New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Romeo

  • People v. Romeo, 12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008): Prosecutorial Delay & Speedy Trial Rights

    12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008)

    A lengthy post-indictment delay, caused by the prosecution’s decision to defer to a foreign prosecution and failure to seek extradition, can violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Summary

    Romeo was indicted in New York for murder in 1987. He fled to Canada and killed a police officer there. Instead of seeking Romeo’s extradition on the New York murder charge, the prosecution deferred to Canadian authorities. Romeo was convicted in Canada and imprisoned. Twelve years after the indictment, Romeo moved to dismiss the New York indictment on speedy trial grounds. He was eventually brought back to New York, convicted of manslaughter, and appealed, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s decision to dismiss the indictment, holding that the prosecution’s delay in pursuing the case violated Romeo’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, based on the five factor test from People v. Taranovich.

    Facts

    In November 1985, a fatal shooting occurred in Suffolk County, New York. A gun belonging to Romeo was identified as the murder weapon. In February 1987, Romeo was ordered to provide a DNA sample. Before providing the sample, Romeo fled to Canada. In Canada, he killed a police officer. He was apprehended and held on a Canadian warrant. Suffolk County authorities obtained hair and blood samples from Romeo, which matched evidence from the New York crime scene.

    Procedural History

    Romeo was indicted in Suffolk County, NY in March 1987. He demanded a speedy trial. The Suffolk County Court denied Romeo’s application to be produced for arraignment before extradition to Canada, suggesting any delay could be addressed later. Romeo was extradited to Canada, convicted, and sentenced. In 1999, Romeo moved to dismiss the NY indictment based on speedy trial grounds; this was denied. In 2005, he was brought back to Suffolk County. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter and appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s lengthy postindictment delay occasioned by delaying their prosecution in favor of a Canadian prosecution violated defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution, coupled with their failure to make a good-faith effort to extradite Romeo, resulted in an excessive delay that prejudiced Romeo’s ability to defend himself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the five-factor balancing test from People v. Taranovich to determine if Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense. The Court found the 12-year delay between indictment and the speedy trial motion to be extraordinary. The primary reason for the delay was the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution and their failure to seek extradition. The Court noted that while the underlying charge of murder was serious, it didn’t excuse the delay. While Romeo was incarcerated, it was due to the Canadian charges. However, the Court found it highly likely that the delay impaired Romeo’s ability to defend himself, especially given his incarceration in a foreign prison. The Court emphasized that the People had been warned that deferring prosecution could cause a speedy trial violation. The Court distinguished this case from others where extradition would clearly be futile, stating, “The fact that a defendant is incarcerated outside of the state makes it incumbent upon the People to make diligent, good faith efforts to secure his presence in the state for arraignment and trial.” Because the People failed to make such efforts, Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated.

  • People v. Romeo, 636 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1994): Balancing Due Process Rights with Prosecution Delay Justification

    People v. Romeo, 636 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1994)

    A lengthy delay in prosecution does not automatically violate a defendant’s due process rights if the delay is justified by good cause, such as witness fear and difficulty in obtaining evidence, and the defendant has not suffered undue prejudice as a result.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the extensive delay in prosecuting Romeo for a 1981 double murder did not violate his due process rights. The court found that the prosecution established good cause for the delay, citing witness fear related to organized crime connections, a key witness fleeing or hiding, and another witness recanting their identification. Balancing the reasons for the delay against the nature of the charges, the lack of pretrial incarceration, and the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the defense, the court concluded that Romeo’s due process rights were not abridged. The court emphasized that a good-faith delay for sufficient reasons does not deprive a defendant of due process, even if some prejudice exists.

    Facts

    In 1981, two bar owners were murdered in Queens. The defendant, Romeo (aka “Pepe”), along with Frank Riccardi (aka “Frankie the Geech”) and Ronald Barlin (aka “Ronnie the Jew”), were suspects, all allegedly linked to organized crime. Despite 20-25 people being present, nearly all denied witnessing the crime. A key witness fled the jurisdiction or hid, refusing to cooperate with police. Another witness recanted her identification of Barlin, leading to the dismissal of his indictment. Riccardi was never located.

    Procedural History

    The case remained unresolved for over a decade. The prosecution eventually moved forward with the case against Romeo. The trial court ruled on the speedy trial/due process issue. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s ruling that the delay was justified, and the Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an extensive delay in prosecuting a defendant for murder violates the defendant’s due process right to a prompt prosecution, despite the prosecution’s claim of good cause based on witness fear and difficulty in obtaining evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution established good cause for the delay, and the defendant did not demonstrate undue prejudice resulting from the delay. The determination of good cause by the Appellate Division had support in the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 (1975): the extent of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the nature of the charge, whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and whether the defense has been impaired by the delay. The court acknowledged the extensive delay but emphasized the underlying double murder charge. It noted the absence of pretrial incarceration and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to the defense. The court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding of witness fear, which supported the prosecution’s claim of good cause for the delay. The court emphasized that “we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards” when dealing with delays in prosecution (People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241, 253). Even with some prejudice to the defendant, “a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process.”