New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Prescott

  • People v. Prescott, 22 N.Y.3d 926 (2013): Unwaived Conflicts of Interest in Simultaneous Representation

    22 N.Y.3d 926 (2013)

    An attorney’s simultaneous representation of a criminal defendant and a co-defendant or prosecution witness whose interests actually conflict constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel unless the conflict is validly waived.

    Summary

    Tyrone Prescott appealed his gang assault conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his appellate lawyer also represented Prescott’s co-defendant, Calvin Martin, at Martin’s sentencing. Martin testified against Prescott at trial. At Martin’s sentencing, the same lawyer argued for leniency based on Martin’s cooperation with the prosecution and testimony against Prescott. The New York Court of Appeals held that this simultaneous representation created an actual, unwaived conflict of interest, entitling Prescott to a new appeal. The court emphasized that a lawyer cannot provide undivided loyalty when representing clients with conflicting interests, and failure to disclose the conflict prevents a valid waiver.

    Facts

    Tyrone Prescott was convicted of gang assault.

    Prescott retained counsel to represent him on appeal.

    Unbeknownst to Prescott, this same counsel represented Prescott’s co-defendant, Calvin Martin, at Martin’s sentencing hearing.

    Martin had served as a prosecution witness and testified against Prescott at trial.

    At Martin’s sentencing hearing, counsel argued for leniency based on Martin’s cooperation with the prosecution and his testimony adverse to Prescott.

    On Prescott’s appeal, counsel sought to discredit Martin’s testimony, arguing it was the word of an admitted liar.

    Counsel never informed Prescott that he also represented Martin, nor did he provide the transcript of Martin’s sentencing hearing despite Prescott’s inquiry.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed Prescott’s conviction.

    Prescott moved for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest.

    The Appellate Division denied the writ.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted Prescott leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s simultaneous representation of a criminal defendant on appeal and that defendant’s co-defendant/prosecution witness at sentencing, where the attorney argues for leniency for the co-defendant based on his testimony against the defendant, constitutes an unwaived actual conflict of interest, thereby violating the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because counsel’s conflicting loyalties prevented him from providing Prescott with effective assistance, and because Prescott did not waive the conflict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that an attorney cannot simultaneously represent clients with conflicting interests without a valid waiver. “Simultaneous representation of two clients with conflicting interests means the lawyer ‘cannot give either client undivided loyalty’.” The court noted counsel argued for leniency for Martin based on testimony directly adverse to Prescott, while simultaneously preparing to challenge that testimony on Prescott’s appeal. This created a direct conflict. The court rejected the argument that the conflict was inconsequential because counsel’s representation of Martin ended before Prescott’s appeal was perfected, stating, “[C]onflicts arise even in cases of successive representation because ‘[e]ven though a representation has ended, a lawyer has continuing professional obligations to a former client, including the duty to maintain that client’s confidences and secrets…which may potentially create a conflict between the former client and a present client.’” The court found that because Prescott was not informed of the conflict and did not waive it, the writ of error coram nobis should be granted. The court cited People v. Alicea, 61 N.Y.2d 23, 29 (1983) and People v. Ortiz, 76 N.Y.2d 652, 656 (1990).

  • People v. Prescott, 95 N.Y.2d 656 (2001): Attempted DWI and the Limits of Criminal Attempt

    People v. Prescott, 95 N.Y.2d 656 (2001)

    Under New York law, attempted driving while intoxicated (DWI) and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle are not legally cognizable offenses due to the comprehensive nature of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its specific penalty scheme, which do not contemplate such attempts.

    Summary

    Defendant was found in the driver’s seat of a truck, keys in the ignition, attempting to start it while intoxicated. He was charged with attempted DWI and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The New York Court of Appeals held that these are not legally cognizable offenses. The Court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to create liability for attempted drunk driving, as evidenced by the detailed statutory scheme in Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides specific penalties for various degrees of DWI but lacks any provisions for attempts. Allowing such charges would disrupt this carefully crafted system and create confusion.

    Facts

    Jeffrey Orlando heard noises outside his home and saw Defendant in his truck, attempting to start it with the keys in the ignition. Defendant stated he wanted to use the truck to pull his own vehicle out of a ditch. Orlando believed Defendant was intoxicated. The truck was operable but hard to start, requiring specific knowledge to engage the engine.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed the charges of attempted DWI and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation, relying on People v. Campbell. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that attempted DWI is possible because DWI proscribes conduct, not just a result, citing People v. Saunders. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether attempted driving while intoxicated is a legally cognizable offense in New York.

    2. Whether attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree is a legally cognizable offense in New York.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature did not contemplate criminal liability for attempted drunk driving, given the comprehensive nature of Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its discrete penalty scheme.

    2. No, because like drunk driving, the Legislature did not contemplate an attempted offense under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511, which is part of an integrated statutory scheme with specific and well-defined penalties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that generally, an attempt to commit a strict liability crime is not cognizable if the crime targets an unintended result, but it is cognizable if the crime targets specific conduct. While DWI appears to target conduct (“operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated”), statutory and policy considerations inform the analysis. The Court emphasized the legislative history and the comprehensive nature of Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, enacted to address drunk driving with specific penalties and procedures. “Article 31 emerged as a tightly and carefully integrated statute the sole purpose of which is to address drunk driving.” The statute’s detailed penalty scheme for various DWI offenses indicates that the Legislature did not contemplate a separate crime of attempted DWI. Creating such an offense would lead to confusion, especially regarding appropriate punishments and license sanctions. The Court also noted the broad definition of “operation” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, which encompasses conduct “dangerously close” to driving. Given this broad definition, the Legislature likely saw no need to expand sanctions to include attempted DWI. Regarding aggravated unlicensed operation, the Court found that the Legislature similarly did not intend to create attempt liability, given the specific penalties and well-defined nature of the offense within Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511.

  • People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216 (1985): Forfeiture of Statutory Double Jeopardy Claim After Guilty Plea

    66 N.Y.2d 216 (1985)

    A defendant forfeits the right to challenge a statutory previous prosecution claim under CPL 40.20 by pleading guilty, even if the claim was raised before the plea, but a constitutional double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea if the charge, on its face, is one that the State may not constitutionally prosecute.

    Summary

    Veronica Prescott pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after her motion to dismiss the indictment based on a prior prosecution for criminal possession of stolen property was partially denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that Prescott forfeited her statutory double jeopardy claim under CPL 40.20 by pleading guilty. While a constitutional double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea, the court found that Prescott’s constitutional rights were not violated because robbery and criminal possession of stolen property are distinct offenses requiring proof of different elements. The court emphasized the importance of finality in criminal cases and preventing defendants from benefiting from plea bargains while avoiding admission of guilt.

    Facts

    Lillian Hasten and another woman were robbed in a shopping mall parking lot on July 30, 1979. Later that day, Prescott attempted to use Hasten’s stolen credit card at a department store. Store security detained Prescott, and Hasten’s husband, a police officer, found stolen property in Prescott’s car.

    Procedural History

    1. July 3, 1979: Prescott was charged with fraud, larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, forgery, and criminal impersonation based on the department store incident.
    2. September 6, 1979: Prescott pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in satisfaction of the store charges.
    3. November 2, 1979: Prescott was indicted for robbery and criminal possession of stolen property related to the mall robbery.
    4. Prescott moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 40.20; the motion was granted in part for the criminal possession counts but denied for the robbery count.
    5. Prescott pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the second degree.
    6. The Appellate Division affirmed the robbery conviction, holding that Prescott waived her CPL 40.20 claim by pleading guilty.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant forfeits a statutory claim under CPL 40.20 to be free from further prosecution by pleading guilty, even if the claim was presented to the court prior to the plea.
    2. Whether a prosecution for robbery in the second degree, following a conviction for criminal possession of stolen property, violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a guilty plea represents a compromise meant to end a criminal case, and allowing the statutory claim to survive would undermine the finality of the plea bargain.
    2. No, because robbery and criminal possession of stolen property are distinct offenses, each requiring proof of an element that the other does not.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a guilty plea is a bargain that should bring finality to a criminal case. Allowing a statutory double jeopardy claim to survive the plea would undermine this principle. The court stated that “the plea both waives certain rights attendant to trial and forfeits rights to renew arguments made before a plea is accepted.” It distinguished constitutional rights, which can survive a guilty plea under Menna v. New York, from statutory rights, which are forfeited “when the statute would confer on the defendant greater rights than the Constitution demands.”

    Regarding the constitutional double jeopardy claim, the court applied the Blockburger test, which asks whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The court explained, “The test for determining whether two offenses are the same within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause is whether two distinct statutory provisions each requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” It found that robbery requires proof of forcible stealing, while criminal possession requires proof of possession of stolen property with intent to benefit or impede recovery by the owner. Because each offense has a distinct element, the court held that Prescott’s constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated.

    The court contrasted this case with situations where a specific statutory offense is always a necessary element of a separately charged offense, which would violate double jeopardy principles, citing Illinois v. Vitale. The court observed that this was not the case here. It was noted that concerns about statutory and constitutional double jeopardy violations could be addressed prior to trial by means of an Article 78 proceeding.

  • People v. Prescott, 66 A.D.2d 61 (1978): Preserving Statutory Double Jeopardy Claims

    People v. Prescott, 66 A.D.2d 61 (1978)

    A statutory double jeopardy claim under state law must be raised before or during a guilty plea to be preserved for appellate review; a constitutional double jeopardy claim, however, can be raised for the first time on appeal.

    Summary

    Prescott pleaded guilty in federal court to fraud and subsequently pleaded guilty in state court to attempted grand larceny based on similar conduct. She argued on appeal that the state prosecution was barred by New York’s statutory double jeopardy protections (CPL 40.20), claiming it was based on the same criminal transaction as the federal case. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Prescott did not raise this statutory claim before or during her guilty plea in state court, it was waived and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. However, the Court noted a constitutional double jeopardy claim could be raised for the first time on appeal. The court also found the restitution order exceeded the permissible probationary period and remitted the case for modification of the sentence.

    Facts

    Prescott engaged in fraudulent activity between August and September 1974.

    In November 1976, she pleaded guilty in federal court to fraudulently demanding money using a false instrument.

    Prior to the federal plea, in April 1976, Prescott was indicted in Kings County, New York, for possessing stolen property and altering forged instruments with intent to defraud, stemming from the same period in 1974.

    On January 3, 1977, she pleaded guilty in state court to attempted grand larceny in the second degree in satisfaction of the state indictment.

    She received a sentence of five years’ probation conditioned on making restitution of over $22,000 at $25 per week, which would extend beyond the probationary period.

    Procedural History

    Prescott pleaded guilty to a federal charge in the Eastern District of New York.

    She was subsequently indicted and pleaded guilty in Kings County Supreme Court.

    Prescott appealed the state court conviction, raising a statutory double jeopardy claim for the first time.

    The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statutory claim under CPL 40.20 that one may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based on the same act or criminal transaction is preserved for appellate review when it is not raised prior to or at the time of a guilty plea.

    Whether a restitution order that extends beyond the lawful period of probation is permissible under New York Penal Law article 65.

    Holding

    No, because the statutory previous prosecution claim was waived by appellant’s plea of guilty and therefore has not been preserved for appellate review.

    No, because under article 65 of the Penal Law, restitution may not be ordered beyond the lawful period of probation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between statutory and constitutional double jeopardy claims. It stated that statutory claims, such as those under CPL 40.20, are subject to the usual rules of preservation, meaning they must be raised at the trial level to be considered on appeal. By pleading guilty without raising the statutory double jeopardy issue, Prescott waived her right to assert it later. The court explicitly contrasted this with constitutional double jeopardy claims, which can be raised for the first time on appeal, citing People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1.

    Regarding the restitution order, the court found that the sentencing court erred by ordering restitution that would extend beyond the five-year probationary period. The court noted that the People conceded this point, acknowledging that article 65 of the Penal Law limits restitution to the duration of probation. Therefore, the case was remitted for modification of the sentence to comply with the law.

    The court provided a clear procedural rule: a statutory double jeopardy claim must be raised before or during the guilty plea to preserve it for appeal. A failure to raise it constitutes a waiver. This case emphasizes the importance of raising all potential legal challenges early in the proceedings to preserve them for appellate review. It also highlights the distinction between statutory and constitutional claims in terms of preservation requirements.

  • People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 213 (1985): Defining Separate Offenses for Double Jeopardy Purposes

    People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 213 (1985)

    A prior prosecution under a town ordinance does not bar a subsequent prosecution under state law if the two laws differ materially in scope and purpose, even if arising from the same underlying conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a prior prosecution for violating a town ordinance concerning local wetlands did not bar a subsequent prosecution for violating a state law concerning wetlands, even though both prosecutions arose from the same conduct. The Court reasoned that the two laws differed materially in scope and purpose. The town ordinance protected local interests, while the state law sought to implement a uniform state policy. The state prosecution also involved conduct (altering an area adjacent to a wetland without a state permit) not covered by the town ordinance, justifying separate prosecutions under CPL 40.20(2)(b).

    Facts

    The petitioner, Prescott, was initially prosecuted for violating a town ordinance related to wetlands. Subsequently, Prescott faced a separate state prosecution for violating a state law pertaining to wetlands (ECL 25-0202). The state charge included allegations of altering an area immediately adjacent to a wetland and acting without a state permit. This conduct, while subject to state law, would not constitute a violation of the town ordinance.

    Procedural History

    After the initial prosecution for violating the town ordinance, the state initiated a separate prosecution against Prescott for violating state wetlands law. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision allowing the state prosecution to proceed, and Prescott appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior prosecution for violating a town ordinance bars a subsequent prosecution for violating a state law when both prosecutions arise from the same conduct related to wetlands alteration.

    Holding

    No, because the town ordinance and state law differ materially in scope and purpose, and the state prosecution includes conduct not covered by the town ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing with Justice Margett’s reasoning that the prior town ordinance prosecution did not bar the subsequent state law prosecution. The court emphasized the material differences in scope and purpose between the two laws. The town ordinance was limited to the town’s interest in local wetlands, whereas the state law aimed to implement a uniform state policy across all state wetlands areas. The court noted that the state prosecution included allegations of altering an area adjacent to a wetland, a violation not covered by the town ordinance. Furthermore, the state charge involved acting without a state permit, which also did not violate the town ordinance requiring a permit from the town board. The court explicitly referenced CPL 40.20(2)(b), which authorizes separate prosecutions for separate offenses. The court stated: “[T]he two laws differ materially in scope and purpose. The town ordinance is only concerned with the town’s interest in local wetlands, while the State law, which applies to a much broader area, seeks to carry out a uniform State policy consistent with the ecology of the State wetlands areas in their entirety.” This distinction justified the separate prosecutions.