New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Street

  • People v. Street, 27 N.Y.3d 309 (2016): Constitutionality of Noise Ordinances and the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

    People v. Street, 27 N.Y.3d 309 (2016)

    A noise ordinance that defines “unnecessary noise” using an objective standard of “a reasonable person of normal sensibilities” is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Syracuse’s noise ordinance, prohibiting “unnecessary noise” from motor vehicles, was unconstitutionally vague. The court held the ordinance constitutional, distinguishing it from a previously invalidated ordinance. The Syracuse ordinance defined “unnecessary noise” using an objective “reasonable person” standard, providing sufficient clarity to give fair notice of prohibited conduct and to guide law enforcement. The court emphasized that noise regulations often require broadly stated definitions but must still meet constitutional standards. The decision reaffirmed that such regulations are constitutional if they define noise by an objective standard and are tailored to a specific context.

    Facts

    Police stopped the defendant’s vehicle because they believed the car stereo was creating noise heard beyond 50 feet, violating Syracuse Noise Ordinance § 40-16(b). During the stop, police discovered crack cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which the trial court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of violating the noise ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because it used an objective standard, and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged in a local court with violating the Syracuse Noise Ordinance, as well as drug possession. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, and convicted the defendant of violating the ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the ordinance constitutional. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Syracuse Noise Ordinance § 40-16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause.

    Holding

    1. No, because the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied a two-part test to determine if the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, examining whether the statute gives fair notice that the conduct is forbidden and provides clear standards for enforcement. The court found that the Syracuse ordinance, unlike the one in People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., used an objective standard—what a “reasonable person of normal sensibilities” would find disturbing—when defining “unnecessary noise.” The court noted that this objective standard distinguishes the ordinance from the subjective, vague standards that were found unconstitutional in Trap Rock, thereby providing sufficient notice and standards for enforcement. The court emphasized that the ordinance was tailored to the specific context of noise from motor vehicles on public highways. The court also noted that the ordinance did not contain the problematic “without limiting the above language” clause found in the prior case that had led to the ordinance being declared unconstitutional.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on drafting and analyzing noise ordinances. It confirms that noise ordinances, while needing to be broadly defined, must employ objective standards to avoid being found unconstitutionally vague. The ruling underscores the importance of using a “reasonable person” standard and limiting the scope of the ordinance to a specific context. This decision helps law enforcement, municipalities, and practitioners understand the parameters of constitutionally permissible noise regulations and how to avoid the vagueness challenges that can arise in this area. The case emphasizes the importance of careful drafting to avoid the pitfalls identified in earlier cases such as Trap Rock.

  • People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231 (1967): Flag Burning and the Limits of Free Speech

    People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231 (1967)

    A state statute prohibiting the public mutilation of the flag does not violate the First Amendment when applied to the act of flag burning as a form of protest, if the statute’s purpose is to prevent a breach of the peace.

    Summary

    The defendant, a World War II veteran, burned an American flag in public to protest the shooting of James Meredith, a civil rights leader. He was convicted under a New York law against publicly mutilating the flag. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was intended to prevent breaches of the peace and that the act of flag burning, in this instance, was akin to inciting violence. The court reasoned that while nonverbal expression is a form of speech, it is not afforded the same level of protection as pure speech, and the state can regulate conduct that threatens public order.

    Facts

    • On June 6, 1966, the defendant learned of the shooting of James Meredith.
    • The defendant burned a 48-star American flag on a street corner to protest the incident.
    • A small crowd gathered, and the defendant stated, “If they let that happen to Meredith we don’t need an American flag.”
    • The defendant was arrested and charged with violating New York Penal Law § 1425, subd. 16, par. d (public mutilation of the flag) and disorderly conduct.
    • He was acquitted on the disorderly conduct charge but convicted of flag mutilation and received a suspended sentence.

    Procedural History

    • The defendant was tried and convicted in a lower court for violating Penal Law § 1425, subd. 16, par. d.
    • The conviction was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of burning the American flag as a form of protest is protected speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, thereby invalidating his conviction under Penal Law § 1425, subd. 16, par. d.

    Holding

    No, because the state statute prohibiting public mutilation of the flag is designed to prevent breaches of the peace, and the act of flag burning in this context posed a threat to public order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that nonverbal expression can be a form of speech protected by the First Amendment but emphasized that this protection is not absolute. It stated that the State may proscribe conduct that threatens the peace, security, or well-being of its inhabitants. The court found that New York’s statute against flag mutilation was intended to prevent breaches of the peace, citing the potential for violence when the flag is treated contemptuously in public.

    The court distinguished between censoring an idea and promoting public safety: “[I]f the State can show that the prohibition of certain conduct is designed to promote the public health, safety or well-being, then, ‘the circumstance that such prohibition has an impact on speech or expression’ does not render the legislation violative of the First Amendment… providing, of course, that other channels of communication are open and available.”

    Furthermore, the court emphasized the long-standing nature of flag desecration laws, noting that such laws exist to discourage contemptuous treatment of the flag in public and prevent potential violence. The court likened the defendant’s act to shouting epithets at passersby, stating that it was an “act of incitement, literally and figuratively ‘incendiary’ and as fraught with danger to the public peace as if he had stood on the street corner shouting epithets at passing pedestrians.”

    The court stated, “[I]nsults to a flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have often been resented and sometimes punished on the spot.”

    Therefore, the court concluded that the statute could be legitimately applied to curb the defendant’s activities in the interest of preventing violence and maintaining public order.