New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Romero

  • People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633 (2006): Appellate Review Standard for Weight of Evidence

    People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633 (2006)

    When considering whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, an appellate court must independently assess the evidence, but give due deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor.

    Summary

    Defendant Romero appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing People v. Gaimari. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division applied the correct legal standard, considering the defendant’s argument that reliance on Gaimari was error. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division did not err, clarifying the historical evolution of the weight of evidence review and reaffirming that People v. Bleakley is the controlling precedent. The court emphasized that appellate courts must give great deference to the jury’s factual findings.

    Facts

    Rafael Baez, Etienne Adorno, and Demetrio Flores drove to Manhattan to rob a drug dealer. Upon arrival, they were ambushed by a group of armed men, including defendant Ubaldo Romero and his brothers, who were involved in narcotics trafficking in the area. Adorno and Flores were killed in the shooting. Romero and his brothers were indicted for second-degree murder. At the retrial, the jury acquitted two brothers but convicted Robert Romero and the defendant, Ubaldo.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, Ubaldo Romero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, citing People v. Gaimari. Romero then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division applied an incorrect legal standard.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in citing People v. Gaimari when rejecting the defendant’s argument that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, thereby indicating that the court failed to apply the correct legal standard for reviewing the weight of the evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division’s citation to People v. Gaimari did not inherently indicate that it applied an outmoded standard of review. The court recognized the jury’s superior ability to assess witness credibility and the facts presented at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history of weight of the evidence review in New York, from common law to the modern standard articulated in People v. Bleakley. The Court noted that initially, appellate review of criminal convictions was limited. Over time, statutes and case law expanded the power of appellate courts to review the facts and determine if a verdict was manifestly unjust. The Court emphasized the importance of deference to the jury’s ability to assess witness credibility, as articulated in People v. Gaimari: “Representing the average judgment of mankind, they could separate the true from the false with a degree of accuracy which, according to the theory of our law founded on the experience of many generations, cannot be attained by reviewing judges.” The Court stated that the modern standard, as defined in People v. Bleakley, requires appellate courts to determine first whether a different finding would have been unreasonable based on the credible evidence. If so, the court must weigh the probative force of conflicting testimony and inferences. Despite the reference to Gaimari, the Appellate Division’s decision indicated that it had properly reviewed the evidence and found no basis to disturb the jury’s determinations. The court cautioned against exclusive reliance on older cases, recommending reference to more contemporary precedent like Bleakley to avoid confusion. The Court emphasized that in Bleakley, the appellate division is not required to “manifest its weight of evidence review power by writing in all criminal cases” (69 NY2d at 496).

  • People v. Romero, 91 N.Y.2d 750 (1998): Limits on Attorney General’s Power to Criminally Prosecute Unlawful Practice of Law

    People v. Romero, 91 N.Y.2d 750 (1998)

    Judiciary Law § 476-a(1), which authorizes the Attorney General to maintain an “action” against those engaged in the unlawful practice of law, refers only to civil actions, not criminal prosecutions, unless explicitly authorized by statute.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Attorney General had the authority under Judiciary Law § 476-a(1) to criminally prosecute an individual for the unlawful practice of law and petit larceny. The defendant, an attorney licensed in Honduras, was granted permission to practice law pro hac vice in New York. After this permission expired, he accepted payment from a woman to represent her in a divorce, but he did not actually provide legal representation. The Attorney General secured an indictment and conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 476-a(1) only authorizes civil actions, and the Attorney General lacks general prosecutorial power without explicit statutory authorization.

    Facts

    Defendant, an attorney in Honduras, was admitted to practice law pro hac vice in New York for a specific project. After his pro hac vice admission expired, a woman approached him seeking representation in her divorce. The defendant accepted $750 from the woman and prepared divorce documents, listing her as a “pro se plaintiff.” The woman later discovered that “pro se” meant she was not represented by an attorney, despite paying the defendant for legal services.

    Procedural History

    The Attorney General presented the matter to a Grand Jury, which indicted the defendant for offering a false instrument for filing (later dismissed), unauthorized practice of law, and petit larceny. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, asserting that Judiciary Law § 476-a authorized the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant of unlawful practice of law and petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, arguing that Executive Law § 63(3) provided an alternative basis for the Attorney General’s authority. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Judiciary Law § 476-a confers prosecutorial authority on the Attorney-General to bring criminal charges against an individual allegedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law?

    Holding

    No, because the word “action” in Judiciary Law § 476-a(1) refers only to civil actions, and the Attorney General lacks general prosecutorial power without explicit statutory authorization.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by noting that the Appellate Division’s reliance on Executive Law § 63(3) was not properly before the court because it was not ruled upon in the criminal court action. The court emphasized that District Attorneys have plenary prosecutorial power, but the Attorney General only has such power when specifically authorized by statute, citing Della Pietra v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 792, 797. The Attorney General argued that Judiciary Law § 476-a, which allows the Attorney General to “maintain an action” against those unlawfully practicing law, includes criminal prosecution. The court disagreed, stating that the word “action” as used in the statute, only encompasses a civil action.

    The Court reasoned that Judiciary Law § 476-a(2) allows bar associations to maintain “such an action,” and interpreting “action” to include criminal prosecution would give bar associations the power to prosecute crimes, which is traditionally a state power. The Court stated, “To read the word ‘action’ in section 476-a (1) to encompass a criminal action would mean that a Bar association could prosecute crimes, and, as a corollary matter, could also convene Grand Juries and issue subpoenas. Such a conclusion would be contrary to the fundamental principle that the power to prosecute crimes is traditionally a power of the State as sovereign.”

    Furthermore, Judiciary Law § 476-b mandates a civil remedy, an injunction, for successful actions under § 476-a. This injunction is a civil action additional to any criminal sanctions. The legislative history of § 476-a, derived from the Civil Practice Act § 1221-a, supports its civil nature, as there was no need to specify it as civil within the Civil Practice Act. The Court emphasized that several other statutes specifically authorize the Attorney General to prosecute crimes, but Judiciary Law § 476-a lacks such specific authorization. Therefore, the Attorney General was limited to a civil prosecution in this case.

  • People v. Romero, 78 N.Y.2d 355 (1991): Hearsay and Interpreted Testimony

    People v. Romero, 78 N.Y.2d 355 (1991)

    Testimony by a witness about statements made to them through an interpreter is inadmissible hearsay if the interpreter had a motive to mislead or a reason to be inaccurate in their translation.

    Summary

    Defendant Romero, who only spoke Spanish, was convicted of drug sales to an undercover officer who only spoke English. A paid informant acted as the interpreter. At trial, the officer testified about what the informant said the defendant had said. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the officer’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The court reasoned that the informant’s paid status and involvement in setting up the drug buys created a motive to mislead, undermining the reliability of the translations and the admissibility of the officer’s testimony repeating those translations.

    Facts

    Defendant Romero, a Spanish speaker, was arrested for selling drugs to an undercover officer, Tillery, who only spoke English. The sales were arranged by Davila, a paid informant fluent in both languages, who acted as the interpreter. Davila received payment contingent on the success of the prosecution. Tillery testified about the English translations Davila provided during their interactions with Romero.

    Procedural History

    Romero was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Romero appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Tillery’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that Davila’s contingent fee arrangement violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an undercover officer’s testimony, repeating statements made by a paid informant acting as an interpreter during a drug transaction, constitutes inadmissible hearsay when the informant had a motive to mislead.

    Holding

    Yes, because the informant’s role and compensation structure created a motive to mislead, undermining the reliability of the translated statements and rendering the officer’s testimony inadmissible hearsay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined that Tillery’s testimony about Davila’s translations was hearsay because it was an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that Romero agreed to sell drugs. While the agency exception to the hearsay rule allows interpreted testimony when the interpreter acts as the party’s agent, this exception does not apply when the interpreter has a motive to mislead. The court distinguished this case from cases like United States v. Da Silva, where the interpreter was considered a mere “language conduit.” Here, Davila’s payment was contingent on a “prosecutable case,” creating a clear motive to ensure Romero’s conviction, thus undermining his neutrality and the reliability of his translations. The court emphasized that the probative value of Tillery’s testimony hinged entirely on the truthfulness of Davila’s translations. Repeating potentially false translations does not enhance the underlying reliability. As the court stated, “All that Davila’s testimony could have ‘verified’ is that Tillery remembered and repeated Davila’s supposed falsehoods correctly.” The court rejected the argument that Davila’s in-court testimony “verified” his prior translations because his motive to lie remained. The court concluded that admitting Tillery’s testimony was not harmless error, as it bolstered the credibility of a key witness whose credibility was very much in question. The court declined to address the due process argument because it was not preserved for review.

  • People v. Romero, 70 N.Y.2d 941 (1988): Preserving Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct on Appeal

    People v. Romero, 70 N.Y.2d 941 (1988)

    To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely objection; unpreserved claims will only warrant reversal if the misconduct is so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial; curative instructions, if given and not objected to, can neutralize potential prejudice.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecutor made improper comments during summation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to preserve many of his claims of error by not objecting during trial. For the comments to which objections were made, the trial court ruled correctly. Furthermore, the trial court provided curative instructions to neutralize any potential prejudice from the prosecutor’s statements, and the defendant did not object to these instructions or request additional ones. The court also found no indication that the Appellate Division failed to properly consider the weight of the evidence.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying crime are not detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum. The appeal centered solely on the conduct of the District Attorney during summation at trial, and whether objections to those comments were properly preserved for appellate review.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing prosecutorial misconduct during summation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, raising the same arguments, along with a claim that the Appellate Division failed to properly consider the weight of the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved his claims of error regarding the District Attorney’s comments during summation by making timely objections at trial.
    2. Whether the curative instructions given by the trial court were sufficient to neutralize any prejudice resulting from the District Attorney’s statements, given the lack of objection to said instructions.
    3. Whether the Appellate Division failed to consider the weight of the evidence in reaching its decision.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to object to many of the District Attorney’s comments, thus failing to preserve those claims for appeal.

    2. Yes, because the trial court provided curative instructions to address any prejudice and the defendant did not object to these instructions or request additional ones.

    3. No, because there was no indication that the Appellate Division misunderstood its obligation or failed to review the weight of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of preserving legal claims by making timely objections at trial. Failure to object generally precludes appellate review. The Court noted that the trial court ruled correctly on the objections that were properly raised. Regarding the unpreserved claims, the Court implied that reversal would only be warranted if the prosecutor’s misconduct was so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, which was not the case here.

    The Court also highlighted the effect of curative instructions. By giving such instructions, the trial court attempted to mitigate any potential prejudice stemming from the prosecutor’s remarks. The defendant’s failure to object to the curative instructions or request further instructions further undermined his claim of error on appeal. The court reasoned that by not objecting, the defendant effectively signaled his satisfaction with the curative measures taken.

    Finally, the Court distinguished this case from People v. Bleakley, where it was apparent that the Appellate Division misunderstood its obligation to review the weight of the evidence. In Romero, there was no indication of such a misunderstanding or failure to review.