New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Santorelli

  • People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 872 (1992): Gender Discrimination in Public Exposure Laws

    People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 872 (1992)

    A statute that criminalizes exposure of a specific part of a woman’s breast, but not a comparable part of a man’s body, is unconstitutional gender discrimination unless the state demonstrates an important governmental interest and a substantial relationship between the classification and that interest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Monroe County Court’s order and dismissed the informations against the defendants, who were arrested for violating Penal Law § 245.01 (exposure of a person) for baring a portion of their breasts in a public park. The court held that the statute was discriminatory on its face because it defined “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s body to include a specific part of the breast, but did not provide a similar definition for men. The court found that the People failed to demonstrate an important governmental interest justifying this gender classification and that the statute was not applicable to the conduct presented.

    Facts

    Defendants were arrested in a Rochester public park for violating Penal Law § 245.01 for exposing “that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola.” The statute defined “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s body as including a specific part of the breast, but lacked a comparable provision for men. The defendants argued that the statute was discriminatory on its face.

    Procedural History

    The Rochester City Court initially dismissed the informations. The Monroe County Court reversed the City Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 245.01 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions by defining “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s body, but not a man’s, as including a specific part of the breast.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People failed to demonstrate an important governmental interest justifying the gender classification and that the statute was not applicable to the conduct presented. The court also relied on its prior holding in People v. Price to determine the statute did not apply to this instance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the statute was discriminatory on its face since it defined “private or intimate parts” of a woman’s but not a man’s body as including a specific part of the breast. Once that assertion was made, the burden shifted to the People to prove there was an important government interest at stake and that the gender classification was substantially related to that interest. The court noted that the People made no attempt to demonstrate that the statute’s discriminatory effect served an important governmental interest or that the classification was based on a reasoned predicate. The court further emphasized that New York was one of only two states which criminalized the mere exposure by a woman in a public place of a specific part of her breast.

    Even in the absence of proof by the People, the court still attempted to construe the statute to uphold its constitutionality if a rational basis could be found to do so. Referencing the statute’s legislative history, the court noted that Penal Law § 245.01 was originally aimed at discouraging topless waitresses and their promoters. The court then relied on the underlying principle of People v. Price, 33 NY2d 831 (1974), which held that the statute “should not be applied to the noncommercial, perhaps accidental, and certainly not lewd, exposure alleged.”

  • People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 975 (1992): Public Nudity and Freedom of Expression

    People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 975 (1992)

    Public nudity is not a form of expression likely to be understood by viewers as conveying a particular point of view and, therefore, is not automatically protected under the First Amendment or the New York State Constitution.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of unlawful exposure for sunbathing nude on a public beach. He argued that his conduct was a form of symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment and the New York State Constitution, and that the statute prohibiting public nudity was unconstitutionally overbroad. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s conduct was not sufficiently expressive to warrant constitutional protection and that the statute was not substantially overbroad. The court also rejected the argument that a fundamental right to public nudity exists.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested twice for sunbathing nude at Riis Park, Bay 1, a beach known informally as “clothes optional.” The police received numerous complaints about nudism from local residents, civic associations, elected officials, and beach visitors. On both occasions, the defendant was sunbathing nude with his wife and children. He argued that he was motivated by Naturist beliefs, which promote health and awareness of human vulnerability through open social nudity.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges. After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of two violations of Penal Law § 245.01 (unlawful exposure). The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, concluding that the defendant’s conduct was not constitutionally protected. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s nude sunbathing constituted symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment and the New York State Constitution.

    2. Whether Penal Law § 245.01 is unconstitutionally overbroad.

    3. Whether a fundamental right to appear nude in public exists.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s mere nude appearance did not create a great likelihood that his philosophy would be imparted to the public.

    2. No, because any arguable overbreadth of the statute is insubstantial.

    3. No, because public displays of nudity are not essential to an ordered system of liberty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that not all conduct intended to convey a message is expressive. To be considered expressive, the conduct must be intended to convey a particularized message, and there must be a great likelihood that the message would be understood by viewers. The court found that nude sunbathing on a beach is not a form of expression likely to be understood as conveying a particular point of view. The likely message to viewers was simply that the defendant was sunbathing nude for comfort or to tan.

    Even if the conduct were expressive, the state’s ability to regulate or prohibit it would not be automatically foreclosed. The court applied the test from United States v. O’Brien, which allows for the regulation of conduct if it is within the government’s constitutional power, furthers an important governmental interest, the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary. The court found that prohibiting public nudity is within the state’s police powers, the statute is not aimed at suppressing opinion, and it furthers the important governmental objective of providing recreational space for the public. The court also held that the statute was narrowly tailored because it only prohibits public nudity and does not impair the defendant’s right to advocate for Naturism by other means. The court noted, “the effect of the nude sunbathers’ repeated appearance at Bay 1 was to foreclose its use by others.”

    The court rejected the overbreadth challenge, finding that any potentially unconstitutional applications of the statute (e.g., nude modeling for an art class) represent only a tiny fraction of the conduct within the statute’s reach. The court stated, “Where, as here, the impermissible applications of a statute represent only a tiny fraction of the conduct within the statute’s reach, the overbreadth will not be considered substantial.”

    Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a fundamental right to appear nude in public exists, noting that no court has gone so far as to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the unbridled right to conduct oneself in public in any manner, regardless of how offensive it may be. “Since it cannot seriously be argued that public displays of nudity are essential to an ordered system of liberty, we decline to recognize such conduct as within our citizens’ fundamental rights.”