New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Roche

  • People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70 (2002): Establishing Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    98 N.Y.2d 70 (2002)

    A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance unless sufficient evidence is presented to support both the subjective element (that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance) and the objective element (that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance).

    Summary

    Roche was convicted of second-degree murder for the stabbing death of his common-law wife. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to warrant an EED charge. The Court clarified that both subjective (defendant’s mental state) and objective (reasonableness of the disturbance) elements must be supported by sufficient evidence, and the brutal nature of the crime alone is insufficient to establish EED. Defendant’s actions and statements before, during, and after the crime did not demonstrate the required loss of self-control or mental infirmity.

    Facts

    Lillian Rivera was found stabbed to death in her apartment, which she shared with Roche. Roche told neighbors Rivera had killed herself. He also told another acquaintance, Bell, that he killed Rivera because she was “going crazy.” Roche changed his story multiple times, initially claiming his wife had committed suicide. At no point did he claim to have lost control or been mentally disturbed at the time of the killing. The defense focused on the theory that someone else committed the murder.

    Procedural History

    Roche was convicted of second-degree murder in the first trial; this was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. At the second trial, Roche requested the judge instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied this request. The jury again convicted Roche of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court should have instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, where the defendant was charged with second-degree murder in connection with the stabbing death of his wife.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support either the subjective or objective elements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant is entitled to an extreme emotional disturbance charge only when sufficient evidence supports both elements of the defense. The subjective element requires evidence that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, typically shown by a loss of self-control due to a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity. The objective element requires a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance, viewed from the defendant’s perspective at the time. The Court found no evidence that Roche suffered from a mental infirmity or loss of self-control during the stabbing. His actions after the crime (attempting to conceal evidence, fabricating a suicide story) indicated a calculated effort to avoid responsibility, not a disturbed state of mind. The Court stated, “Defendant cannot rely on his statements to the police to establish the presence of an extreme emotional disturbance since he asserted that he had not harmed his wife in any respect.” The Court rejected the argument that the brutality of the crime, alone, indicated an extreme emotional disturbance. While the nature of the wounds can be relevant, it must be linked to other compelling evidence of emotional disturbance. “Where we have referenced the nature or severity of the wounds, the probative value of such evidence has been linked to other compelling evidence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The Court concluded that the arguments and errands cited by the defense were insufficient to constitute a reasonable explanation or excuse for extreme emotional disturbance.

  • People v. Roche, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996): Agency Defense in Criminal Sale of Controlled Substance

    People v. Roche, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996)

    A jury instruction on the agency defense in a criminal sale of a controlled substance case is sufficient when it accurately conveys that the jury can consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of the defense.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree for selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer. At trial, she argued an agency defense, claiming she bought the drugs on the officer’s behalf. She appealed, arguing the trial court’s charge to the jury on the agency defense was insufficient under People v. Andujas. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury instruction was adequate because it correctly stated that the jury could consider any benefit received from the buyer when deciding if the defendant acted as the buyer’s agent.

    Facts

    The defendant sold two vials of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer.

    At trial, the defendant claimed the officer asked her to get crack for him and offered to “get her high.”

    She testified she bought four vials, kept two for herself, and expected to barter sex later for the officer providing her with crack.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    She appealed, arguing the trial court’s jury charge on the agency defense was insufficient.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the agency defense, specifically whether the instruction failed to adequately convey that any benefit received from the buyer could support the defense.

    Holding

    No, because the jury charge, taken as a whole, accurately instructed the jury that it could consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of the agency defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no merit in the defendant’s argument that the trial court should have expanded its charge on the agency defense under People v. Andujas, 79 N.Y.2d 113.

    The court correctly instructed the jury that it could consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of an agency defense.

    The Court determined that, “in that context, the charge as a whole accurately provided the jury with the proper instruction (see, e.g., People v Fields, 87 N.Y.2d 821; People v Warren, 76 N.Y.2d 773).”

    The Court emphasized that the key is that the charge as a whole conveys the proper understanding of the law. It did not require a specific formulation beyond ensuring the jury understood that benefits from the buyer could support the defense.

  • People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978): Establishing Agency Defense in Drug Sales

    People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978)

    In a prosecution for the sale of a controlled substance, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the agency defense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to suggest they acted solely as the buyer’s agent, without any independent commercial interest in promoting the transaction.

    Summary

    Roche was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the agency defense, arguing he acted solely as the buyer’s agent. The trial court denied the request, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Roche’s testimony presented a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the agency defense. The court emphasized that if Roche procured the drugs solely to accommodate a friend without any profit motive, he acted as an agent, and the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The indictment charging a sale to a specific person does not preclude an agency defense based on transferring the substance to another individual. Thus, the failure to charge agency was reversible error.

    Facts

    Undercover Officer Fargione and informant Bowe went to Roche’s apartment to buy cocaine, pre-arranged by phone calls between Roche and Bowe. According to the prosecution, Roche handed Bowe an envelope containing cocaine. Bowe took some, added flour, and gave the rest to Fargione. Fargione tried to pay Roche, but Roche directed the money to Bowe, who then gave it to Roche.

    Roche testified that Bowe repeatedly asked him to get cocaine. Roche procured one gram for $125 as a favor, making no profit and having no interest in the transaction. He gave the cocaine to Bowe, who added flour, and Bowe paid him in Fargione’s absence. Roche stated this was the first time he had ever procured cocaine for another.

    Procedural History

    Roche was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the agency defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Roche then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the agency defense, given Roche’s testimony suggesting he acted solely as an agent for the buyer.

    Holding

    Yes, because Roche’s testimony provided a reasonable view of the evidence that he acted solely to accommodate a friend (Bowe) without any commercial interest in promoting the transaction, thus entitling him to a jury instruction on the agency defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the agency defense applies when a defendant acts solely as the buyer’s alter ego in procuring drugs. If there is a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the claim that the defendant acted as an instrumentality of the buyer, the court must instruct the jury on the agency defense. The court stated, “In this case, failure to grant defendant’s timely request to charge agency constitutes reversible error. Defendant’s testimony raised the question of whether he simply purchased and delivered a small quantity of drugs solely to accommodate a friend without any commercial interest in promoting the transaction — the quintessential agency relationship.”

    The court dismissed the argument that the transfer of drugs from Bowe to Fargione invalidated the agency defense, stating that under Roche’s version of the facts, these were two distinct transactions. The court also rejected the argument that the indictment charging a sale to Fargione precluded the agency defense. The court stated, “The corpus delicti of the crime charged was the transfer of a controlled substance (Penal Law, § 220.00, subd 1); the person to whom that substance was transferred was immaterial to this conviction.” The court noted that denying the agency defense in this circumstance would be “tantamount to a ruling that the transfer constituted a sale as a matter of law without putting the People to their burden of disproving an agency relationship.” The court concluded that the People cannot deprive a defendant of the agency defense by charging them with a sale to whomever ultimately obtains the drugs.

  • People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978): The Agency Defense in Drug Sales

    People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978)

    A defendant who acts solely as the agent of a buyer in a drug transaction, without a profit motive or direct interest in the sale, is not guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Summary

    The case addresses the “agency defense” in drug sale cases, where a defendant claims to have acted solely as the buyer’s agent. Roche was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed this conviction, holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the agency defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a reasonable view of the evidence supported the agency defense because Roche did not initiate the drug transaction, appeared to be acting as a go-between, and did not personally profit. The court emphasized that the agency defense is applicable when the defendant acts solely on behalf of the buyer, without any independent interest in promoting the sale. However, the court affirmed Roche’s conviction for criminal possession, as agency is not a defense to possession.

    Facts

    Undercover officer Lugo befriended Roche. Lugo expressed interest in buying narcotics, and Roche indicated he could help. After Lugo repeatedly contacted Roche, they met, and Roche directed Lugo to a bar in Manhattan to “see the man” (the seller). Roche entered alone, returning to Lugo with the price: $4,000. Lugo gave Roche the money, and Roche re-entered the bar. Roche then directed Lugo to a discotheque for the drug delivery. At the discotheque, Lugo saw a man hand Roche a package, which Roche then gave to Lugo. The package contained heroin. Lugo later complained about the heroin’s quality, but Roche offered no adjustment.

    Procedural History

    Roche was indicted for criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance. At trial, the court denied Roche’s request for a jury instruction on the agency defense. The jury convicted Roche. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the sale conviction and ordering a new trial on that count, while affirming the possession conviction. Both Roche and the prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency defense, where the defendant acted solely as the buyer’s agent in a drug transaction, is still valid under New York law.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the agency defense, given the evidence presented.

    3. Whether agency is a defense to criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature has not abolished the defense, indicating its acceptance of the ameliorative judgment not to punish a person who merely facilitates a buyer’s acquisition of drugs.

    2. Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence suggested that Roche acted as a mere instrumentality of the buyer, warranting a jury instruction on the agency defense.

    3. No, because agency is not a defense to criminal possession, as knowingly possessing the heroin, even briefly, constitutes the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed the validity of the agency defense, stating that one who acts solely as the procuring agent for the buyer is a principal or conspirator in the purchase rather than the sale. Since the statutes are aimed at sellers, not buyers, someone assisting only the buyer incurs no greater liability than the buyer. This defense is a common-law attempt to recognize medical and sociological aspects that complicate a defendant’s participation. The court emphasized that the agency defense requires the agent to have no direct interest in the contraband being sold and no profit motive. The court outlined factors to consider when determining agency, such as salesman-like behavior, touting the product’s quality, bargaining over price, previous acquaintance with the supplier, and whether the accused advanced their own funds. The court found that there was an issue of fact on the question of agency because Roche did not initiate the transaction, Lugo pursued him, and there was no proof of material benefit to Roche. The court stated: “so long as there is some reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant acted as a mere instrumentality of the buyer, determination of the existence of an agency relationship should be submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions”. The court emphasized that agency is not an affirmative defense but negates the “sale” element of the crime. The court distinguished between sale and possession and concluded since Roche had possessed the drugs, even briefly, agency was not a defense to the possession charge.