10 N.Y.3d 457 (2008)

When a sentencing court fails to pronounce a mandatory or discretionary term of post-release supervision (PRS) during sentencing, the proper remedy is to remit the case for resentencing so the court can properly pronounce the PRS term, rather than striking the PRS term altogether.

Summary

This case addresses the remedy when a sentencing court fails to pronounce a term of post-release supervision (PRS) as required by New York law. Several defendants argued that their PRS terms should be stricken because the sentencing courts did not orally pronounce them. The New York Court of Appeals held that the failure to pronounce the PRS term was a procedural error, but the correct remedy is resentencing to allow the court to properly pronounce the PRS term. Striking the PRS term would result in a sentence not contemplated by statute.

Facts

Five defendants were convicted of violent felonies. Under New York law, these convictions required a term of post-release supervision (PRS). In some cases, the PRS term was mandatory, while in others, the court had discretion to set the length of the PRS term within a statutory range. In all five cases, the sentencing courts failed to orally pronounce the PRS term during the sentencing hearing. In some cases, the PRS term was noted on court worksheets or commitment sheets, but not stated aloud in court. Defendant Sparber disavowed vacating his plea, seeking only to strike the PRS term.

Procedural History

In all five cases, the defendants appealed, arguing that the PRS term should be stricken from their sentences because it was not orally pronounced by the sentencing court. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments, holding that the PRS term was included by operation of law and that the clerk’s entry of the PRS term on the commitment sheet satisfied due process requirements. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in all five cases.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a sentencing court’s failure to orally pronounce a term of post-release supervision (PRS) at the time of sentencing entitles the defendant to have the PRS term stricken from the sentence.

2. Whether notation of the PRS term on court worksheets or commitment sheets, without oral pronouncement, constitutes a proper sentencing pronouncement.

Holding

1. No, because striking the PRS term would result in a sentence that does not comply with the statutory requirements for violent felony offenses.

2. No, because sentencing is a uniquely judicial responsibility that must be carried out by the court in the defendant’s presence.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law §§ 70.00(6) and 70.45(1) mandate a period of PRS for violent felony offenses, and CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40 require the court to pronounce the sentence in the defendant’s presence. The court emphasized that sentencing is a judicial responsibility, not a clerical one, and that the PRS term must be orally pronounced to ensure transparency and allow the defendant to understand the full consequences of their conviction. The Court rejected the argument that notations on worksheets or commitment sheets could substitute for oral pronouncement. Citing People v. Sturgis, 69 N.Y.2d 816, 818 (1987), the court noted that where a sentence violates CPL 380.20, the proper remedy is vacatur of the sentence and remitter for resentencing.

The Court stated, “These concerns are particularly acute where, as in the case of defendant Rodriguez, the PRS term may vary and must be set at the court’s discretion (see e.g. Penal Law § 70.45 [2] [b]-[f]). And, even in cases with mandatory PRS terms, the defendant still has a statutory right to hear the court’s pronouncement as to what the entire sentence encompasses, directly from the court.”