New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Quevas

  • People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 41 (1993): Foundation Required for Third-Party Identification Testimony

    People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 41 (1993)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 60.25, before a third party can testify about a witness’s prior identification of the defendant, the prosecution must establish that the witness cannot currently identify the defendant based on present recollection.

    Summary

    Quevas was convicted of sodomy and related crimes. The prosecution introduced testimony from a police officer regarding the complainant’s prior out-of-court identification of Quevas. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to lay a proper foundation for the officer’s testimony. Specifically, the prosecution did not adequately establish that the complainant’s inability to identify Quevas in court stemmed from a lack of present recollection, as required by CPL 60.25, rather than other factors such as fear or visual impairment. The court emphasized the importance of establishing the reason for the witness’s failure to make an in-court identification before allowing third-party identification testimony.

    Facts

    The complainant, a 14-year-old, testified that he was sodomized by Quevas and another man. During the trial, the prosecutor asked the complainant if he could identify either of the perpetrators in the courtroom. The complainant repeatedly stated, “Nope.” The complainant had previously identified Quevas to a police officer during a search of the area where the crimes occurred. The defense argued that because the complainant stated that the perpetrator was not in the courtroom (rather than stating he didn’t remember), the police officer should not be allowed to testify about the prior out-of-court identification.

    Procedural History

    Quevas was convicted in the trial court. The trial court allowed the police officer to testify about the complainant’s out-of-court identification. Quevas moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the officer’s testimony was improperly admitted. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution laid a proper foundation under CPL 60.25 to permit a police officer to testify about the complainant’s prior out-of-court identification of the defendant, given the complainant’s explicit denial that the perpetrator was present in the courtroom.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to establish that the complainant’s inability to identify Quevas in court was due to a lack of present recollection, as opposed to other possible reasons, such as fear, visual impairment, or the possibility that Quevas was not the perpetrator.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPL 60.25 requires the prosecution to establish a lack of present recollection before introducing third-party identification testimony. The court noted that the complainant’s testimony was ambiguous and did not definitively establish a lack of present recollection. The court stated, “In order to lay a proper foundation under CPL 60.25 there must be testimony from the witness which establishes a lack of present recollection of the defendant as the perpetrator.” The court also pointed out that the trial court itself had suggested several possible reasons for the complainant’s failure to identify Quevas, including visual impairment and a failure to look carefully at the defendant. Because the prosecution did not establish that the complainant’s inability to identify Quevas stemmed from a lack of present recollection, the court held that the admission of the police officer’s testimony was erroneous. The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations where the witness is afraid to make an in-court identification, noting that here, the reason for the failure to identify was not adequately explored.

  • People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony When Witness Refuses to Identify Due to Fear

    People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993)

    Third-party testimony recounting a witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant is inadmissible under CPL 60.25 when the witness refuses to make an in-court identification due to fear, as the statute requires the witness to be unable to identify the defendant based on present recollection.

    Summary

    Abraham Rodriguez was robbed and identified two of his assailants to police shortly after the incident. However, at a pretrial hearing and subsequent trial, Rodriguez refused to identify the defendants in court, stating he feared for his life. The trial court allowed the police officers to testify about Rodriguez’s prior identification, and the defendants were convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CPL 60.25 does not permit third-party testimony of a prior identification when the witness’s refusal to identify is based on fear, not an inability to recall.

    Facts

    Abraham Rodriguez was robbed by a group of men after leaving a bar. He reported the robbery to the police and, while in a patrol car, identified two men on the street as his assailants. The police arrested the two men. Rodriguez stated that a third man who was with them was not involved. At the time of arrest, one defendant had $70, and the other had no cash.

    Procedural History

    At a pretrial Wade hearing, Rodriguez refused to identify the defendants, citing fear for his safety. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude the police officer’s testimony regarding the prior identification. The defendants were convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding the officers’ testimony admissible due to Rodriguez’s fear. A dissenting judge believed the fear was an improper basis for admitting the testimony. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 60.25, an eyewitness’s refusal to identify defendants because of fear allows the admission of third-party testimony of an identification made by him at the time of arrest.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 60.25 requires that the witness be unable to make an identification “on the basis of present recollection,” and the witness’s fear indicates a present ability to identify, not an inability to recall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that third-party testimony of a prior identification is generally inadmissible. CPL 60.25 provides a specific exception, allowing such testimony only when the witness is “unable at the proceeding to state, on the basis of present recollection, whether or not the defendant is the person in question.” The court reasoned that Rodriguez’s refusal to identify the defendants stemmed from fear, demonstrating that he was, in fact, able to recognize them. The court stated that “By his repeated refusals to identify defendants because of fear of retribution, Rodriguez manifested not an inability to identify these defendants — a neutral fact — but the converse.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where the witness’s inability to identify the defendant resulted from a lapse of time or a change in appearance, which would properly invoke CPL 60.25. The court explicitly declined to extend the application of CPL 60.25 to situations where fear prevents identification, as this would contradict the statute’s clear language requiring an inability to identify based on present recollection.