New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Steward

  • People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 493 (2011): Resentencing Eligibility and Predicate Felonies

    People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 493 (2011)

    A defendant is ineligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 if they have a prior violent felony conviction within the preceding ten years, regardless of whether they were formally adjudicated a predicate felon based on that violent felony.

    Summary

    Defendants Steward and Wright sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 for drug offenses. The trial courts denied their motions, finding they were ineligible due to prior violent felony convictions within the statutory time frame. The defendants argued that because they were not *adjudicated* predicate felons based on those violent felonies at the time of their sentencing for the drug offenses, the violent felonies should not disqualify them from resentencing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that a formal adjudication as a predicate felon based on the violent felony is not required for the exclusion to apply. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute indicates that prior adjudication is only required under a separate provision not applicable here.

    Facts

    Steward was convicted in March 2004 for criminal sale of a controlled substance. He had a 1991 conviction for robbery in the first and second degrees (violent felonies).
    Wright was convicted in May 2005 for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He had two 1994 convictions for attempted robbery in the second degree (violent felonies).
    Neither defendant was adjudicated a predicate felon based on their violent felony convictions at the time of their sentencing for the drug offenses.

    Procedural History

    Both Steward and Wright moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009.
    The trial courts denied the motions, finding them ineligible due to prior violent felony convictions.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial courts’ decisions.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must have been formally adjudicated a predicate felon based on a prior violent felony conviction to be excluded from resentencing eligibility under CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i).

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i) does not require a formal adjudication as a predicate felon based on the violent felony for the exclusion from resentencing to apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory interpretation of CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i). The court emphasized that the statute excludes individuals with a prior conviction for a violent felony offense within the preceding ten years. The defendants conceded they had prior violent felony convictions within that timeframe.

    The court distinguished between CPL 440.46(5)(a) and CPL 440.46(5)(b). The latter provision explicitly requires a prior adjudication for certain offenses to trigger the exclusion, while the former does not. The court applied the principle that “(w)hen different terms are used in various parts of a statute . . . , it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended” (Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530 [1975]). Since paragraph (b) included a “prior adjudication” requirement, but paragraph (a) did not, the legislature intentionally omitted that requirement from paragraph (a).

    The court also addressed the defendants’ argument that Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b) and CPL 400.21(7)(c) limit the term “predicate felony conviction” to only those convictions previously adjudicated. The court clarified that while CPL 400.21(7)(c) requires an adjudication for the term “second felony offender,” the term “predicate felony conviction” itself does not require such an adjudication.

    The court noted that defendants seeking resentencing can still challenge the validity of the underlying prior violent felony convictions. Quoting L 2004, ch 738, § 23, the court stated that a court may “conduct a hearing, if necessary, to determine whether [a defendant] qualifies to be resentenced or to determine *any controverted issue of fact relevant to the issue of sentencing*.” Thus, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s orders, finding that the defendants were ineligible for resentencing due to their prior violent felony convictions, irrespective of whether they were previously adjudicated predicate felons on those bases.

  • People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 104 (2010): Limits on Voir Dire Questioning

    16 N.Y.3d 104 (2010)

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it imposes an unreasonably short time restriction on attorney questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire, especially in a complex felony case where potential jurors have expressed biases or have connections to the victim.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-minute time limit on defense counsel’s questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire. The court found that this limitation, given the serious felony charges, the victim’s prominence, and the jurors’ potential biases, deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to assess juror qualifications. The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to tailor voir dire procedures to the specific circumstances of each case, and to reconsider time limitations when they prove unduly restrictive and prejudicial.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with robbery after allegedly stealing a necklace from Raashaun Casey, a radio personality known as “DJ Envy.” Casey and a friend pursued the defendant, leading to his apprehension. Before jury selection, the trial court imposed a five-minute time limit for each round of voir dire. During voir dire, several prospective jurors revealed they or their close relations were victims of robbery or theft. Some jurors also indicated familiarity with the victim, DJ Envy. Defense counsel objected to the time limit but the court continued to enforce it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. He appealed, arguing that the time restriction during voir dire denied him a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-minute limitation on counsel’s questioning of jurors during voir dire in a multiple felony case, thus denying the defendant a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s time restriction prevented defense counsel from adequately exploring potential juror biases and relevant matters affecting their qualifications, especially given the serious nature of the charges and the identity of the victim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in supervising voir dire under CPL 270.15(1)(c), but emphasized that any time restrictions must still afford counsel a “fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters.” The Court acknowledged the absence of rigid guidelines for determining appropriate time limits but highlighted several factors, including the number and seriousness of charges, media attention, and unique concerns arising from the identity of the defendant, victim, or witnesses. The court noted that the five-minute restriction was significantly shorter than those previously upheld.

    The Court also found it significant that the victim was a local radio celebrity known to many prospective jurors and that a number of venire members stated that they or someone close to them had been a crime victim. The Court reasoned that these circumstances called for a more extended period for counsel questioning. Although the trial judge was conscientious in her examination of the venire, “the attorneys were significantly limited in their efforts to follow-up on provocative answers given by prospective jurors in response to the court’s inquiries.”

    The Court stated, “Given the lack of clarity in the record concerning whether certain prospective jurors were discharged or retained, we cannot say that defendant’s claim of prejudice is refuted by the record.” The Court emphasized that “trial judges are not always able to cover all avenues of questioning that interest the parties during voir dire—that is why the Legislature has directed that counsel must be provided a ‘fair opportunity’ to examine prospective jurors after the court has concluded its questioning.”

    The Court concluded that “the unusually short time restriction imposed by the court prevented counsel from having a sufficient opportunity to examine the various prospective jurors whose statements could reasonably be expected to elicit further questioning, and defendant’s claim of prejudice cannot be discounted…” and reversed the conviction.