People v. Ricardo, 73 N.Y.2d 224 (1989)

A trial court has the discretion to impanel separate juries for co-defendants in a joint trial when one defendant’s confession implicates the other, and redaction is insufficient to protect the non-confessing defendant’s right to confrontation, provided that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent prejudice.

Summary

Ricardo and Ahrens were jointly tried for criminally negligent homicide stemming from a car accident. Ricardo’s statement to police implicated both defendants in drag racing, but was inadmissible against Ahrens. To avoid a Bruton violation, the trial court impaneled separate juries for each defendant. The Court of Appeals upheld the procedure, finding that while not explicitly authorized by statute, the use of dual juries was within the court’s inherent power to manage trials efficiently while protecting defendants’ rights. The Court emphasized that dual juries should be used sparingly and with careful consideration of due process.

Facts

Mildred Carmen was killed when her car was struck by two vehicles driven by Ricardo and Ahrens. The prosecution alleged the defendants were racing prior to the collision. Ricardo made a statement to an off-duty police officer immediately after the accident requesting the officer’s son not to tell the police they were drag racing. This statement was admissible against Ricardo but not Ahrens.

Procedural History

Ricardo and Ahrens were jointly indicted for second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. Ahrens moved for severance due to Ricardo’s statement. The People opposed severance and requested a joint trial with separate juries for each defendant. The trial court granted the People’s request over defendants’ objections. Ricardo was adjudicated a youthful offender based on the jury verdict finding him guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a trial court is authorized to impanel separate juries for co-defendants in a joint trial when one defendant’s confession implicates the other.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Ricardo’s guilt of criminally negligent homicide.

Holding

1. Yes, because the court’s power to employ multiple juries may logically be implied from the terms of the joinder statutes and is consistent with the general practice and procedure authorized by the Legislature.
2. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Ricardo guilty of criminally negligent homicide for failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his conduct.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that while no statute explicitly authorizes dual juries, the court has inherent power to adopt procedures consistent with general practice authorized by statute. The Legislature’s preference for joint trials, as expressed in CPL 200.20 and 200.40, supports the use of dual juries as a means of avoiding severance. The court found the procedure consistent with the court’s responsibility to administer justice efficiently while protecting a defendant’s rights. The court emphasized this procedure should be used sparingly and with careful consideration of due process. Quoting Judiciary Law § 2-b [3]: “A court of record has power * * * to devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it”.

Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the Court held the People proved more than excessive speed. There was evidence that Ricardo failed to observe a vehicle plainly visible in front of him or take steps to avoid it, and that his failure was caused by engaging in a race with another car on a busy divided highway in a metropolitan area. This, the Court reasoned, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The court explained that criminal negligence requires failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. The inadvertent risk created must be apparent to anyone sharing the community’s general sense of right and wrong.