New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Price

  • People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 403 (2017): Authenticating Social Media Evidence in Criminal Trials

    People v. Price, 29 N.Y.3d 403 (2017)

    To authenticate evidence from a social media profile, the proponent must show both that the printout is an accurate depiction of the website content and that the website is attributable to the defendant; mere appearance of the defendant’s name and picture on the profile is insufficient.

    Summary

    In People v. Price, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained from a social media website, specifically a photograph allegedly depicting the defendant with a firearm. The court held that the prosecution failed to properly authenticate the photograph because it did not establish a sufficient link between the defendant and the social media account from which the photo was obtained. The court emphasized that for such evidence to be admissible, the prosecution must not only prove that the printout accurately represents the online content but also demonstrate that the account belongs to, and is controlled by, the defendant. Without this connection, the photograph lacks the necessary foundation of authenticity and is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, Chris Price, was convicted of robbery. At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce a photograph purportedly showing Price holding a handgun. The photograph was obtained from a public profile on the social media website BlackPlanet.com. A detective testified that she found the profile by searching Price’s surname. The profile used the username “Price_OneofKind” and displayed several photographs of Price. The victim identified the gun in the photograph as “similar” to the one used in the robbery. However, the prosecution presented no evidence to show that Price created or controlled the profile.

    Procedural History

    Price objected to the admission of the photograph, arguing a lack of authentication. The trial court admitted the photograph over objection. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the prosecution laid a proper foundation for the photograph’s admission. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to authenticate a photograph obtained from an internet profile page as a fair and accurate representation of the defendant holding a gun.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the website belonged to and was controlled by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the prosecution failed to adequately authenticate the photograph. The court reiterated the importance of authentication, requiring proof that the evidence is genuine and has not been tampered with. The court noted that in the case of photographs, authentication usually requires testimony that the photograph accurately represents the subject matter depicted. The court acknowledged that authentication methods may vary. Specifically, the court addressed whether a photograph found on social media could be authenticated. Assuming this was possible with proof that the website was attributable to the defendant, the court found the evidence presented – merely the appearance of the defendant’s surname and picture on the profile page – was insufficient. The court explained that the prosecution provided no evidence Price was aware of or exercised control over the profile.

    The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the photograph was sufficiently authenticated by the detective’s testimony about the profile page and the accuracy of the printout, combined with the indicia suggesting that the profile belonged to defendant. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions that have adopted a two-pronged analysis for authenticating evidence from internet profiles: proof of an accurate printout and proof that the website is attributable to the defendant. However, the New York court found the second prong, the link to the defendant, was absent here.

    The concurring opinion by Judge Rivera further emphasized the need for authentication. Judge Rivera clarified that the People’s proof needed to overcome two levels of authentication, demonstrating not only the accuracy of the printout but also that the web page belonged to Price. She agreed that the appearance of Price’s name and picture alone did not establish this link. Without evidence the defendant exercised dominion or control, the photograph was not properly authenticated.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides important guidance for attorneys regarding the authentication of social media evidence. It establishes that, at a minimum, more than the mere appearance of a defendant’s identifying information on a social media profile is required for authentication. Prosecutors and civil litigators must provide stronger evidence demonstrating the defendant’s link to the account. This might include evidence of the defendant’s communications through the account, use of electronic devices associated with the account, or other indicia of control. This case impacts:

    • How similar cases should be analyzed: Authentication of social media evidence requires careful attention to establishing the defendant’s control over the social media account.
    • Changes to legal practice in this area: Attorneys must anticipate needing to present evidence of ownership or control, not just content matching, to authenticate social media materials.
    • Business or societal implications: As social media use grows, this case impacts evidence presentation in an increasingly large number of legal contexts.
    • Later cases that have applied or distinguished this ruling: Other courts will likely use this case to establish a baseline for authentication standards.

  • People v. Price, 14 N.Y.3d 61 (2010): Exceptional Circumstances and Speedy Trial Rights

    14 N.Y.3d 61 (2010)

    The “exceptional circumstances” exclusion to the speedy trial rule requires the prosecution to demonstrate that, for practical reasons beyond their control, they could not proceed with a legally viable prosecution, and it does not apply where the delay is a result of prosecutorial inaction.

    Summary

    Price was charged with attempted disseminating indecent material to minors. After an intermediate appellate court decision made such a prosecution legally untenable, the prosecution paused the case, but did not dismiss it or notify the defendant. After the New York Court of Appeals reversed that intermediate decision, the prosecution moved forward, more than six months after the initial charge. The Court of Appeals held that the time between the intermediate court’s decision and its reversal did not constitute “exceptional circumstances” excusing the delay under CPL 30.30(4)(g), emphasizing the need to discourage prosecutorial inaction and ensure defendants are informed about the status of their cases.

    Facts

    Defendant Price was arraigned on February 2, 2006, on a felony complaint for attempted disseminating indecent material to minors. The charge stemmed from explicit internet conversations with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old, but no sexual images were transmitted.

    Procedural History

    The Second Department held in People v. Kozlow that a conviction for disseminating indecent material requires the transmission of sexual images. The District Attorney, bound by this precedent, determined that Price could not be indicted, but left the criminal complaint pending. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Kozlow, holding that no images were required for a conviction. The People then indicted Price, more than six months after his initial arraignment. The Supreme Court granted Price’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the interval between an intermediate appellate court decision holding a prosecution legally untenable and a Court of Appeals decision reversing that holding constitutes “exceptional circumstances” under CPL 30.30(4)(g), excusing the prosecution’s delay in bringing the case to trial.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was the result of prosecutorial inaction, as the People failed to either withdraw the complaint or seek a continuance, and this inaction does not constitute exceptional circumstances under CPL 30.30(4)(g).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 30.30 aims to prevent prosecutorial inaction. While there is no precise definition of “exceptional circumstances,” the term is limited by the legislative intent to discourage inaction. The exclusion applies only when the People, for practical reasons beyond their control, cannot proceed with a legally viable prosecution. The Court highlighted that the prosecutor could have sought a continuance from the court, ensuring judicial oversight and keeping the defendant informed. Here, the People concede there was no legal basis to proceed after the intermediate appellate court’s decision. The Court stated, “[l]egal rulings are routine events in criminal trials. The fact that a particular ruling may be erroneous does not by itself transform that ruling into an ‘exceptional circumstance.’” While the People were not in control of the appellate court’s erroneous decision, they did have control over the criminal complaint and allowed it to stand, despite the apparent legal impediment. The Court concluded that applying the exclusion here would allow criminal complaints to pend indefinitely based on the mere possibility of a change in the law. The Court acknowledged the potential for unfortunate results where a defendant may benefit from an erroneous appellate decision, but reiterated that speedy trial cases often transcend the specifics of a particular defendant’s guilt, and exist to protect the public interest.

  • People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981): Dog Sniffs and Fourth Amendment Rights

    People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981)

    The use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Leonard Price was arrested after a trained dog alerted police to the presence of drugs in his luggage at an airport. Price argued that the dog sniff was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and thus the subsequent warrant obtained based on the dog’s reaction was invalid. The New York Court of Appeals held that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it does not intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court reasoned that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air. This case establishes an exception to the warrant requirement based on the limited and non-intrusive nature of a canine sniff.

    Facts

    Leonard Price and Carl Parsons were observed at the Los Angeles airport exhibiting nervous behavior and carrying large sums of cash while purchasing tickets for a flight to Buffalo shortly before departure.

    Detective Kaiser, suspicious of their behavior, alerted other officers who brought a trained narcotics detection dog named Frog to the airline’s baggage area.

    Frog alerted to the presence of controlled substances in the defendants’ luggage.

    Based on the dog’s reaction and Detective Kaiser’s observations, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was contacted, who then relayed the information to the New York State Police.

    The State Police obtained a search warrant for the defendants and their luggage.

    After the defendants claimed their baggage at the Buffalo airport, drug enforcement agents stopped and searched them, finding a large amount of heroin in one of the suitcases.

    Procedural History

    Price was indicted on charges related to criminal possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.

    Price moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dog sniff in Los Angeles was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and that the subsequent warrant in New York was therefore invalid.

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

    Price pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air in a public place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy, citing Terry v. Ohio and Katz v. United States.

    While acknowledging that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of closed luggage (United States v. Chadwick), the court distinguished this from the act of a dog sniffing the air surrounding the luggage.

    The court stated, “Since the dog does nothing more than smell the air surrounding the luggage in order to detect odors emanating from that luggage, there was no intrusion or search of the luggage. Defendant must assert a reasonable expectation that the air surrounding his luggage and the odor apparent in that surrounding air will remain private. In such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment affords no protection.”

    The court relied on analogous precedent regarding items in plain view and odors noticeable to the public, noting that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in plain view of an officer lawfully in the position from which he observes the item (Harris v. United States), and that “there can be no reasonable expectation that plainly noticeable odors will remain private.”

    The court cited federal cases that have considered the use of drug-sniffing dogs and concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the air surrounding one’s possessions (e.g., United States v. Fulero, United States v. Venema, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Solis, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court reasoned that “once one releases something into the open air, there can be little reasonable expectation of asserting one’s claims of privacy in either the item itself or in the surrounding air.”

    The court compared the use of a dog to track contraband to the use of dogs to track escaped criminals or lost persons, as well as the use of a flashlight to enhance an officer’s vision (People v. Cruz, People v. Sullivan).

    The court also noted that airline passengers surrender some expectation of privacy by entrusting their luggage to a common carrier responsible for ensuring passenger safety, referencing airport searches (People v. Kuhn, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court concluded that the police acted properly by seeking a warrant to search the luggage after the dog alerted to the presence of drugs (United States v. Chadwick), finding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant based on the defendants’ behavior, the large amount of cash they carried, and the dog’s reaction and training.