New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Russell

  • People v. Russell, 79 N.Y.2d 1024 (1992): Admissibility of Lay Witness Identification Testimony

    People v. Russell, 79 N.Y.2d 1024 (1992)

    Lay witnesses familiar with a defendant’s appearance before a crime can offer identification testimony based on surveillance photos, even if they didn’t witness the crime, to assist the jury, especially if the defendant altered their appearance after the crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of lay witness testimony identifying the defendant in bank surveillance photographs. Four lay witnesses, who knew the defendant before the robbery, identified him in the photos, even though they were not eyewitnesses to the crime. This was deemed permissible because the defendant had changed his appearance after the robbery by shaving his beard. The court reasoned that the testimony aided the jury in making an independent assessment, and did not constitute improper bolstering. The court also held that the testimony was not cumulative because the bank tellers, while identifying the defendant in court, did not specifically identify him in the surveillance photographs.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of bank robbery. The prosecution presented bank surveillance photographs as evidence. The defendant had a beard at the time of the robbery, but shaved it off shortly afterward. The prosecution called four lay witnesses (defendant’s roommate, his roommate’s mother, his landlord, and a friend) who knew the defendant before the robbery. These witnesses identified the defendant as the person depicted in the surveillance photographs.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the lay witness identification testimony. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing four lay witnesses, who did not witness the bank robbery, to identify the defendant as the person depicted in bank surveillance photographs.
    2. Whether the lay witnesses’ testimony constituted improper bolstering or an improper opinion about an ultimate fact.
    3. Whether the lay witnesses’ photograph identifications should have been excluded because they were unduly cumulative and duplicative of the bank tellers’ eyewitness testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the witnesses’ testimony aided the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the man in the bank photographs was indeed the defendant, especially since the defendant altered his appearance after the crime.
    2. No, because the testimony concerned the witnesses’ personal knowledge of the defendant’s appearance at the time the photographs were taken, not a previous extrajudicial identification of the defendant or the photographs.
    3. No, because the defendant did not object to the number of witnesses presented, and the bank tellers’ testimony was not duplicated, as the tellers did not specifically identify the defendant in the surveillance photographs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the lay witnesses’ testimony was relevant because the robber’s identity was the central issue in the case, and the prosecution presented proof that the defendant changed his appearance immediately after the crime. The court distinguished this case from situations involving prior extrajudicial identifications or identifications of photographs of the defendant. The court emphasized that the witnesses’ personal knowledge of the defendant’s appearance at the time the photographs were taken allowed them to aid the jury in determining whether the person in the photographs was the defendant. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions (United States v. Robinson and United States v. Farnsworth) in support of its reasoning. The court further found that the testimony was not cumulative because the bank tellers, although identifying the defendant in court as the robber, did not state that he was the person in the surveillance photographs. The court emphasized the tellers only testified the photographs accurately portrayed the crime scene and that the man in the photograph was the robber.

  • People v. Russell, 71 N.Y.2d 1016 (1988): Preserving Objections to Redacted Confessions

    71 N.Y.2d 1016 (1988)

    A defendant must object to the admission of a co-defendant’s redacted confession at the time it is offered into evidence to preserve the claim for appellate review; a pre-trial motion to sever is insufficient if the defendant does not renew the motion after the court rules on the confession’s admissibility.

    Summary

    Russell was convicted of rape and sodomy. At a joint trial with his co-defendant Bailey, Bailey’s redacted confession, referring to “another person,” was admitted. Russell had made a pre-trial motion to sever, which was denied as premature but he did not object to the admission of the redacted confession at trial until after the jury was instructed. The New York Court of Appeals held that Russell failed to preserve his claim regarding the admission of the confession because he did not object when it was offered into evidence. The court emphasized that a pre-trial motion to sever, without a subsequent objection to the specific evidence, is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Facts

    Russell and Bailey were charged with rape, sodomy, and unlawful imprisonment of a 14-year-old girl. Bailey confessed to the crimes, implicating himself and Russell. Prior to trial, Russell moved to sever his trial from Bailey’s. The trial court denied the motion as premature, allowing renewal. After a Huntley hearing deemed Bailey’s confession admissible with redactions referring to “another person,” Russell’s counsel sought “verification” that the court would not grant severance. The court verified that it would not and added that the confession would be redacted to remove references to Russell by name. Russell’s counsel did not object and waited until after the jury was instructed to question the redaction’s efficacy and renew the severance motion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Russell on all counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the unlawful imprisonment conviction. Russell appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the denial of his motion to sever was reversible error because Bailey’s redacted confession was admitted at trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a claim regarding the admission of a co-defendant’s redacted confession by making a pre-trial motion to sever, or whether the defendant must object to the admission of the redacted confession at trial when it is offered as evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to object to the admission of the co-defendant’s redacted confession at the time it was offered into evidence, thus failing to preserve the claim for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection when the evidence is offered. The court stated, “The purposes and requirements of the preservation rules are not satisfied by intertwining and piggy-backing distinct procedural steps of the criminal proceeding, as for example severance motions and evidentiary submissions.” Russell’s pre-trial motion to sever, made before the admissibility of the confession was determined, was insufficient. After the Huntley hearing, when the court ruled on admissibility subject to redaction, Russell’s counsel did not renew the motion to sever or object to the redaction. His silence was construed as acquiescence. The court noted that the objection after jury instructions was too late for preservation purposes. The Court found that any evidence admitted without objection that may have linked Russell to Bailey’s confession was inconsequential and did not amount to prejudicial error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.