New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Santos

  • People v. Santos, 2025 NY Slip Op 01008: Enforceability of Shock Incarceration Waivers in Plea Agreements

    2025 NY Slip Op 01008

    A waiver of participation in a shock incarceration program, agreed to as part of a plea bargain, is not a component of the sentence and does not render the sentence illegal, even though the waiver is noted in the uniform sentence and commitment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legality of a plea agreement condition where a defendant waived participation in the shock incarceration program. The defendant argued the waiver was an illegal component of his sentence. The Court held that the waiver was not a component of the sentence and, therefore, did not render the sentence illegal. The Court reasoned that the waiver did not direct the Department of Corrections to impose a specific form of punishment and its impact on the sentence’s duration was speculative. The dissent argued that allowing such waivers contravened public policy favoring rehabilitation and undermined the Department’s authority.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with operating as a major trafficker. He pleaded guilty to a lesser charge as part of a plea bargain, receiving a determinate sentence and agreeing to waive enrollment in the shock incarceration program. At sentencing, he asked the court to enroll him in the program, acknowledging the waiver. The court, bound by the plea agreement, denied the request, and the defendant was sentenced according to the agreement. The uniform sentence and commitment noted the waiver.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the Supreme Court and sentenced to a determinate term and post-release supervision. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the shock waiver was illegal. The Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the waiver of participation in the shock incarceration program, as a condition of a plea agreement, is an illegal component of the sentence.

    Holding

    No, because the waiver is not a component of the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the waiver of shock incarceration was not a component of the sentence itself. The Court cited prior cases to demonstrate that sex offender certification, surcharges, and orders of protection are not part of a sentence, so a waiver of shock incarceration, which merely affected the defendant’s *eligibility* for a program that could potentially affect his time served, was not a component of the sentence either. The waiver does not dictate how the sentence should be served. It only addresses the possibility of future participation in a program and has an uncertain effect on the duration of the sentence.

    The Court also rejected the dissenting judges’ attempt to reframe the defendant’s argument, which was specifically a challenge to the legality of the sentence based on the inclusion of the waiver. The Court held that the defendant was not challenging the waiver itself, but the legality of a sentence that included a prohibition on his access to the shock incarceration program, which is not the same thing.

    The dissenting judges disagreed, arguing the shock waiver violates public policy favoring rehabilitation and contradicts the legislature’s intent to delegate decisions on shock program participation to the Department of Corrections. They contend that despite the waiver not being a component of the sentence, its validity can be challenged because it infringes on public policy, specifically the goal of reducing recidivism through rehabilitative programs. The dissent criticized the majority for failing to address this public policy concern, arguing that the waiver improperly restricts the Department’s ability to use shock incarceration, which has proven successful in lowering recidivism rates and reducing costs.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of what constitutes a component of a sentence in New York. The Court distinguished between conditions that directly alter the execution of the sentence (which the waiver did not do) and other elements of a plea agreement. Attorneys should understand that a waiver of eligibility for a post-sentencing program is treated differently from a condition that directly impacts the sentence’s length or the requirements of incarceration. The Court’s reasoning suggests a broad deference to plea bargains, even if they involve stipulations that could impact a defendant’s future options. This decision implies that unless a plea agreement condition is explicitly prohibited by statute or directly affects the sentence’s nature, it is likely to be upheld. This case also illustrates the importance of clearly framing legal arguments. The Court focused on the specific claim made by the defendant about the illegality of the *sentence*, as opposed to broader challenges to the waiver itself. Finally, the dissent raises an important point about balancing the value of plea bargaining with public policy considerations; attorneys must understand the potential for challenge when a plea agreement conflicts with public policy.

  • People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986): Burden of Proof for Speedy Trial Violations

    People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986)

    When a defendant alleges a violation of their statutory right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, the People bear the burden of proving that any delays are excludable from the time calculation.

    Summary

    Santos was arrested in December 1978 and indicted on drug charges. He moved to dismiss the indictments nearly two years later, arguing he was denied a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in summarily denying Santos’s motion. Once the defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded. The People’s failure to provide specific dates and factual bases for exclusions warranted a hearing to resolve the factual disputes.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on December 6, 1978.

    Two weeks later, he was arraigned on drug charges.

    On October 31, 1980, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments based on a denial of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and 30.30, alleging a two-year delay mostly attributable to the prosecution.

    The prosecution responded that delays were due to plea negotiations and the defendant’s detention in New Jersey, but failed to specify dates or relevant exclusions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss without a hearing.

    The defendant was subsequently convicted on drug charges.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, remitting the case for a hearing on the CPL 30.30 motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on CPL 30.30 without holding a hearing, given the defendant’s allegations of unexcused delay.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum under CPL 30.30, the burden shifts to the People to controvert the factual basis for the motion and demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded from the time calculation. If the People’s papers present a factual dispute, a hearing is required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 210.45(4), which states that if a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment and alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted unless the People controvert the factual basis for the motion. The court cited People v. Lomax, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Gruden in support of this principle.

    The court emphasized that, as stated in People v. Kendzia, once the defendant demonstrates unexcused delay, “the burden of showing that time should be excluded falls upon the People.”

    Here, the defendant alleged a delay of nearly two years. While the initial affidavit lacked a precise starting date for the delay, the prosecutor’s response cured this defect.

    The Court found that the People failed to meet their burden because they did not provide specific dates or a factual and statutory basis for each exclusion. The court noted that the People’s obligations under CPL 30.30 are independent of obligations under the Agreement on Detainers and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, although time spent in other jurisdictions may be excludable under CPL 30.30.

    The court concluded that because the prosecutor’s affidavit raised a factual dispute but did not establish compliance with speedy trial obligations as a matter of law, a hearing was required to determine the excludability of the alleged delays.