New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Starling

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 118 (1995): Unauthorized Jury Room Demonstration and Preservation of Error

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 118 (1995)

    When a court officer’s unauthorized conduct in a jury room does not usurp the court’s authority and the court takes corrective action, a defendant must object to preserve any error for appeal; absent a timely objection, the error is considered curable and cured.

    Summary

    Starling was convicted of second-degree murder. During jury deliberations, a court officer, at the jury’s request, demonstrated how the murder weapon (a bayonet) fit into its sheath, without the court’s authorization. The trial court informed both sides and, with the defendant’s consent, instructed the jury to disregard the demonstration. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s failure to object to the demonstration, instead agreeing to a curative instruction, meant the issue was not preserved for appeal. The court distinguished this case from instances where a judge delegates essential judicial functions, emphasizing that the trial court retained control and addressed the impropriety.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend’s father by stabbing him with a bayonet.

    Conflicting accounts were presented at trial: the prosecution argued the stabbing was deliberate, while the defendant claimed self-defense, stating the deceased seized the bayonet first.

    During deliberations, the jury requested the bayonet and its sheath.

    A court officer allowed the jury to handle the bayonet, and demonstrated how it could be drawn from the sheath while it was in his waistband, but the court officer refused to allow the jurors to experiment with the bayonet themselves.

    The court officer told the court about the demonstration, and the court informed both sides.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, finding the defense waived any issue by agreeing to a curative instruction, and rejecting the argument that a mode of proceedings error occurred.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and the order denying CPL 440.10 relief, determining the court officer’s conduct was ministerial and did not usurp the trial court’s authority.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the court officer’s unauthorized demonstration in the jury room constituted a “mode of proceedings” error that need not be preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court took appropriate action to address the unauthorized demonstration and the defendant consented to a curative instruction instead of objecting or moving for a mistrial, the issue was not preserved for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from People v. Ahmed, where a judge improperly delegated judicial functions. In this case, the trial court retained control of the proceedings and addressed the court officer’s impropriety by informing both sides and offering a curative instruction.

    The Court relied on People v. Bonaparte, where a court officer’s communication with the jury was deemed ministerial and any error was unpreserved because of the failure to object. The court found the present case even stronger for affirmance because the court officer’s actions were unauthorized.

    The Court emphasized that the defendant had the opportunity to object to the demonstration but instead agreed to the curative instruction. The court stated, “[I]n all, the impropriety was protestable but unprotested, curable and cured.”

    The Court found that the court officer’s actions did not usurp the court’s authority, distinguishing this case from People v. Khalek, where a court officer improperly instructed the jury leading them to change their verdict. The Court emphasized the trial court retained control of the trial.

    The Court reiterated that preservation is essential for appellate review, unless the error goes to the essential validity of the trial.

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Defining ‘Sale’ of Narcotics Under New York Law

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    Under New York Penal Law, the term “sell,” concerning controlled substances, includes any transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another, even without monetary exchange or commercial benefit.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a “handoff” of narcotics between two individuals to avoid police detection constitutes a “sale” under Penal Law § 220.00(1). The police observed Starling passing a bag of cocaine to a juvenile. Starling was charged with criminal sale and possession with intent to sell. The Court held that the transfer of drugs, even without monetary consideration, falls within the statutory definition of “sell,” which includes “give or dispose of to another.” The Court affirmed the conviction, emphasizing the legislature’s intent to encompass any form of transfer, regardless of commercial nature.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Starling handing a small paper bag to a juvenile on a street corner after observing Starling exchanging an item from the bag for what appeared to be paper currency with an unknown third party. Upon approaching Starling, he handed the bag to a juvenile. The juvenile discarded the bag, which was found to contain seven ziplock bags of cocaine. $376 was recovered from Starling during arrest.

    Procedural History

    Starling was indicted on charges of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39[1]) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16[1]). Starling moved for a trial order of dismissal, arguing the prosecution failed to prove a “sale” or intent to sell. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Division affirmed Starling’s conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Penal Law § 220.00(1), a “handoff” of narcotics between two individuals, absent evidence of monetary exchange or other consideration, constitutes a “sale”?

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory definition of “sell” includes “to give or dispose of to another,” encompassing any transfer of a controlled substance, regardless of whether it is commercial in nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the broad statutory definition of “sell” in Penal Law § 220.00(1), which includes “to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another.” This definition demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to include any form of transfer, rejecting the need for commercial elements. The Court cited People v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 NY2d 64, 72 stating that the legislative intent was to “include any form of transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another”. The court also referred to People v. Herring, 83 NY2d 780, 782, emphasizing that “a defendant may be guilty as a seller even if he does not receive any consideration for the transfer of drugs to the buyer”. The Court rejected Starling’s argument that the transfer could not be a sale because the juvenile may have jointly possessed the drugs. The Court stated that the record lacked sufficient evidence that the juvenile exercised any control over the contraband prior to the handoff. Therefore, the trial court properly declined to charge the jury on the concepts of joint, constructive and temporary possession. Regarding Starling’s claim that the court failed to comply with the notice requirements of CPL 310.30 in responding to the jury’s notes, the Court found that because the court read the content of the jury’s notes in open court prior to responding, this case was distinguishable from People v. O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270. Defense counsel was given notice of the contents of the jury notes and had knowledge of the substance of the court’s intended response and counsel’s silence at a time when any error by the court could have been obviated by timely objection renders the claim unpreserved and unreviewable.

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise a specific objection at the time of the alleged error, giving the trial court an opportunity to correct it; a new or different objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and assault after shooting his neighbor. During jury deliberations, the jury requested a written list of elements for each charge, which the court declined, offering them the opportunity to take notes instead. Later, jurors orally requested instructions on intoxication, intent, and other issues. Defendant moved for a mistrial, objecting to the oral questions but not to the note-taking or the lack of opportunity to discuss the supplemental instructions beforehand. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his appellate claims by not raising timely and specific objections at trial.

    Facts

    The defendant argued with his neighbor about his dog and subsequently shot the neighbor. The jury rejected the defendant’s alibi defense and convicted him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, as well as assault in the second and third degrees. During deliberations, the jury requested a written list of elements for each charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, raising issues related to the jury’s note-taking during supplemental instructions and the court’s handling of oral questions from the jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the issue of the jury taking notes during supplemental instructions when he failed to object at the time the court permitted note-taking and, in fact, objected to a subsequent cautionary instruction on note-taking.

    2. Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the issue that he was denied an opportunity to discuss with the court supplemental instructions before they were given to the jury, when his only objection at trial was that the oral questions did not permit him to preserve the jury’s queries.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant did not object to the note-taking when it occurred and later objected to a cautionary instruction, thereby waiving any claim regarding the need for such instructions.

    2. No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was based on a different ground than the argument he raised on appeal, specifically that he was denied the opportunity to discuss the supplemental instructions with the court before they were given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of raising timely and specific objections at trial to preserve issues for appellate review. The court stated that, regarding the note-taking, “at the time the court permitted the jurors to take notes, there was no objection and no request for cautionary instructions.” Furthermore, when the prosecutor requested cautionary instructions, “the defendant objected, thereby waiving any claim he might have had regarding the need for cautionary instructions.”

    Regarding the supplemental instructions, the court cited People v. O’Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, which indicates a defendant should have an opportunity to discuss proposed answers to jurors’ questions. However, the court found that the defendant’s objection at trial only pertained to the lack of a clear record of the jury’s questions, not the denial of an opportunity to confer on the instructions. The court cited People v. DeRosario, 81 N.Y.2d 801, to reinforce the principle that a claim must be properly preserved to be reviewable on appeal. The court reasoned that the purpose of requiring a specific objection is to give the trial court the opportunity to correct the error. By failing to raise the specific objection at trial, the defendant deprived the court of that opportunity, and the issue was therefore not preserved for appellate review. The Court of Appeals thus reinforced the idea that objections need to be clear and contemporaneous to the error to allow for proper judicial consideration and correction at trial.

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Upholding Defendant’s Right to Counsel During Jury Deliberations

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    CPL 310.30 requires that counsel be given meaningful notice of jury inquiries and an opportunity to be heard before the response is given, especially when the inquiries are substantive and deviate from the original written questions.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery, drug possession, and weapons possession. During jury deliberations, the trial judge held oral colloquies with the jury beyond their initial written inquiries, discussing reasonable doubt and possession without allowing defense counsel meaningful participation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the lack of meaningful participation by defense counsel in formulating responses to the jury’s substantive follow-up questions violated CPL 310.30. The court emphasized that counsel must have the opportunity to be heard before the response is given, ensuring a fair trial.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested during a narcotics buy-and-bust operation where an undercover officer was held at gunpoint. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of multiple charges, including robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal sale of a controlled substance, and criminal possession of a weapon. During jury deliberations, the trial court engaged in several oral exchanges with the jury, addressing questions beyond the scope of the jury’s initial written inquiries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding a violation of CPL 310.30 regarding communication with the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated CPL 310.30 by engaging in substantive oral exchanges with the jury during deliberations, concerning matters not included in the original written inquiries, without allowing defense counsel meaningful participation in formulating the responses?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 310.30 requires that counsel be given meaningful notice of jury inquiries and an opportunity to be heard before the response is given, and this opportunity was not provided with respect to the substantive follow-up questions posed by the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 310.30, as interpreted by People v. O’Rama, mandates that counsel receive meaningful notice of jury inquiries and have the opportunity to be heard before the court responds. The court emphasized that the oral exchanges between the judge and the jury included substantive discussions regarding reasonable doubt and constructive and actual possession, which were not part of the original written queries. Since the defense counsel was not given a meaningful opportunity to participate in formulating the responses to these follow-up questions, the statute was violated.

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Lykes, where the jury was given mere clarifying inquiries. In this case, the jury received additional instructions on crucial, distinct, substantive issues. The court stated that “an important purpose of the statute ‘is to ensure that counsel has the opportunity to be heard before the response is given’” (quoting People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270, 277). The court found that the initial opportunity to participate in responses to written notes did not satisfy the statute regarding the subsequent oral exchanges, as the follow-up questions changed the substantive scope of the inquiries. The court also noted that the identification by the undercover officer was merely confirmatory, and a Wade hearing was not required, citing People v. Polanco, 80 NY2d 1012 and People v. Wharton, 74 NY2d 921.