Tag: People v. Shuman

  • People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975): Jury Instructions and Lesser Included Offenses in Felony Murder

    People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975)

    In a felony murder case, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses (such as the underlying felony) unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would permit the jury to find the defendant not guilty of felony murder but guilty of the lesser included offense.

    Summary

    Charles Shuman was convicted of two counts of felony murder. The indictment alleged robbery and burglary as the predicate felonies. Shuman argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the underlying felonies as lesser included offenses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a lesser included offense instruction is only required if there is a basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense (felony murder) while convicting on the lesser offense. Here, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the victim’s death resulted directly from the defendant’s actions during the commission of the felonies, precluding a finding of guilt on the underlying felonies without also finding guilt on felony murder.

    Facts

    Patrolman Levy found Alex Chafetz bound and gagged in his apartment. Chafetz died from asphyxiation due to the gag. Shuman confessed to entering Chafetz’s apartment with accomplices to commit robbery and burglary. During the crime, Shuman admitted to gagging Chafetz. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was homicide by asphyxiation due to gagging. The defendant did not present any evidence to contradict this conclusion.

    Procedural History

    Shuman was indicted on two counts of felony murder, predicated on robbery and burglary. At trial, Shuman requested the judge to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies (robbery, attempted robbery, burglary, or attempted burglary) as lesser included offenses. The trial court refused. The jury convicted Shuman of both counts of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Shuman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a felony murder trial, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies (robbery and burglary) as lesser included offenses when there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the underlying felonies but did not cause the victim’s death.

    Holding

    No, because under no view of the evidence could a jury find the defendant not guilty of felony murder but guilty of the underlying felonies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the “some basis in the evidence” test (derived from People v. Mussenden) to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction was warranted. This test, now codified in CPL 300.50 as a “reasonable view of the evidence” test, requires the instruction of a lesser included offense only when there is a basis for the jury to find the defendant not guilty of the greater crime but guilty of the lesser crime. The court emphasized that “every possible hypothesis” except the higher crime must be excluded to warrant a refusal to submit lower degrees or included crimes. The court noted that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Here, Shuman’s confession and the medical examiner’s testimony established a direct causal link between Shuman’s act of gagging the victim and the victim’s death by asphyxiation. Because there was no contradictory evidence presented, the court concluded that “under no view of the evidence could a jury find defendant not guilty of the crime charged and yet find him guilty of any crime necessarily included in that charged in the indictment.” Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies as lesser included offenses. The court implicitly suggests that the key is whether the act leading to the felony is separate in time or effect from the act causing the death. Here, the two were inextricably intertwined.