31 N.Y.2d 170 (1972)

Evidence, including witness testimony, derived directly from an illegal search is inadmissible in court unless the connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.

Summary

The case concerns the admissibility of testimony from a witness discovered as a direct result of an illegal search. Police conducted an unlawful search of Schisck’s apartment, finding narcotics. During the search, they questioned Bramante, who provided information leading to Holbauer, who testified Schisck performed abortions on her. Schisck moved to suppress Holbauer’s testimony, arguing it was fruit of the poisonous tree. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to admit the testimony, finding a sufficient attenuation between the illegal search and the witness’s testimony, despite strong dissent arguing for suppression.

Facts

Police illegally searched Schisck’s apartment and found narcotics.
During the illegal search, a man named Bramante was admitted into the apartment and questioned.
Bramante gave the police information that led them to Elizabeth Holbauer.
Holbauer testified that Schisck had performed two abortions on her.
This testimony formed the basis of the indictment against Schisck for abortion.

Procedural History

Schisck moved to suppress the physical evidence seized during the illegal search; the motion was granted, and the People did not appeal.
Schisck then moved to suppress all evidence stemming from the search, including witness testimony.
The trial court granted this motion, but the Appellate Division reversed.
The case reached the New York Court of Appeals on appeal from the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether testimony of a witness, whose identity was discovered as a direct result of an illegal search, is admissible against the defendant.

Holding

No, because while evidence obtained during an illegal search, as well as evidence derived directly from it, is generally inadmissible, the connection between the illegal search and the testimony was sufficiently attenuated in this case to permit its admission.

Court’s Reasoning

The court acknowledged the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which generally excludes evidence derived from illegal searches. However, it also recognized the attenuation doctrine, which allows the admission of evidence when the connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently weak.
The court reasoned that the testimony of Holbauer was admissible because the connection between the illegal search and her testimony was sufficiently attenuated. They did not provide specific reasoning for the attenuation.
Chief Judge Fuld dissented, arguing that there was a direct and strong connection between the illegal search and Holbauer’s testimony. He emphasized that Bramante was discovered and questioned during the search itself, and the information he provided led immediately to Holbauer.
The dissent further argued that there is no logical basis for distinguishing between tangible and testimonial evidence when applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, quoting Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392: “the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it”.
The dissent cited Smith v. United States, 344 F.2d 545, as analogous, where witness testimony was excluded as fruit of an illegal search because the connection between the illegality and the testimony was direct.
The dissent highlighted the importance of excluding illegally obtained evidence to discourage police misconduct, referencing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
This case illustrates the complexities in applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, particularly when dealing with witness testimony. The attenuation exception can be difficult to apply, and the presence of dissenting opinions indicates the lack of clear consensus on when the connection between the illegal search and the evidence becomes too attenuated. It highlights the importance of meticulously examining the causal chain between illegal police action and the evidence sought to be admitted, considering whether the evidence would inevitably have been discovered through independent legal means.