New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Perry

  • People v. Perry, 67 N.Y.2d 834 (1986): Necessity of Circumstantial Evidence Charge When Evidence is Wholly Circumstantial

    People v. Perry, 67 N.Y.2d 834 (1986)

    When the prosecution’s case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the trial court commits reversible error by refusing a defense request to instruct the jury on the nature and use of circumstantial evidence.

    Summary

    John Perry, a parking lot attendant, was robbed by masked gunmen. Police apprehended the defendant, Perry was unable to identify him, and no direct evidence linked the defendant to the robbery. The defense requested a circumstantial evidence charge, which the court initially agreed to provide but then failed to give. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the robbery case against the defendant was wholly circumstantial, the trial court’s refusal to provide a circumstantial evidence charge was reversible error, warranting a new trial on the robbery counts. The court also clarified that attempted murder in the first degree remains a viable charge in New York, despite the invalidation of the mandatory capital sentence associated with the completed crime of first-degree murder.

    Facts

    John Perry, a parking lot attendant, was robbed by three masked, armed men. The robbers tied Perry up and stole a car from the parking lot. Perry freed himself, flagged down a police car, and identified the stolen car. A high-speed chase ensued, and police apprehended two suspects. The defendant, armed, fled into a housing project and exchanged gunfire with pursuing officers. He then entered an auto repair shop, firing at the owner and an officer. After further pursuit, the defendant fired at officers before being apprehended. Perry could not identify the defendant as one of the robbers. The defendant was charged with attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first and second degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first and second degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, the defense requested a circumstantial evidence charge regarding the robbery counts. The trial court initially agreed but failed to provide the charge and refused to do so when reminded. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case following the Appellate Division’s affirmation.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to provide a circumstantial evidence charge when the case against the defendant on the robbery counts was wholly circumstantial.
    2. Whether attempted murder in the first degree is a nonexistent crime in New York, such that the defendant’s conviction must be reduced to attempted murder in the second degree.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the case against the defendant on the robbery counts was entirely circumstantial, and the defendant requested a circumstantial evidence charge. Refusal to provide this charge was reversible error.
    2. No, because while the mandatory capital sentence for first-degree murder was invalidated in People v. Smith, the substantive crime of first-degree murder, and therefore attempted murder in the first degree, remains viable under Penal Law § 125.27.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Perry could not identify the defendant and no direct evidence connected him to the robbery, the prosecution’s case was “wholly circumstantial.” Therefore, the trial court was obligated to provide a circumstantial evidence charge upon the defense’s request. The failure to do so deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the robbery charges. The Court cited People v. Ford, 66 NY2d 428 and People v. Sanchez, 61 NY2d 1022, as precedent supporting the necessity of a circumstantial evidence charge in such circumstances. Regarding the attempted murder charge, the Court clarified that its prior decision in People v. Smith, 63 NY2d 41, only invalidated the mandatory death sentence for first-degree murder, not the substantive crime itself. As the court stated, “It was the death sentence, not the crime of first degree murder, that we found unconstitutional. Section 125.27 of the Penal Law, therefore, remains viable as a substantive basis for a charge of attempted murder in the first degree.” This clarifies that the elements of first-degree murder, when coupled with an attempt, still constitute a valid crime, even though the ultimate penalty of death is no longer applicable.

  • People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114 (1975): Discretion in Withholding Presentence Reports

    People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114 (1975)

    A sentencing court has discretion to withhold disclosure of presentence investigative reports, provided the defendant is afforded an opportunity to refute aggravating factors that may negatively influence the court.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a sentencing court’s refusal to disclose presentence investigative reports violates a defendant’s rights to due process, confrontation, and effective counsel. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the sentencing process is crucial, the full panoply of constitutional rights does not apply. Disclosure of the presentence report is not mandatory, but the defendant must have the opportunity to refute aggravating factors. The court found that the procedures in place, including the right of allocution and the ability to submit a presentence memorandum, adequately protect the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    Defendant Perry pleaded guilty to criminal trespass after being charged with burglary. At sentencing, his attorney requested to examine the probation report, which was denied. Perry’s attorney then argued for leniency, highlighting Perry’s employment record and minimal involvement in the crime. Similarly, Defendant Ortiz pleaded guilty to attempted coercion. Before sentencing, the court expressed concern about an earlier incident involving Ortiz, which he denied. Ortiz’s attorney also requested to review the presentence report, but this request was denied. The attorney argued for leniency, emphasizing Ortiz’s family and community involvement.

    Procedural History

    Both Perry and Ortiz appealed, arguing that the refusal to disclose the presentencing reports violated their constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals of New York consolidated the appeals to address the common legal issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentencing court’s refusal to disclose a presentence report to the defendant violates the defendant’s rights to due process, confrontation, and effective counsel.

    Holding

    No, because as long as the defendant is afforded an opportunity to present relevant information and the court can reconcile any disparities, the procedures are constitutionally valid; disclosure of presentence reports remains within the discretion of the sentencing court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that sentencing is a crucial stage but held that not all constitutional rights apply. Citing Williams v. New York, the court reiterated that the sentencing process does not require the same level of due process as a trial. The key is whether the defendant has an opportunity to refute aggravating factors that may have negatively influenced the court. The court noted that New York law provides defendants with the right of allocution (CPL 380.50) and the ability to submit a presentence memorandum (CPL 390.40). These procedures allow the court to weigh pertinent considerations. The court emphasized that presentence reports are not compiled in an adversarial context and their main function is to provide the court with the best available information. The court stated, “Whether sentencing is conducted in a fundamentally fair manner in accordance with the constitutional limitations does not depend on the disclosure of the presentence report. There is nothing talismanic about the report itself. The key is whether the defendant has been afforded an opportunity to refute those aggravating factors which may have negatively influenced the court.”

    The court also recognized that nondisclosure might constitute an abuse of discretion in certain instances, particularly where no legitimate public interest is advanced. However, the court found no such abuse in these cases because the sentencing courts articulated the factors relied on and permitted extensive discussion by the defendants and their counsel.