People v. Stannard, 42 N.Y.2d 148 (1977)

In a perjury trial, background evidence is admissible to make the subject matter of the perjury intelligible to the jury, but the trial court must carefully monitor the introduction of such evidence to prevent it from prejudicing the defendant.

Summary

Robert Stannard, a New York City police officer, was convicted of perjury for lying to a grand jury investigating police corruption. At trial, the prosecution introduced extensive testimony from another officer, Serpico, detailing corrupt activities of other officers, none of which directly related to Stannard’s alleged perjury. The trial court admitted this testimony as background evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the extensive background testimony was unduly prejudicial and exceeded the permissible scope, thereby denying Stannard a fair trial. The Court emphasized that while some background evidence is permissible to provide context, it must be carefully monitored to avoid unfairly influencing the jury.

Facts

A Grand Jury investigated police corruption in the Seventh Division of the New York City Police Department. Stannard testified before the Grand Jury and denied collecting protection money from Juan and Dolores Carreras and denied meeting with Carreras and others to discuss how Carreras could continue his policy business. He was subsequently charged with perjury based on these denials. At trial, Inspector Sachson testified about the investigation triggered by Patrolman Serpico. Serpico then provided extensive testimony about police corruption involving other officers and gamblers, but this testimony was unrelated to Stannard’s specific interactions with Carreras.

Procedural History

Stannard was convicted of five counts of perjury. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Stannard appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the order and remanded for a new trial.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in admitting extensive background testimony regarding police corruption that was unrelated to the defendant’s alleged perjury, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

Holding

Yes, because the extensive background testimony exceeded permissible discretionary bounds and was unduly prejudicial to the defendant, denying him a fair trial.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court acknowledged that some background evidence is permissible in perjury cases to make the subject matter intelligible to the jury, citing People v. Doody. However, it emphasized that the introduction of such evidence must be carefully monitored to prevent it from spilling over its barriers and distorting the jury’s contemplation of the determinative and critical evidence, quoting People v. Gleason. The Court found that Serpico’s testimony was overly extensive and added facts involving the defendant and others in a web of activity which could only be considered by the jury reprehensible, resulting in the perjury testimony becoming only background for the evidence of police corruption in the Seventh Division. The Court noted the District Attorney’s summation exacerbated the prejudice by urging the jury to send a message to Stannard and other officers about police corruption. The Court stated, “Truly prejudicial evidence cannot be erased from a juror’s mind by the court’s instructions”. The Court distinguished People v. Doody, noting that in that case, the prosecution lacked direct witnesses and relied on circumstantial proof, whereas in Stannard’s case, the prosecution had direct witnesses (Carreras and others) to testify against Stannard’s grand jury testimony. The Court concluded that the excessive amount of background evidence destroyed the reasonable balance between its claimed importance and its potential for prejudicing the defendant’s case, warranting a new trial.