New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Quinones

  • People v. Quinones, 95 N.Y.2d 349 (2000): Permissibility of Simultaneous Restitution and Mandatory Surcharge

    95 N.Y.2d 349 (2000)

    A sentencing court may simultaneously impose a sentence of restitution to the crime victim and a mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee, consistent with Penal Law § 60.35 (6), until the defendant has actually made restitution.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a sentencing court could simultaneously order restitution to a crime victim and impose a mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee under Penal Law § 60.35(6). The Court held that such simultaneous imposition is permissible until the defendant has actually made restitution. This interpretation favors and encourages payment of restitution to the crime victim while ensuring the state recovers costs for victim services. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding no merit in the defendant’s additional claims.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery charges stemming from two separate incidents. In the first, he and others robbed a taxicab driver at knifepoint, taking $100 and the cab itself. The second incident involved robbing another victim of 25 cents and a stick of gum, also at knifepoint. The defendant’s accomplices pleaded guilty and testified against him at trial.

    Procedural History

    The robberies were charged in separate indictments but joined for trial. After a jury found the defendant guilty on all robbery counts, the County Court imposed prison terms for each conviction. The court also ordered the defendant to pay $100 in restitution to the cab driver and imposed the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee for both robberies. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Penal Law § 60.35 (6), a sentencing court may order a defendant who has not yet made restitution to pay both restitution and a mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of Penal Law § 60.35(6) permits the imposition of both restitution and the mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee until the defendant has actually made restitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court’s reasoning centered on the interpretation of Penal Law § 60.35(6), which states that “where a person has made restitution or reparation pursuant to section 60.27 of this chapter, such person shall not be required to pay a mandatory surcharge or a crime victim assistance fee.” The Court emphasized the use of the past tense “has made,” indicating that the exemption from the surcharge only applies after restitution has been completed. The Court noted that the Legislature could have prohibited the simultaneous imposition of both but chose not to. The Court stated, “The Legislature could have prohibited the imposition of both outright, but instead employed the past tense with regard to the payment of restitution and reparations under Penal Law § 60.27, thus indicating that until restitution has been paid a defendant can be ordered to pay the mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee.” The Court also pointed to Penal Law § 60.35 (4), which provides a mechanism for a refund of the surcharge and fee if they are ultimately “not required” after restitution is made. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to prioritize restitution to victims while also ensuring funding for victim services through the surcharge. The Court acknowledged the split in Appellate Division Departments on this issue, siding with the Second and Fourth Departments’ view. The Court agreed with the Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 60.35 (6), noting the effect is to prefer and encourage payment of restitution to the crime victim.

  • People v. Quinones, 57 N.Y.2d 270 (1982): Admissibility of Evidence and Witness Rehabilitation

    People v. Quinones, 57 N.Y.2d 270 (1982)

    A party cannot claim error on appeal for evidentiary rulings unless a specific objection was made at trial, and a witness can be rehabilitated after an implicit claim of recent fabrication by introducing prior consistent statements.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the defendant’s conviction. The court held that the defendant’s objections to the admission of a taped conversation were insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Further, it found no error in allowing a police agent to refresh her recollection with notes, nor in allowing the prosecutor to rehabilitate the agent after the defense implied recent fabrication. Finally, the court determined that the prosecution’s inability to produce a confidential informant did not warrant reversal, as the informant was not an eyewitness, and their unavailability was previously explained.

    Facts

    A police agent engaged in drug transactions with the defendant. During the trial, the prosecution introduced a taped conversation between the agent and the defendant. The agent also testified, using notes to refresh her recollection. The defense cross-examined the agent regarding omissions in her “buy reports.” A confidential informant, whose identity was known to the defendant, was unavailable to testify.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s objections to the admission of the taped conversation were sufficient to preserve a hearsay argument for appellate review.
    2. Whether it was error to allow the police agent to refresh her recollection using notes.
    3. Whether it was error to allow the prosecutor to rehabilitate the agent after the defense implied recent fabrication.
    4. Whether the prosecution’s inability to produce a confidential informant warrants reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the objections raised at trial were insufficient to preserve the hearsay argument for review.

    2. No, because using notes to refresh a witness’s recollection is permissible, as long as the notes are not offered into evidence.

    3. No, because when a party on cross examination implicitly asserts recent fabrication, the other party can rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony of prior consistent statements.

    4. No, because the informant was not an eyewitness to the drug transaction, their identity was known to the defendant, and the unavailability was explained in a prior trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant’s objections to the taped conversation at trial (that it was “self-serving” and “not in furtherance of any conspiracy”) did not preserve the argument that it was inadmissible hearsay. The court cited People v. Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 720 in support of the proposition that specific objections are required to preserve issues for appellate review. The court further reasoned that it was permissible for the police agent to use her notes to refresh her recollection as long as the notes were not offered as evidence themselves.

    Regarding the rehabilitation of the agent-witness, the Court found that the defendant’s cross-examination opened the door for the prosecution to elicit testimony that the agent had included the defendant’s name in an earlier “buy report”. The court stated that the defense attorney had “opened the door by interrogation as to the omission of defendant’s name from her ‘buy reports’ of October 31, and November 28, 1974.” This allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence showing consistency between her testimony and her earlier reports to rebut the implication of recent fabrication.

    Finally, the Court reasoned that the absence of the confidential informant did not warrant reversal because the informant was not an eyewitness to the drug transactions, their identity was known to the defendant, and the unavailability had been explained at a prior trial. The court does not explicitly state what the explanation for the unavailability was, but this suggests that the prosecution made reasonable efforts to locate the informant.