People v. Rosano, 50 N.Y.2d 1004 (1980)

A statutory presumption in a criminal case does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, provided there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed, and the presumption does not relate to criminal intent.

Summary

Defendants were convicted of violating Lien Law § 79-a, which addresses the misuse of trust funds in construction projects, and Penal Law § 210.35 for making false statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the convictions. The court held that the statutory presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3), which states that failure to keep required books is presumptive evidence of misapplication of trust funds, does not violate constitutional principles. The court clarified that the presumption is a permissible inference and does not shift the burden of proof to the defendants or relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Facts

The defendants were involved in a construction project and were accused of misusing trust funds. They were also charged with making false statements in affidavits submitted to a lending institution. A key piece of evidence was their failure to maintain the books and records required by Lien Law § 75. The prosecution argued that this failure triggered the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3), indicating that the trust funds were used for unauthorized purposes.

Procedural History

The defendants were convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the statutory presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3) unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal case.

2. Whether the People demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the affidavits submitted to the lending institution constituted a falsity.

Holding

1. No, because the statutory presumption is a permissible inference, does not relate to criminal intent, and there is a rational basis between the failure to keep records and the application of trust funds for a non-trust purpose. It does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. No, because the People failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the affidavits submitted to the lending institution constituted a falsity.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a(3) does not violate constitutional principles because it is merely a permissible inference, not a mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. The court emphasized that the prosecution still had the duty to prove the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on People v. Farina, 290 N.Y. 272 and Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 in its analysis.

The court stated, “It is readily apparent that both courts below, and quite correctly, treated this statutory presumption as only a permissible inference that defendants, by failing to keep statutorily prescribed records, used trust funds for other than authorized trust purposes.” The court also noted that “the presumption does not relate to criminal intent.” The court found a “rational basis between the fact proved (failure to keep records) and the fact presumed (applying trust funds for a nontrust purpose).”

Regarding the charge of making false statements, the court expressed no opinion on whether intent to utter or publish the statement as true is necessary for a conviction under Penal Law § 210.35 but concluded that the People failed to prove the affidavits were false beyond a reasonable doubt. The court referenced People v Chesler, 50 NY2d 203. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling primarily for the reasons stated in the Appellate Division opinion by Justice Lazer.