People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909)

Attempted subornation of perjury requires the false testimony solicited to be material to the issue in the underlying case; otherwise, it cannot constitute the crime of attempted subornation of perjury.

Summary

The defendant was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury for soliciting false testimony in a divorce case. The solicited testimony concerned an act of adultery different from the one alleged in the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the solicited testimony was immaterial to the issue presented in the divorce case. Since materiality is an essential element of perjury, an attempt to suborn immaterial testimony does not constitute attempted subornation of perjury. The Court clarified that an attempt to induce false testimony may be punishable under a separate statute concerning falsifying evidence, but not under the perjury statutes.

Facts

Frank J. Gould was the defendant in a divorce action brought by Helen K. Gould. The complaint alleged a single act of adultery committed by Frank J. Gould with an unknown woman in North Sydney, Cape Breton, Canada, on July 25, 1907.
The defendant, Teal, attempted to procure false testimony from Mabel MacCauslan. Teal solicited MacCauslan to testify that in March 1908, she saw Frank J. Gould coming out of a bedroom in Bessie Van Doren’s apartment in New York City, suggesting adultery between Gould and Van Doren.
The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery, at a different time and place, and with a different person than the act alleged in the divorce complaint.

Procedural History

The defendant, Teal, was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury in the trial court.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reviewed the case based on exceptions to evidentiary rulings made during the trial.

Issue(s)

Whether a person can be convicted of attempted subornation of perjury based on evidence that the solicited false testimony was not material to the issue in the underlying case.

Holding

No, because attempted subornation of perjury requires that the solicited testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury. Since perjury requires that the false testimony be material, soliciting immaterial testimony cannot constitute attempted subornation of perjury.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that materiality is an essential element of perjury. The statute defines perjury as “willfully and knowingly testifies falsely, in any material matter.” Subornation of perjury requires inducing another to commit perjury; therefore, if the person suborned does not commit perjury, the suborner is not guilty of subornation.
Attempted subornation of perjury, then, requires an act done with the intent to commit subornation of perjury, but failing to do so. The crime of subornation of perjury can only occur if the false testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury.
In this case, the testimony Teal attempted to procure from MacCauslan was “irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial” to the issue in Gould v. Gould. The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery than the one alleged in the complaint.
“If false testimony is not material it cannot support an indictment for perjury. The testimony upon which such a charge is predicated must be false ‘in any material matter.’”
The Court rejected the argument that the testimony might become material if the complaint were amended, stating that the charge of perjury cannot depend on issues or events arising after the testimony is given. The Court also noted that the legislature had provided for cases where the false testimony is immaterial via a statute concerning “Falsifying Evidence.”