New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Pagan

  • People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 365 (2012): Appealability of Probation Modification Orders

    People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 365 (2012)

    A direct appeal does not lie from an order modifying the conditions of a sentence of probation; the proper method for challenging such an order is a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

    Summary

    Defendant Pagan pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon and received a sentence of jail time and probation. The Department of Probation later sought to modify the conditions of his probation to include warrantless home searches. The Supreme Court granted a modified request, allowing “knock and announce” searches. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the modification order was not directly appealable under the Criminal Procedure Law. The Court stated that judicial review must be sought via a CPLR article 78 proceeding, such as prohibition, to challenge the court’s power to modify the probation conditions.

    Facts

    Jorge Pagan pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. In June 2008, he was sentenced to six months in jail and five years of probation, pursuant to a plea agreement. More than three months later, the New York City Department of Probation applied to the court to enlarge the conditions of Pagan’s probation under CPL 410.20 to authorize searches of his home during his probationary term. Pagan opposed the application, arguing that the court lacked the authority to modify the conditions of probation to include warrantless home searches.

    Procedural History

    In January 2009, the Supreme Court granted the application, modifying the conditions of probation to permit the Department of Probation to conduct sporadic “knock and announce” searches of Pagan’s home at reasonable hours when he was present. Pagan appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed. A dissenting Justice granted Pagan leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can appeal from an order modifying the conditions of a sentence of probation.

    Holding

    No, because no appeal lies from a determination made in a criminal proceeding unless specifically provided for by statute, and CPL article 450 does not authorize a direct appeal from an order modifying probation conditions. However, judicial review may be sought in a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by emphasizing the principle that appeals in criminal proceedings are statutory creations, and absent specific authorization, no appeal lies. The Court analyzed CPL article 450, which governs the appealability of orders in criminal proceedings. CPL 450.10(2) allows a defendant to appeal from a “sentence,” as prescribed by CPL 450.30(1), which, in turn, allows appeals based on a sentence being “invalid as a matter of law” or “harsh or excessive.” However, CPL 450.30(3) specifies that an appeal from a sentence under CPL 450.10(2) can only be from the sentence originally imposed or from a resentence following an order vacating the original sentence.

    The Court reasoned that the January 2009 order modifying the conditions of Pagan’s probation did not fit either statutory category. It was not the sentence originally imposed, nor did the court vacate the original sentence and impose a resentence. Instead, the court altered the conditions of probation pursuant to CPL 410.20(1), which authorizes a court to “modify or enlarge the conditions of a sentence of probation.” Therefore, the modification order was not a “sentence” within the meaning of CPL 450.30(3), precluding a direct appeal. The Court stated, “[W]e cannot apply a more expansive interpretation just because we think it is a good idea, especially when an adequate legal remedy aside from a direct appeal [is] available.”

    The Court highlighted that Pagan could have brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition to challenge the modification of the conditions of his sentence of probation on the ground that the court lacked the power to modify as it did. The Court directed the Appellate Division to dismiss the appeal, as neither the Appellate Division nor the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain it.

  • People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012): Claim of Right and Mistake of Fact Defenses in Robbery

    People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012)

    In a robbery case, a defendant’s claim that they mistakenly believed the property they were taking was theirs is equivalent to a claim of right defense, and neither defense is permissible where the defendant used force to take fungible currency.

    Summary

    Debra Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree after an altercation with a cab driver over change. Pagan argued that she mistakenly believed the money she was trying to take from the cab driver was rightfully hers. The New York Court of Appeals held that, in this context, Pagan’s “mistake of fact” defense was indistinguishable from a “claim of right” defense, which is not a valid defense when force is used to take money, especially fungible currency, even if the defendant honestly believes they are entitled to it. The court emphasized the risk of violence inherent in such situations.

    Facts

    Debra Pagan hailed a cab, stating she only had $4, though the minimum fare was $6. The driver agreed to the lower amount. Upon arrival, Pagan gave the driver a $1 bill and a $20 bill, later claiming she was owed $17 in change, despite the driver returning the $1 bill. Pagan then demanded the $20 back and offered $4 from the $16 in change to the driver, who refused, stating she was paying him with his own money. The cab’s security locks were activated, preventing Pagan from leaving. When the driver said he would take her to the police, she put the $16 on the console. As the driver headed to the police precinct, Pagan tried to grab the $16, scratching and biting his hand. She then brandished a knife and demanded the money. Police officers intervened, arresting Pagan.

    Procedural History

    Pagan was indicted on charges including attempted robbery. At trial, she requested a jury instruction on mistake of fact, arguing she believed the money was hers. The trial court denied this, giving instead a negative claim of right instruction. Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a mistake of fact jury instruction.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in giving a negative claim of right instruction to the jury.
    3. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because under these facts, the mistake of fact defense is equivalent to a claim of right defense, which is not permitted in robbery cases involving the use of force.
    2. No, because the negative claim of right instruction was proper under the circumstances, as the money at issue was fungible currency.
    3. Yes, because the jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant did not have a good faith belief that the bills she tried to take were hers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that robbery involves “forcible stealing,” and while a claim of right is a defense to larceny, it is limited in robbery cases due to the risk of injury. The court stated, “Forcibly taking the property of another, even when one honestly believes it to be one’s own property ‘entails the risk of physical or mental injury to individuals’”. In Pagan’s case, her claim that she mistakenly believed the money was hers was equivalent to a claim of right. The court emphasized that a mistake of fact defense, like a claim of right defense, does not apply when force is used to take money to satisfy a preexisting debt. Regarding the negative claim of right instruction, the court noted that currency is generally considered fungible, and therefore, a defendant cannot have a true claim to specific bills unless they have unique characteristics. The court distinguished this from taking a specific chattel, like a painting, where a good faith belief of ownership might negate larcenous intent. The Court found that the evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Pagan knew the money was not hers and was attempting to take it by force. The court reasoned that the People disproved the defense by presenting evidence that Pagan negotiated a $4 fare, tried to pay with the driver’s change, scratched and bit the driver, and produced a knife.

  • People v. Pagan, 93 N.Y.2d 514 (1999): Defining ‘Immediacy’ in Robbery Cases

    People v. Pagan, 93 N.Y.2d 514 (1999)

    The determination of ‘immediacy’ between a larceny and the use of force, which elevates the crime to robbery, is a factual question for the jury, even if there’s a time gap between the taking and the threat.

    Summary

    Pagan was convicted of robbery, grand larceny, and other offenses for acting as a lookout while his accomplice stole from a sleeping man on the subway. The victim awoke and demanded his property back, at which point the accomplice threatened him. The critical issue was whether the threat occurred immediately after the taking, as required for robbery. The Court of Appeals held that ‘immediacy’ is a question of fact for the jury, and the jury could reasonably conclude that the threat was immediate, even if there were some discrepancies in witness testimonies regarding the exact timing.

    Facts

    Gavilanes was sleeping on a subway car. Postigo stole Gavilanes’s property while Pagan acted as a lookout. Gavilanes woke up and approached Postigo to demand the return of his property. Pagan warned Postigo of Gavilanes’s approach. Postigo threatened Gavilanes with physical force to retain the stolen property. Pagan and Postigo were arrested. The arresting officer, Darge, testified at trial, as did Gavilanes.

    Procedural History

    Pagan was convicted in the trial court of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and several lesser offenses. Pagan appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the threat occurred immediately after the taking, a necessary element for robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Pagan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that Postigo threatened Gavilanes immediately after the taking of his property, thereby satisfying the ‘immediacy’ element required to elevate the crime from larceny to robbery under Penal Law § 160.00(1).

    Holding

    Yes, because the question of immediacy in this case is an issue of fact for the jury. A jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence presented that the threat of force occurred immediately after the larceny.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that ‘immediacy’ is a factual question for the jury to decide, similar to determining whether the defendant threatened the “immediate use of physical force” or whether a homicide occurred in “immediate flight” from a felony. The Court noted that in determining the legal sufficiency of evidence, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the People’s favor, and a jury can accept some and reject other pieces of evidence. Here, the jury could reasonably conclude from Gavilanes’s testimony that Postigo used the threat of force to retain the stolen property, and from Darge’s testimony that the confrontation occurred within minutes of the larceny and in Pagan’s presence. The Court further stated, “Even if the gap between the taking and the threat were longer, as defendant insists, the question whether one immediately succeeded the other would remain an issue of fact, and it cannot be said here, as a matter of law, that the threat was not immediately made.” The court found no merit to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983): Determining Accomplice Status for Corroboration Requirements

    People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983)

    A witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence, that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts or conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law in the intentional murder of James Amico, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The defendant argued Destino was an accomplice because of his involvement in the earlier assault and attempted robbery of Amico. The Court held that Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law to the murder because the evidence did not conclusively link him to the intentional murder itself; his car loan was ostensibly for taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. Additionally, the murder was a separate crime from the initial robbery and assault, as the facts constituting the murder were distinct.

    Facts

    Destino was involved in the initial assault and attempted robbery of James Amico. Destino provided his car, purportedly to transport Amico to a hospital. Later, Destino learned that others had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal. There was a significant time interval between the assault and the murder. The agreement to use Destino’s car appeared to be for a different purpose than murder. Destino participated in removing bloodstains from his car after the murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder. The defendant’s attorney moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People’s case, arguing Destino was an accomplice as a matter of law, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law to the intentional murder of James Amico, thus requiring corroboration of his testimony under CPL 60.22.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not conclusively establish that Destino participated in the intentional murder or in an offense based on the same facts or conduct as the murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPL 60.22, a witness is an accomplice requiring corroboration only if the evidence reasonably leads to the conclusion that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts. The court found no direct connection between Destino and the intentional murder, other than the use of his car. The court emphasized that the car was provided under the pretense of taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. The court distinguished this case from People v. Cona, where there was an ongoing criminal enterprise. Here, the robbery and assault were separate incidents from the intentional murder. The court stated, “Nothing connects Destino to the intentional murder other than the use of his car. As to that, the only evidence adduced is that the car was provided so that Amico could be taken to a hospital, and that it was not until four hours later that Destino learned that the others…had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal instead of taking him to the hospital.” The court also cited Grunewald v. United States and the ALI Model Penal Code to support the argument that Destino’s act of cleaning bloodstains did not make him an accomplice. The court concluded that the facts and conduct involved in the robbery attempt and assault were distinct from those constituting the intentional murder, therefore Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law.

  • People v. Pagan, 45 N.Y.2d 725 (1978): Permissible Encouragement vs. Coercion of Jury Verdicts

    People v. Pagan, 45 N.Y.2d 725 (1978)

    A trial court may encourage jurors to adhere to their oaths and make one final effort to review the evidence and reach a verdict, but it must not coerce or compel the jury to reach a particular verdict.

    Summary

    After five hours of deliberation, a jury was unable to reach a verdict. The trial judge gave a supplemental charge encouraging them to renew their deliberations. Approximately 90 minutes later, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The defendant appealed, arguing that the judge’s supplemental instructions were coercive. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the judge’s approach was not ideal, the instructions did not amount to impermissible coercion because the judge simply asked the jury to exert its best efforts and renew deliberations without singling out jurors or threatening them.

    Facts

    The jury deliberated for five hours without reaching a verdict.

    The trial court instructed the jury that the case was simple compared to others, some of which last months, but that the jury was expected to come to a verdict.

    The court noted that sometimes juries cannot reach a verdict and that a deadlock had occurred recently in a more involved case.

    The court urged the jury to renew deliberations and to “make every effort possible to arrive at a verdict.”

    Approximately one and a half hours later, the jury returned a guilty verdict.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial.

    The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s supplemental instructions to the jury were impermissibly coercive.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s supplemental instructions to the jury, given after the jury announced it was unable to reach a verdict, were impermissibly coercive.

    Holding

    No, because the trial judge simply asked the jury to exert its best efforts and renew deliberations. The judge did not impermissibly single out jurors for noncompliance with the majority, nor were any jurors improperly threatened.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a trial judge must not coerce or compel a jury to agree upon a particular verdict, citing People v. Faber, 199 N.Y. 256, 259. The court stated that supplemental charges which prod jurors through prejudicial innuendoes or coerce them with untoward pressure to reach an agreement will not be countenanced.

    However, the court also recognized that a trial court may properly discharge its responsibility to avoid mistrials by encouraging jurors to adhere to their oaths and make one final effort to review the evidence and reach a verdict, citing People v. Faber, supra, p. 258.

    The court distinguished the present case from cases where the supplemental charge was found to be coercive. The court found that the trial judge in this case simply asked the jury to exert its best efforts and renew deliberations. The judge did not single out any jurors, threaten them, or suggest that the jury would be forced to continue deliberations indefinitely without communication. The court noted that the defendant’s general objection was unsupported by a timely request for an additional charge.

    The court emphasized that while the trial judge’s approach may not have been ideal, it did not cross the line into impermissible coercion.