Tag: People v. Slavin

  • People v. Slavin, 1 N.Y.3d 392 (2004): Admissibility of Tattoos as Evidence of Motive and the Fifth Amendment

    1 N.Y.3d 392 (2004)

    The Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination does not bar the admission of photographs of a defendant’s tattoos as evidence of motive, as tattoos are considered physical characteristics and their creation is not compelled by the state, even if they reflect the defendant’s thoughts.

    Summary

    Christopher Slavin was convicted of hate crimes after attacking two Mexican laborers. Over his objection, the prosecution introduced photographs of Slavin’s numerous offensive and racially charged tattoos to demonstrate his motive. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the tattoos were physical characteristics, not compelled testimony, and therefore admissible despite Slavin’s Fifth Amendment claims. The court reasoned that the state did not compel Slavin to create the tattoos, and they were thus akin to pre-existing documents that can be used as evidence, even if incriminating.

    Facts

    Christopher Slavin lured two Mexican day laborers with a false promise of work and drove them to an isolated location. During the drive, he questioned their ethnicity. Upon arrival, Slavin and an accomplice brutally attacked the men. Slavin struck them with a metal post-hole digger, while the accomplice stabbed one of them. The victims escaped and were rescued by a passing motorist.

    Procedural History

    Slavin was indicted, and he moved to dismiss the indictment and preclude the use of photographs of his tattoos at trial, arguing Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations. The trial court denied the motion, and the People were permitted to take a second set of photographs. Slavin was convicted of attempted murder, assault, and aggravated harassment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by admitting photographs of his tattoos, taken over his objection, as evidence of motive for committing a hate crime.

    Holding

    No, because the tattoos were physical characteristics, not compelled testimony, and the state did not force Slavin to create them; therefore, the admission of photographs of the tattoos did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled testimony, not against the use of physical characteristics as evidence. Relying on Schmerber v. California, the court stated that the privilege protects an accused from being compelled to testify against himself or provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. The court emphasized that while the tattoos may have reflected Slavin’s inner thoughts, he was not compelled to create them by the state.

    The court analogized the tattoos to pre-existing documents, noting that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of such documents, even if incriminating, because their creation was not compelled. The court distinguished this case from situations where the act of producing evidence has testimonial aspects, such as admitting the existence or authenticity of documents, because the prosecution was already aware of the tattoos’ existence.

    The dissent argued that the tattoos were offered to prove Slavin’s state of mind and were therefore testimonial, thus violating his Fifth Amendment rights when he was compelled to reveal them. The dissent likened the forced removal of clothing to a strip search and argued that it constituted a greater invasion than a subpoena. The dissent also noted that the tattoos were covered by clothing, negating any claim that photographing them was part of routine arrest processing. Further, the dissent asserted that the second set of photographs taken pursuant to CPL 240.40 was unauthorized as the statute applies to non-testimonial evidence only.

    The majority countered that even if the second set of photographs was improperly authorized, there was no prejudice as the first set was admissible. Ultimately, the court held that Slavin was not compelled to be a witness against himself, as the tattoos were created voluntarily and the expert witness only testified as to the customary meaning of the images, without offering an opinion on Slavin’s thoughts during the attack.