ineffective assistance, warranting coram nobis relief.

Summary

Townsley was convicted of murder and assault. During trial, the prosecutor implied defense counsel colluded with a witness to fabricate a defense. Townsley’s appellate counsel did not argue this potential conflict of interest on direct appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the conflict of interest issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the prosecutor’s implication created a situation where defense counsel should have testified, and the appellate counsel’s failure to recognize and argue this point fell below the standard of meaningful representation.

Facts

Townsley was convicted for the shooting death of Lynell James and the wounding of Johmar Brangan. The prosecution’s witnesses identified Townsley as the shooter. Townsley’s defense was that Simeon Nelson, the leader of a drug ring, committed the crime, and the witnesses were afraid to accuse Nelson. During cross-examination, the prosecutor insinuated that Townsley and his attorneys met with Nelson to coordinate a false defense, suggesting collusion. The defense attorney attempted to rebut this insinuation during summation.

Procedural History

Townsley was convicted in June 1995 and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. His pro se habeas petition was denied. He then moved to vacate the conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to a conflict of interest; this motion was denied. He then petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was conflicted due to the prosecutor’s implication that they colluded with a witness, thereby requiring them to testify and violating the advocate-witness rule?

Holding

Yes, because the prosecutor’s insinuation created a conflict of interest under the advocate-witness rule that appellate counsel should have recognized and argued on direct appeal.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals, in dissent, focused on whether appellate counsel provided “meaningful representation.” Citing People v. Stultz, the dissent noted appellate advocacy is meaningful if it reflects a competent grasp of facts, law, and procedure. The dissent argued that appellate counsel should have recognized that trial counsel operated under a conflict of interest. The prosecutor’s cross-examination implied the defense lawyers colluded with Nelson to fabricate a defense, potentially violating the advocate-witness rule. The dissent argued that defense counsel’s testimony became necessary to rebut the prosecutor’s insinuation. The failure of trial counsel to recognize and address this conflict, coupled with the appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal, constituted ineffective assistance, warranting coram nobis relief. The dissent cited appellate counsel’s own affirmation stating he “did not perceive the conflict of interest issue” as evidence that there was no strategic reason for the omission. The dissent also pointed to the prosecutor’s inflammatory statements during summation, which trial counsel failed to object to, further supporting the claim of ineffectiveness. The dissent reasoned that the combination of the conflict and the unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct should have been apparent to any reasonable appellate counsel.