New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Skinner

  • People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980): Right to Counsel Attaches When Attorney is Retained, Even in Non-Custodial Interrogation

    52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980)

    Once a suspect retains counsel on a matter under investigation, the police cannot interrogate that suspect about the same matter in a non-custodial setting if the suspect’s attorney has instructed the police not to question the suspect in their absence; any waiver of the right to counsel must occur in the presence of the attorney.

    Summary

    Skinner was a suspect in a murder investigation and had retained an attorney who instructed the police not to question him outside of his presence. Despite this instruction, police served Skinner with an order to appear in a lineup, and then proceeded to question him about the homicide, obtaining incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that Skinner’s state constitutional rights were violated. Because Skinner had retained counsel specifically for the matter under investigation and his attorney instructed the police not to question him in the attorney’s absence, the police could not elicit statements from Skinner in a non-custodial setting without violating his right to counsel. This decision emphasizes the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the state’s obligation to respect it.

    Facts

    Diane Snell was murdered in June 1975. Police suspected Skinner, who had been seen with her the night before. Skinner was questioned twice and submitted to polygraph examinations, but did not confess. In the early fall of 1975, Skinner retained attorney Leo Fallon due to the repeated police questioning. Fallon informed the police department that he represented Skinner and instructed them not to question Skinner without him. In March 1977, police served Skinner with an order to show cause regarding a lineup. After serving the order, detectives, knowing Skinner was represented, questioned him about the homicide and obtained incriminating statements. Skinner was then taken to the police station, but refused to make a statement until he spoke with his attorney.

    Procedural History

    Skinner moved to suppress the statements made on March 10, 1977. The hearing court denied the motion, finding the questioning was non-custodial. Skinner was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the statements were admissible because the interrogation was non-custodial and unrelated to service of the order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated Skinner’s New York constitutional right to counsel when they interrogated him in a non-custodial setting about a matter for which he had retained counsel, after his attorney instructed the police not to question him in his absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Skinner retained counsel specifically on the matter under investigation, and the police knew this, they could not question him on the same matter in a non-custodial setting after his attorney had instructed them not to question him in his absence. Any waiver of this right had to occur in the presence of his attorney.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the New York State Constitution’s guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and due process. The court emphasized that the right to counsel includes the right to have an attorney present while considering whether to waive rights. The court stated that “where, as here, a defendant is known to have invoked the right to and obtained the services of counsel on the matter about which the person is questioned, the State may not use statements elicited from that person in the absence of a waiver of counsel made in the presence of the attorney.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the non-waiver rule was deemed inapplicable in non-custodial settings. The court cited *People v. Townes* and *People v. Roberson*, cases that suppressed statements made in the absence of counsel even though the defendants were not in custody. Here, Skinner had retained counsel specifically because of the police investigation, indicating he felt unable to deal with the authorities without legal assistance. His attorney had interceded, demanding the police not question him, a demand the police ignored on March 10. The court rejected the argument that absent formal commencement of a criminal action, the defendant could be questioned with impunity after service of an order to show cause simply because he was not in custody.

    The Court also reasoned that allowing the police to question a represented individual in a non-custodial setting renders the right to counsel illusory. The effect of a waiver of counsel is the same regardless of whether the setting is custodial or non-custodial; therefore, the waiver’s validity should be equally scrutinized. The court found the motivations of the police irrelevant, as the impact on the right to counsel remains the same.

    The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that they depend on statements of the “guilty” to further an investigation. However, the Court countered that law enforcement officials must operate within the bounds of our State constitutional guarantees of the privilege against self incrimination and the right to counsel.

  • People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980): Admissibility of Statements Made in Custody Without Counsel Present

    People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980)

    Once an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding representing a defendant in connection with criminal charges under investigation, the defendant in custody may not waive the right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant’s statement made during a Review Board interview while in custody and without his attorney present should have been suppressed. The court emphasized the importance of the presence of counsel when a defendant in custody waives the right to counsel, particularly after an attorney has already entered the proceedings. Judge Jasen’s concurring opinion focused on the precedent set by People v. Hobson, arguing that the interview was inadmissible due to the defendant’s custodial status and the absence of his attorney during the waiver of his right to counsel.

    Facts

    The defendant, Skinner, was in custody and had an assigned attorney. While in detention, a police representative of the Review Board interviewed him. This interview stemmed from a complaint initiated voluntarily by Skinner. Prior to the interview, the Review Board representative gave Skinner the standard pre-interrogation warnings, as per Miranda v. Arizona. Skinner acknowledged understanding these rights.

    Procedural History

    The case initially proceeded through the lower courts, with the Appellate Division issuing an order. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, ultimately reversing the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals vacated the defendant’s plea, suppressed the statement, restored the case to its pre-pleading status, and remitted it to the Supreme Court, New York County for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant in custody, who is represented by counsel in a criminal proceeding, can validly waive the right to counsel during an interview conducted by a Review Board representative, outside the presence of his attorney.

    Holding

    No, because once a lawyer has entered a criminal proceeding representing a defendant in connection with criminal charges under investigation, the defendant in custody may not waive the right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in a concurring opinion by Judge Jasen, relied heavily on the precedent established in People v. Hobson. The core of the reasoning is that a custodial defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is ineffective if it occurs outside the presence of their attorney, especially after the attorney has formally entered the proceedings. Judge Jasen directly quoted Hobson, stating, “[o]nce a lawyer has entered a criminal proceeding representing a defendant in connection with criminal charges under investigation, the defendant in custody may not waive his right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer.” The court emphasized that the Miranda warnings given prior to the interview were insufficient to validate the waiver, given the custodial setting and the absence of counsel. The court underscored the importance of ensuring that any waiver of constitutional rights is competent, intelligent, and voluntary, which is best achieved when counsel is present. This decision reinforces the protection afforded to defendants in custody who have already obtained legal representation, preventing potentially coercive or ill-advised waivers of their right to counsel. The concurring opinion serves as a narrower, more direct application of existing precedent, focusing specifically on the Hobson rule rather than broader considerations about the voluntariness of the defendant’s actions.