New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Robinson

  • People v. Robinson, 17 N.Y.3d 868 (2011): Harmless Error and Defendant’s Right to Explain Statements

    People v. Robinson, 17 N.Y.3d 868 (2011)

    A defendant is entitled to explain potentially inculpatory statements made to police, and denying them that opportunity is not harmless error when the statements are the primary evidence of guilt and the evidence is not otherwise overwhelming.

    Summary

    Robinson was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The key evidence was a loaded revolver found in a car he was driving and a statement he made to the arresting officer. The trial court prevented Robinson from fully explaining his statement. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court’s error was not harmless. Because the other evidence was not overwhelming and the statement was crucial, Robinson should have been allowed to explain his side of the story for the jury to properly assess his guilt or innocence.

    Facts

    Officer Finn stopped Robinson for a traffic violation. Robinson exited the vehicle and became argumentative. Finn arrested Robinson for obstruction and resisting arrest. Finn decided to impound the vehicle because the registered owner wasn’t present and the car was illegally parked. During an inventory search before impounding, Finn found a loaded revolver under the driver’s seat. Robinson was charged with criminal possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    At trial, Officer Finn testified that Robinson said, “it wasn’t armed, but that’s okay, possession is nine/tenths of the law” after being informed of the firearm charge. Robinson offered a slightly different version. The trial court sustained the prosecution’s objection when defense counsel asked Robinson to explain why he made that statement. The jury found Robinson guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed, deeming the error harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed harmless error in preventing the defendant from explaining potentially inculpatory statements made while in police custody, when those statements formed a crucial part of the evidence against him.

    Holding

    No, because the error was not harmless, as the defendant’s statements were the primary evidence of his guilt, and the evidence was not overwhelming. The defendant should have been allowed to explain his statements to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that rules of evidence aim to ensure the jury hears all pertinent, reliable, and probative evidence. While the Appellate Division correctly identified the trial court’s error, it erred in deeming it harmless. The Court of Appeals reiterated the Crimmins standard for harmless error: it applies only when there is “overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt” and no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant but for the error (People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242 [1975]). Here, the evidence was not overwhelming. Robinson wasn’t the vehicle’s owner, had only driven it briefly, and other family members had prior access. Thus, Robinson’s statements were the main evidence of his knowledge of the revolver. The Court stated: “Considering that defendant’s explanation may have created doubt in the jury’s mind sufficient to rebut the automobile presumption, resulting in an acquittal, it cannot be said that the error was harmless.” Because the jury was unable to hear and consider the defendant’s explanation for a key piece of evidence against him, the conviction was overturned.

  • People v. Robinson, 37 N.Y.3d 78 (2021): Harmless Error and Defendant’s Right to Testify

    People v. Robinson, 37 N.Y.3d 78 (2021)

    An error preventing a defendant from testifying in their own defense is not per se reversible and may be deemed harmless if the prosecution’s case is overwhelming and the defendant’s proffer of testimony is not credible.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether preventing a defendant from testifying constitutes harmless error. The Court held that while a defendant has a fundamental right to testify, the denial of that right can be deemed harmless if the prosecution’s case is overwhelming and the defendant’s proposed testimony lacks credibility. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the error was harmless in this instance because of the strength of the evidence against the defendant and the lack of a credible proffer regarding the defendant’s intended testimony.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of a crime after a trial. During the trial, the defendant sought to testify in their own defense, but an error occurred that prevented them from doing so. Specific details of the crime itself are not central to the legal issue, which concerns the denial of the right to testify and the application of the harmless error doctrine.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The conviction was appealed, arguing that the denial of the right to testify was reversible error. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is per se reversible error, or whether it can be subject to harmless error analysis.

    Holding

    No, because while a defendant has a fundamental right to testify, the denial of that right can be deemed harmless error if the prosecution’s case is overwhelming and the defendant’s proposed testimony lacks credibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the fundamental nature of the right to testify, citing previous decisions such as People v. Williams and People v. Shields. However, the Court reasoned that not all constitutional errors require automatic reversal. The Court applied the harmless error doctrine, which requires a determination of whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. Here, the Court found the prosecution’s case to be “overwhelming,” suggesting that the evidence presented was so strong that it negated any potential impact from the defendant’s absence from the witness stand. Moreover, the Court considered the lack of a “credible” proffer from the defendant, implying that the defendant failed to adequately demonstrate how their testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial. The dissent argued that preventing a defendant from telling their side of the story should never be considered harmless, as it infringes on the jury’s role. The dissent cited Holmes v. South Carolina, emphasizing a defendant’s right to present a defense. The majority, however, concluded that, based on the specific facts, the error was harmless. The court states that to hold otherwise, would allow defendants to manipulate the system and escape convictions despite overwhelming evidence against them.

  • People v. Robinson, 98 N.Y.2d 755 (2002): Establishing Need for Grand Jury Minutes

    People v. Robinson, 98 N.Y.2d 755 (2002)

    A party seeking disclosure of grand jury minutes must first establish a compelling and particularized need before a court balances factors to determine if disclosure is appropriate.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s orders in two separate cases, holding that the defendants failed to demonstrate a compelling and particularized need for grand jury minutes. The Court found that the denial of access to these minutes did not violate the defendants’ appellate due process rights or their right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Court emphasized the two-step process for grand jury minute disclosure: first, establishing a compelling need, and second, a court balancing various factors. The Court also rejected defendant Robinson’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for the assault charge.

    Facts

    The facts of the underlying criminal cases are not detailed in this decision, as the appeal focuses solely on the denial of the defendants’ requests for access to grand jury minutes for their appeals. The relevant fact is that both defendants, Robinson and an unnamed co-defendant, sought access to grand jury minutes to support their respective appeals of their convictions.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted at the trial court level. They then appealed to the Appellate Division, seeking access to the grand jury minutes to aid in their appeals. The Appellate Division denied their requests. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the denial of access to grand jury minutes violated their appellate due process rights and their right to effective assistance of appellate counsel.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division violated the defendants’ appellate due process rights by denying their requests for access to grand jury minutes.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division violated the defendants’ rights to effective assistance of appellate counsel by denying their requests for access to grand jury minutes.
    3. (Specifically for Robinson) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the assault in the second-degree charge.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendants failed to meet their threshold burden of demonstrating a compelling and particularized need for the grand jury minutes.
    2. No, because the defendants failed to meet their threshold burden of demonstrating a compelling and particularized need for the grand jury minutes.
    3. No, because the defendant Robinson’s contention relating to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assault in the second-degree charge is without merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the established two-step procedure for disclosing grand jury minutes. First, the party seeking disclosure must establish a “compelling and particularized need” for the minutes. Only after this threshold is met must the court then “balance various factors to assess, in its discretion, whether disclosure is appropriate under the circumstances presented.” The Court cited prior cases, including People v. Fetcho, Matter of Lungen v. Kane, and Matter of District Attorney of Suffolk County, to support this framework. The Court found that this two-step procedure “comports with the requirements of due process.”

    Since the defendants failed to demonstrate a compelling and particularized need for the minutes, the Court concluded that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in denying the requests. The Court emphasized that without satisfying the initial burden, the balancing test is not triggered. Therefore, there was no violation of the defendants’ appellate due process rights or their rights to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The court stated, “As a threshold matter, a party seeking disclosure of grand jury minutes must establish a compelling and particularized need for them. Only then must the court balance various factors to assess, in its discretion, whether disclosure is appropriate under the circumstances presented.” The court also summarily dismissed Robinson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence without providing further analysis. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001): Establishes Objective Test for Traffic Stops Based on Probable Cause

    97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001)

    A traffic stop is lawful if supported by probable cause, regardless of the officer’s primary motivation or what a reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a traffic stop based on probable cause is invalid if the officer’s primary motivation was to investigate a different matter. An unidentified complainant reported a reckless driver in a red Suzuki. A state trooper observed a matching vehicle with a faulty muffler. The trooper stopped the vehicle, and based on observations, sobriety tests, and admissions, arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals held the stop was lawful because the trooper had probable cause to believe the defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law, irrespective of the trooper’s subjective motivation.

    Facts

    An unidentified person reported a reckless driver operating a red Suzuki with its top down or removed to the authorities. A State Trooper located a Suzuki matching that description. While following the Suzuki, the trooper noticed that it had a faulty muffler, a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(31). The trooper then initiated a traffic stop.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and subsequently indicted and convicted of felony driving while intoxicated. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and granted the defendant’s suppression motion. The Appellate Division reasoned that the trooper used the traffic infraction as a pretext to investigate the reckless driving complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denied the defendant’s suppression motion, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a traffic stop supported by probable cause is unlawful if the officer’s primary motivation was to investigate a matter unrelated to the traffic violation.

    Holding

    No, because provided a traffic stop is supported by probable cause, “neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on an objective test, focusing solely on whether probable cause existed for the traffic stop. The Court stated, “provided a traffic stop is supported by probable cause, ‘neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant’.” The court emphasized that the suppression court’s undisturbed finding was that the trooper had probable cause to believe the defendant committed a muffler violation. The court explicitly rejected the Appellate Division’s focus on the trooper’s subjective motivation. This ruling provides law enforcement with clear guidance: if probable cause exists for a traffic violation, the stop is lawful, regardless of the officer’s underlying intent. The court in this case does not discuss dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001): Traffic Stops and ‘Pretext’

    97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001)

    A police officer’s subjective intent does not invalidate a traffic stop if the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, even if the stop is a ‘pretext’ to investigate other suspected criminal activity.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three separate appeals concerning the legality of traffic stops where the officers’ primary motivation was to investigate potential criminal activity rather than enforce traffic laws. The New York Court of Appeals adopted the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren v. United States, ruling that a traffic stop is lawful under the New York State Constitution if there’s probable cause for a traffic violation, regardless of the officer’s subjective intent or whether a reasonable traffic officer would have made the stop. This decision clarifies the objective standard for evaluating traffic stops in New York.

    Facts

    People v. Robinson: Officers stopped a livery cab for running a red light, primarily intending to give the driver safety tips. An officer saw a passenger wearing a bulletproof vest and a gun on the floor, leading to the passenger’s arrest.

    People v. Reynolds: An officer observed a known prostitute entering the defendant’s truck. After a registration check revealed an expired registration, the officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer arrested the driver for DWI, after observing signs of intoxication.

    People v. Glenn: Officers observed a livery cab making an illegal turn. They stopped the vehicle suspecting a robbery. They found cocaine on the back seat and on the passenger’s person, leading to the passenger’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    In Robinson and Glenn, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, applying the Whren rationale. In Reynolds, the Rochester City Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, dismissing all charges, which County Court affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a traffic stop violates Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution when an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred but the primary motivation for the stop is to conduct another investigation.

    Holding

    No, because where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation, a stop does not violate Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution, regardless of the officer’s primary motivation or whether a reasonable traffic officer would have made the stop.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 is identical, generally conferring similar rights. However, the Court recognized its authority to expand rights beyond the Federal Constitution when a longstanding New York interest is involved. The Court adopted the objective standard in Whren v. United States. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding the law and the potential harm to innocent citizens if police are unduly restricted. The Court noted that pretextual stops could be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause if they are the result of discriminatory enforcement. The court found that a probable cause stop is not based on the discretion of police officers, but on violations of law. As the Court stated: “In none of the cases cited by defendants has this Court penalized the police for enforcing the law. We should not do so here.” The dissent argued that the majority’s decision inadequately protects citizens from arbitrary exercises of police power, especially considering the ease with which minor traffic violations can be found and the potential for discriminatory enforcement. The dissent proposed a “reasonable police officer” standard, asking whether a reasonable officer assigned to traffic enforcement would have made the stop under the circumstances, absent a purpose to investigate more serious criminal activity.

  • People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648 (1997): Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony Under Due Process When Witness is Unavailable

    People v. Robinson, 89 N.Y.2d 648 (1997)

    A defendant’s due process rights may require the admission of a witness’s Grand Jury testimony when that witness is unavailable to testify at trial, the testimony is material and exculpatory, and bears sufficient indicia of reliability, even if such admission is not explicitly authorized by statute.

    Summary

    Robinson was convicted of sexual abuse and misconduct. His defense hinged on the testimony of his then-fiancée, who testified before a grand jury corroborating his version of events. When she became unavailable for trial, Robinson sought to admit her grand jury testimony. The trial court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exclusion of the grand jury testimony violated Robinson’s due process rights because the testimony was material, the witness was unavailable, and the testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability due to the prosecutor’s probing questioning before the grand jury.

    Facts

    Robinson was accused of sexually abusing the complainant. At trial, the complainant stated that the act was non-consensual. Robinson claimed the sex was consensual and occurred in the presence of his then-fiancée (later his wife). Before the grand jury, Robinson’s fiancée corroborated his account. The grand jury indicted Robinson on some charges, but not on first-degree rape. Prior to trial, Robinson’s wife left the jurisdiction and refused to return to testify despite a court order.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Court denied Robinson’s motion to admit his wife’s grand jury testimony. Robinson waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted by the bench. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the grand jury testimony was sufficiently reliable and material. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s constitutional right to due process requires the admission of hearsay evidence consisting of Grand Jury testimony when the declarant has become unavailable to testify at trial, and the testimony is material, exculpatory, and possesses sufficient indicia of reliability.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the circumstances of this case, where the hearsay testimony is material, exculpatory and has sufficient indicia of reliability, the trial court’s failure to admit such evidence was reversible error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that CPL 670.10 does not explicitly authorize the admission of grand jury testimony at trial. However, it recognized that a defendant’s right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process. Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the court emphasized the importance of allowing a defendant to present witnesses in their own defense. The Court found that the testimony was material because the declarant was the only other person with firsthand knowledge of the events. The witness was deemed unavailable despite Robinson’s due diligence. Concerning reliability, the Court noted that while the absence of cross-examination typically impairs the reliability of grand jury testimony, in this case, the prosecutor’s direct examination of the witness served the essential purpose of cross-examination by exploring potential biases and testing the accuracy of her testimony. The Court highlighted that the prosecutor’s questions explored the witness’s relationship with both the complainant and the defendant, and even elicited testimony unfavorable to the defendant. The court found that the prosecutor’s questioning “clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form.” Because the erroneous exclusion of the proffered evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order for a new trial. As the Court stated, “[t]he prosecutor explored the long-standing relationship between the witness and the complainant which the complainant corroborated. Similarly, the prosecutor questioned the witness about her relationship with the defendant which revealed any biases which might have affected her credibility.” This demonstrated reliability, allowing the Grand Jury testimony to be admitted.

  • People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 536 (1986): Admissibility of Prior Crime Evidence for Identity Requires Clear and Convincing Proof

    People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 536 (1986)

    For evidence of a prior crime to be admissible to prove identity, the prosecution must establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the prior crime by clear and convincing evidence.

    Summary

    Robinson was convicted of attempted robbery. The prosecution introduced evidence of a prior bank robbery to establish identity. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence connecting Robinson to the prior robbery was insufficient. The Court clarified that while prior crime evidence can be admissible to prove identity, it requires clear and convincing proof that the defendant committed the prior crime. The Court reasoned that admitting evidence based on a lower standard risks prejudice and jury confusion, outweighing the probative value. This case emphasizes the high standard required for admitting prior crime evidence to prove identity.

    Facts

    On December 12, 1978, an individual attempted to rob a Home Savings Bank teller, Lettie Pinney, in Albany. The robber handed Pinney a note demanding money, but fled when she passed the note to another teller. Pinney and another customer gave descriptions of the suspect. Prior to this incident on December 5, 1978, the Central Savings and Loan Association, also in Albany, was successfully robbed. Vickie Owens, a teller, received a similar note and handed over money. Neither teller could identify Robinson as the perpetrator. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the Central Savings robbery to prove Robinson’s identity and intent in the Home Savings attempted robbery.

    Procedural History

    Robinson was convicted of attempted robbery in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Robinson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence of the prior robbery was improperly admitted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a prior uncharged crime is admissible to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crime when the evidence linking the defendant to the prior crime is less than clear and convincing.

    Holding

    No, because a trial court abuses its discretion when it admits evidence of an uncharged crime to prove identity based on less than clear and convincing proof that the defendant committed both the prior crime and that the prior crime had a unique modus operandi.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Molineux rule excludes evidence of uncharged crimes unless its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice. When identity is at issue, evidence of a prior crime is admissible only if the modus operandi is unique and there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the prior crime. The Court stated, “To make evidence of a prior uncharged crime relevant, there must be more than a unique method involved, for, as Molineux long ago stated, ‘the naked similarity of *** crimes proves nothing’ (168 NY, at p 316).” The Court emphasized that the probative value depends on showing the method is unique and that the defendant committed the prior crime. Prejudice is a significant concern, especially with heinous crimes. The Court determined that the evidence linking Robinson to the Central Savings robbery was insufficient. No fingerprints were found, and no one identified him. The only link was handwriting analysis, which was contested. The Court concluded that the evidence of the Central Savings robbery was erroneously admitted, requiring reversal and a new trial. The Court emphasized that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law, in admitting evidence of an uncharged crime on the issue of identity on less than clear and convincing proof of both a unique modus operandi and of defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime.

  • People v. Robinson, 36 N.Y.2d 224 (1975): Inventory Searches of Illegally Parked Vehicles

    People v. Robinson, 36 N.Y.2d 224 (1975)

    Police may conduct an inventory search of an illegally parked vehicle after it has been towed, provided the search is not a pretext for discovering weapons or contraband.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, finding that a loaded revolver discovered during an inventory search of his illegally parked car was admissible as evidence. The court reasoned that the police have the right to conduct an inventory search of a vehicle that has been towed after being illegally parked, as long as the search is not a pretext for discovering evidence of a crime. The court also addressed a prosecutorial error during cross-examination but deemed it non-prejudicial in this non-jury trial.

    Facts

    The defendant’s automobile was illegally parked in a bus stop zone. The vehicle was towed to a police pound. During a search of the vehicle, ostensibly to safeguard its contents (an inventory search), a loaded revolver was found in the glove compartment. The revolver was removed, and the defendant was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon as a felony in a non-jury trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that the revolver was seized in violation of his constitutional rights, and that prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search of the defendant’s vehicle and seizure of the revolver violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant regarding prior out-of-state convictions, for which the prosecutor lacked certificates of conviction, constituted prejudicial error.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police may lawfully conduct an inventory search of an illegally parked motor vehicle after it has been towed away, provided the search is not a pretext to discover weapons or contraband.
    2. No, because on the whole record, the impropriety was not prejudicial in this instance, especially since this was a non-jury case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, which established the permissibility of inventory searches of illegally parked vehicles after they have been towed. The court emphasized that “there was no suggestion that this was a pretext search, intentionally conducted with the purpose or expectation of discovering weapons or contraband.” The justification for the search stemmed from the fact that the vehicle had been towed for being illegally parked. The court distinguished pretextual searches, which are impermissible, from legitimate inventory searches conducted to protect the owner’s property and to protect the police from claims of lost or stolen property.

    Regarding the prosecutor’s improper cross-examination, the court acknowledged the error but found it non-prejudicial. The court cited People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 172-173, and noted that in a non-jury trial, the judge is presumed to be less susceptible to prejudice than a jury. The court concluded that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. The court implicitly weighed the evidence of guilt against the potential prejudice from the improper questioning. The fact that the judge, and not a jury, was the fact-finder likely played a crucial role in the court’s determination that the error was harmless. Because this was a bench trial, the judge’s legal expertise was weighed to mitigate the improper cross-examination by the prosecutor.

  • People v. Robinson, 36 N.Y.2d 224 (1975): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Robinson, 36 N.Y.2d 224 (1975)

    To preserve a question of law for review by the New York Court of Appeals regarding a ruling or instruction of a criminal court, a protest must be registered at the time of such ruling or instruction, or at a subsequent time when the court has an opportunity to correct the error.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murder, attempted robbery, and attempted grand larceny. On appeal, he argued that the trial court’s jury charge contained errors, including misstatements of fact and confusing legal instructions. However, defense counsel did not object to the charge or request clarifications during the trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that because no timely objection was made, the alleged errors were not preserved for appellate review in that court. While the Appellate Division has discretion to review unpreserved errors, the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction is limited to questions of law that have been properly preserved.

    Facts

    The defendant was present during an attempted robbery where one of the victims was shot and killed by one of the defendant’s companions. At trial, the defendant admitted his presence but denied knowing his companions planned to commit a crime or that they were armed, and denied any participation. Another victim testified that the defendant cut off his escape route during the robbery attempt. Another witness testified that the defendant and his companion left his apartment earlier that evening, stating they needed money urgently, and that the defendant knew his companion had a gun. The defendant told a detective “they were looking for a prostitute and a pimp to take them off.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing errors in the jury charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unobjected-to error in the trial court’s jury charge is reviewable by the New York Court of Appeals when the defendant claims he was deprived of a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the failure to object to the charge or request further clarifications at a time when the error could have been corrected, means that the defendant preserved no question of law reviewable in the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that its jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited to questions of law, and that CPL 470.05(2) requires a protest to a ruling or instruction at a time when the court could effectively change it. The court noted that counsel for both sides have a responsibility to protect the rights of the parties by calling the court’s attention to correctable errors of law. Here, the defendant’s failure to object to the jury charge at trial meant that the alleged errors were not preserved for review in the Court of Appeals. The Court distinguished the Appellate Division’s broader power under CPL 470.15(1) to consider any question of law or fact, even absent a protest. The Court stated: “[W]e note in this regard that counsel for both sides are not without responsibility in protecting the substantial rights of the parties and that that responsibility extends to calling the attention of the court to errors of law which adversely affect a client at a time when such errors are correctible.” Because the Appellate Division had already affirmed the judgment, the Court of Appeals was constrained to affirm as well, because the alleged errors were not reviewable in the absence of a proper exception or request.