New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Scott

  • People v. Scott, 2025 NY Slip Op 01562: Plea Voluntariness when Sentencing Information is Erroneous

    2025 NY Slip Op 01562

    A guilty plea is involuntary if a court provides inaccurate information about a defendant’s sentencing exposure, especially when the misinformation is significantly higher than the statutorily permitted maximum.

    Summary

    Marquese Scott pleaded guilty to three counts of burglary, but the trial court repeatedly and incorrectly informed him that he faced a maximum sentence of 45 years if convicted at trial, when the statutory maximum was 20 years. The New York Court of Appeals held that Scott’s guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the court’s misinformation about his potential sentence created an unduly coercive environment. The court emphasized that a plea must be a free and informed choice, considering the totality of the circumstances. Due to the significant disparity between the court’s stated potential sentence and the actual maximum, the plea was deemed invalid, and the case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Marquese Scott, aged 23, was charged with three counts of burglary in the second degree. The prosecution initially indicated Scott faced up to 15 years on each count with a potential 45-year consecutive sentence. A plea deal was offered: if Scott pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to 6 to 8 years. The court, however, misinformed Scott several times, stating he faced a maximum of 45 years if convicted. Scott pleaded guilty, stating he understood the potential 15-year sentences per count. At sentencing, the court imposed an enhanced sentence of 5 years on each count, for a total of 15 years, followed by 5 years of post-release supervision, despite the original agreement. The court’s misstatement of the maximum potential sentence was in error because Penal Law 70.30(1)(e)(i) capped Scott’s aggregate sentence at 20 years.

    Procedural History

    Scott was indicted on three counts of burglary. He subsequently appeared with counsel to discuss a plea agreement. After the trial court made several erroneous statements regarding his potential sentence, Scott pleaded guilty. He was later sentenced to an enhanced sentence. Scott appealed, claiming his plea was involuntary due to the court’s misstatements, but the Appellate Division deemed the claim unpreserved, reducing the sentence but not addressing the plea’s voluntariness. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scott’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, given the court’s erroneous statements about his potential maximum sentence.
    2. Whether Scott was required to preserve the challenge to his guilty plea by moving to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court’s misinformation about the potential sentence created an environment where the plea was not a free and informed choice.
    2. No, because when a court provides the defendant with erroneous information concerning their maximum sentencing exposure, that is contrary to the undisputed text of the Penal Law, fails to correct its error on the record, and the defendant has no apparent reason to question the accuracy of that information, the defendant need not preserve a challenge to the voluntariness of the guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and must represent an informed choice. This depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age and experience of the accused. The court found that the trial court’s error in misinforming Scott that he faced 45 years (versus the actual 20-year maximum) rendered the plea involuntary, due to a severe misrepresentation of the risks. The court distinguished the case from People v. Williams, where the court had expressed uncertainty about the sentencing options. The court determined that the defendant did not need to preserve the issue, as the error was clear from the record.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes that trial courts must accurately inform defendants about their potential sentencing exposure during plea proceedings. This case significantly reinforces the requirement for accurate information in plea bargains. Attorneys must thoroughly review the statutes to ensure accuracy, especially in cases involving multiple charges or consecutive sentencing. The case also supports the need for a thorough plea colloquy, and for the court to correct its own errors. The ruling suggests a careful review of the plea colloquy is critical, as any misstatements could invalidate a guilty plea and lead to a retrial. Moreover, this case potentially eliminates the need for a CPL 440 motion and allows a direct appeal.

  • People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010): Applying the Rape Shield Law & Jury Selection

    People v. Scott, 15 N.Y.3d 590 (2010)

    New York’s Rape Shield Law (CPL 60.42) generally prohibits evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct, but a trial court has discretion to admit such evidence if it is relevant and admissible in the interests of justice; furthermore, a trial court has discretion in ruling on challenges for cause regarding jurors.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct under New York’s Rape Shield Law and challenges for cause during jury selection. The defendant was convicted of rape in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in precluding certain evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct and in its rulings regarding jury selection, finding no abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting victims from harassment and confusion of jurors, while also recognizing the court’s role in ensuring an impartial jury.

    Facts

    K.D., a minor, attended a party where she consumed alcohol and marijuana. She later claimed to have had intercourse with both Steven A. and the defendant, Scott. Initially, she only accused Steven A., but later accused the defendant of rape. At trial, K.D. testified that the defendant raped her. Another attendee, A.B., testified that K.D. was crying and wearing only a sheet after being alone with the defendant. The defense sought to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. to explain her emotional state, but the trial court largely prohibited this evidence.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with rape in the first degree (forcible), rape in the second degree (statutory), and endangering the welfare of a child. The County Court initially granted the defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of K.D.’s sexual conduct but later reversed its decision. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree rape but convicted him of second-degree rape and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with another person around the time of the alleged rape, pursuant to CPL 60.42 (5)?

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its rulings regarding the disqualification and retention of jurors?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court appropriately applied CPL 60.42 (5) and the evidence’s relevance was contingent on the People introducing evidence of bruising, which they did not do.

    2. No, because the trial court’s actions were within its discretion under CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, and leaning towards disqualification of a potentially biased juror is permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rape Shield Law, CPL 60.42, generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct in sex offense prosecutions to protect victims from harassment and prevent juror confusion. The court acknowledged that CPL 60.42 (5) allows for an exception “in the interests of justice,” but emphasized that this discretion should be exercised cautiously. The court found that the trial court’s decision to preclude evidence of K.D.’s sexual activity with Steven A. was appropriate because the People did not introduce evidence of bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed to the defendant, which was the basis upon which the defense argued for admissibility.

    Regarding jury selection, the court cited CPL 270.15 (4) and CPL 270.20, which govern challenges for cause. The court acknowledged the trial court’s failure to make a probing inquiry of the sworn juror who expressed reservations about the lack of DNA evidence. However, the court stated that discharging this juror was authorized and proper under CPL 270.15(4). The Court also noted that a trial court should err on the side of disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, quoting People v. Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 651 (1979): “trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve”. The court found no error in refusing to disqualify the other prospective juror, citing People v. Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420 (1980), because the relationship between the prosecutor and that juror was distant in time and limited in nature.

  • People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996): Specificity of Discovery Requests and Brady Material

    People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996)

    When a defendant makes a specific request for Brady material, the prosecution’s failure to disclose such evidence is judged by the “reasonable possibility” standard of prejudice, meaning there’s a reasonable possibility the trial outcome would have differed had the evidence been produced.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction, arguing the prosecution failed to disclose Brady material – a “scratch” sheet referencing a polygraph examination of the sole eyewitness, Glenn Shaw. The defense had requested the polygraph report. The trial court granted a new trial, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the request not specific enough. The Court of Appeals held the request was specific, triggering the “reasonable possibility” standard. However, it ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal because polygraph results are inadmissible, and evidence suggested the witness was truthful.

    Facts

    Glenn Shaw, the only eyewitness, testified he saw the defendant with a handgun and others running from the victim’s house after hearing a gunshot. Before trial, the defense requested the polygraph exam report of a confidential informant. A “homicide bureau information sheet” (the “scratch sheet”) alluded to Shaw’s polygraph test, stating he was possibly withholding information. This sheet was not disclosed to the defense.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing a Brady violation. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the discovery request not specific, and the stricter “reasonable probability” standard was not met. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defense counsel’s request for “a copy of the report of the polygraph exam(s) given to the confidential informant showing date(s) of exam and all results” constituted a specific request for Brady material.

    2. Whether, assuming a specific request, the failure to disclose the “scratch sheet” warranted a new trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the request provided specific notice of the defense’s desire for the witness’s polygraph test results.

    2. No, because polygraph evidence is inadmissible, and other evidence suggested the eyewitness was truthful, so there was no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have differed had the document been produced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the defense’s request was specific because it provided particularized notice of the information sought, even if the defense didn’t know the document’s precise form. This specificity triggers the “reasonable possibility” standard for materiality under Brady. The Court cited People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, emphasizing that “heightened prosecutorial attention is appropriate” when the defense provides specific notice of its interest in particular material. However, the Court found that even under the “reasonable possibility” standard, a new trial was not warranted. The Court emphasized that “[a] polygrapher’s opinions regarding the witness’s veracity are not admissible evidence (see, People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217).” Additionally, the assistant district attorney who prepared the document had no recollection of its source, and other evidence suggested the witness was truthful. Therefore, the court found no reasonable possibility that the trial outcome would have changed had the document been disclosed.

  • People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474 (1992): State Constitution Affords Greater Privacy Protection for Posted Land

    People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474 (1992)

    Under the New York State Constitution, landowners who conspicuously post “No Trespassing” signs on their property have a reasonable expectation of privacy, protecting them from warrantless searches, even in open fields outside the curtilage of their home.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the “open fields” doctrine, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, does not adequately protect the privacy rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution. The court ruled that landowners who post “No Trespassing” signs or otherwise manifest an intent to exclude others have a reasonable expectation of privacy on their property, even in areas outside the curtilage of their dwelling. This decision allows for greater protection against warrantless searches on private land under the New York Constitution than is afforded under the Fourth Amendment.

    Facts

    Defendant Scott owned 165 acres of rural, undeveloped land in Chenango County, New York. He resided in a mobile home on the property. Scott conspicuously posted “No Trespassing” signs around the perimeter of his property, spaced approximately every 20 to 30 feet. William Collar, a private citizen, trespassed on Scott’s property and observed marihuana plants under cultivation. Collar reported this to the State Police, who requested that he obtain a leaf from one of the plants. Collar complied. Investigator Hyman accompanied Collar onto the property where Hyman personally observed the plants. Neither Collar’s nor Hyman’s entries were authorized by Scott. Based on this information, police obtained a search warrant and seized the marihuana plants.

    Procedural History

    Scott was charged with criminal possession of marihuana. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing that the warrant was based on illegal entries onto his property. The County Court denied the motion, relying on Oliver v. United States. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the “open fields” doctrine applied and that Scott had no legitimate expectation of privacy. Scott appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “open fields” doctrine, as articulated in Oliver v. United States, should be adopted as the law of New York State under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution, where a landowner has posted “No Trespassing” signs and otherwise manifested an intent to exclude the public.

    Holding

    No, because the Oliver ruling does not adequately protect fundamental constitutional rights under the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court declined to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Oliver v. United States, finding that it did not adequately protect the privacy rights guaranteed by the New York State Constitution. The court emphasized that Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution could provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that landowners who conspicuously post “No Trespassing” signs or otherwise indicate that entry is not permitted have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court distinguished Oliver by noting that the defendant in that case had not explicitly manifested an intent to exclude the public. The court emphasized the importance of the right to be let alone, citing Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States. The court criticized the Oliver court’s suggestion that the very conduct discovered by the government’s illegal trespass (i.e., growing marihuana) could be considered as a relevant factor in determining whether the police had violated the defendant’s rights, stating “Such after-the-fact justification for illegal police conduct would not be compatible with New York’s recognition of fairness as an essential concern in criminal jurisprudence.” The court stated, “where landowners fence or post ‘No Trespassing’ signs on their private property or, by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable.” Because the police entries onto Scott’s posted property were illegal, the search warrant obtained based on those entries was invalid, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286 (1970): Landlord Liability for Tenant’s Unlawful Conduct

    People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286 (1970)

    A landlord is not liable for a tenant’s unlawful conduct on the leased premises unless the landlord has the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy due to the unlawful activity.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a landlord for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting the storage of junked vehicles. The landlord had leased the property to his son, who then stored the vehicles. The court held that the landlord could not be held liable because he did not have the right to re-enter the property and stop his tenant’s actions. A dissenting opinion argued the landlord did have the right to re-enter to discontinue the unlawful use of his property, especially since the lease was a sham. This case illustrates the limits of a landlord’s responsibility for a tenant’s illegal activities and the importance of the right to re-entry.

    Facts

    The defendant, Scott, leased his property to his son. After the lease was executed, a municipal ordinance was enacted prohibiting the storage of junked vehicles. The son stored approximately 100 junked vehicles on the property. The defendant was arrested and convicted for violating the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    The Broome County Court convicted the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the landlord could not be held liable for his tenant’s actions because he lacked the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy based on the unlawful activity. The dissent argued for affirmance, asserting the lease was a sham and the landlord had a right and a duty to re-enter.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landlord can be held criminally liable for a tenant’s violation of a municipal ordinance on the leased property, when the landlord does not have the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy?

    Holding

    No, because a landlord cannot be penalized for conduct over which he has no control. The court reasoned that the landlord’s inability to control his tenant’s unlawful acts precluded imposing any penalty upon him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant could not be held liable for his son’s actions because he had leased the property and did not have the legal right to re-enter and stop the unlawful activity. The court relied on the principle that a person cannot be penalized for conduct over which he has no control. The court stated that the owner “cannot permit an unlawful condition to persist with impunity,” but reasoned the landlord did not “permit” in this case since the lease transferred control to the tenant. They distinguished Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 stating that in this case, the lease was executed before the enactment of the ordinance, therefore no sanction can be imposed upon the defendant.

    The dissenting opinion argued that the landlord did have the right to re-enter the property to discontinue the unlawful use, regardless of whether the activity was for profit. The dissent cited People ex rel. Jay v. Bennett, 14 Hun 63 stating: “This statute was intended not only to prevent the use of premises for an unlawful purpose, but to protect the landlord from the consequences of allowing such unlawful purpose to continue. It gave him in other words the power to put an end to it, and thus to shield himself from any penalty for knowingly permitting the premises to be used as indicated.” The dissent further argued the lease was a sham, granting the landlord the right to re-enter at any time. The dissent also noted the defendant took no action for almost a year after the ordinance was effective, which should warrant an affirmance (Tenement House Dept. of City of N. Y. v. McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160).