New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Spivey

  • People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993): Establishing Intent in Felony Assault and Verdict Sheet Restrictions

    People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993)

    The intent necessary for a felony assault conviction is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and the defendant need not be physically present at the scene of the assault, as long as the assault occurs during the immediate flight from the predicate felony; furthermore, verdict sheets listing statutory elements are reversible error unless agreed upon by both parties.

    Summary

    Defendant Spivey was convicted of second-degree assault (felony assault) after his accomplices assaulted a police officer during their flight from a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the assault count and ordering a new trial, also directing the trial court to sanction the prosecution for a Rosario violation (failure to produce a police officer’s memo book). The Court of Appeals reinstated the assault count, holding that the intent for felony assault can be inferred from the underlying felony, even if the defendant wasn’t physically present during the assault. The Court also affirmed the new trial order due to an improper verdict sheet but removed the mandate to fashion a Rosario sanction because the defendant received the relief requested at trial.

    Facts

    Transit Police Officer Schumacher witnessed Spivey and three others robbing a man. Schumacher apprehended Spivey but pursued the other three into a subway. The three suspects assaulted Schumacher. After a chase, two were caught. Spivey was tried jointly with the other defendants. Officer Schumacher’s memo book, containing entries about the case, was lost before trial. At a reconstruction hearing, Schumacher testified about the incident. The defense moved for a mistrial or to preclude Schumacher’s testimony, but the court denied the mistrial and stated there was no reconstruction testimony before the jury.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Spivey of second-degree assault and other crimes. The Appellate Division reversed the assault conviction, dismissed that count, and remanded for a new trial on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division also directed the trial court to fashion a sanction for the Rosario violation. The People appealed the dismissal of the assault count and the Rosario sanction direction. Spivey appealed the new trial order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the intent necessary for a felony assault conviction can be inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, similar to felony murder doctrine.
    2. Whether a defendant must be physically present at the scene of the assault for a felony assault conviction.
    3. Whether the defendant was entitled to an additional sanction for the Rosario violation.
    4. Whether the verdict sheet containing additional explanatory language was proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for felony assault is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and whether the assault occurred during the immediate flight from a predicate felony is a question of fact for the jury.
    2. No, because it is sufficient that the assault is made on a nonparticipant of a predicate felony “in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of [the] felony, * * * or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]).
    3. No, because the trial court granted the alternative relief requested by the defense (preclusion of reconstruction testimony), no additional sanction is required.
    4. No, because giving the jury a verdict sheet that lists some of the statutory elements of the counts is reversible error unless the parties agree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analogized felony assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]) to felony murder (Penal Law § 125.25), noting their similar language. It cited People v. Gladman, 41 NY2d 123, stating that in felony murder, intent is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony. The Court applied the same logic to felony assault, referencing People v. Snow, 74 NY2d 671, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the intent for felony murder or assault is inferred from the underlying felony. The Court held that the assault occurring during immediate flight is a factual question for the jury.

    The Court further held that physical presence isn’t required, emphasizing the statute’s language about assaults made “in furtherance” of the felony or flight. Regarding the Rosario violation, the Court noted that the defense requested, and received, preclusion of reconstruction testimony, thus satisfying the need for a sanction.

    Finally, the Court reaffirmed the rule against verdict sheets listing statutory elements without agreement from both parties, citing People v. Kelly, 76 NY2d 1013, and other cases. This necessitates a new trial despite the reinstatement of the assault charge.

  • People v. Spivey, 46 N.Y.2d 1014 (1979): Justification for Stop and Frisk Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Spivey, 46 N.Y.2d 1014 (1979)

    Police officers are justified in stopping and frisking a suspect when they have a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, and that the suspect is armed and dangerous.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a stop and frisk conducted by police officers who had received a radio call about an armed robbery. The Court held that the officers’ actions were justified because the defendant matched the description of the robber, was in the vicinity of the crime, and acted suspiciously during questioning by refusing to provide his name and address and fidgeting with his hands. This case illustrates the application of the reasonable suspicion standard in the context of a rapidly unfolding investigation of a violent crime.

    Facts

    Police officers received a radio call informing them of an armed robbery. The defendant was walking on a deserted street in the vicinity of the crime and matched the description of the robber provided in the radio call. When questioned, the defendant refused to furnish his name or a specific address. The defendant repeatedly removed his hands from the radio car and shuffled them around. The officers observed suspicious bulges in the defendant’s jacket pockets.

    Procedural History

    The lower court ruled that the stop and frisk was unlawful, suppressing the evidence obtained. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, having received a radio call informing them of an armed robbery, were justified in stopping and frisking the defendant, who matched the description of the robber, was walking on a deserted street in the vicinity of the crime, and acted suspiciously during questioning?

    Holding

    Yes, because based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed an armed robbery and was armed and dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the police conduct was reasonable given the information available to the officers at the time of the stop and frisk. The Court relied on the following factors: the radio call informing them of an armed robbery, the defendant matching the description of the robber, the defendant’s presence in the vicinity of the crime, and the defendant’s suspicious behavior during questioning. Citing People v. Havelka, 45 NY2d 636, 640-641, the Court stated the officers were justified in stopping the defendant. The Court also found the limited pat-down was justified, explaining “Given this situation and defendant’s status as an armed-robbery suspect, it was quite reasonable for the officer to investigate the suspicious bulges in the jacket pockets.” This decision emphasizes the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances when evaluating the reasonableness of a stop and frisk. The ruling also highlights the diminished expectation of privacy in situations involving violent crimes and potential danger to the public. The Court did not elaborate on dissenting or concurring opinions.